Thus, we have no way whatsoever to know if NK has dismantled completely or not, which means it will ALWAYS keep at least a couple of nukes.

A question is whether NK can feel safe enough with a system of strategic ambiguity —- "did we keep a few that work? or not?" —— or if it feels it needs to be more bold and say, "We have them." then later "maybe not" then later "We have them" as it has for the past few years.

If I were NK, and I viewed the rest of the world as I currently do, I would settle for the ambiguity – little hints here – little leaks there —- rather than the more bold, usual NK style of pissing on agreements before they are really dead (completely) by doing something bold like testing a nuke or shooting off an ICBM.

NK's military is going to continue to deteriorate.

But, I doubt its stockpiles of WMDs and artillery would be deteriorating anywhere nearly as much as those elements of the military that require warm bodies and fuel and material.

If that is true, then it will continue to have a very good deterent – enough of a deterent to prevent the US from making very big moves, and the nukes would just be icing on the cake with cherries on top.

And either NK knows now or will learn in the next 10 years that —- with its buried nukes —- and its staying so close to collapse —–
——it will be able to squeeze China and South Korea probably enough to get what it needs to survive.

It is a gamble.

China probably doesn't fear that the WMD and nuke arsenal can really do damage to them if the North begins to implode and decides to take people out with it.

China could probably decided Japan and South Korea and then the US would pay the price of a NK collapse, and that would up set the global and regional economy, but who is to say China wouldn't come out better in the long run with those three competitors being hugely preoccupied with a NK disaster?

Yes, China fears a refugee crisis. Yes, China would not want to lose influence in the northern half of Korea. So, China will probably want to keep NK alive.

But, if any nation in the mix is in a better position should the worst happen, it is China.

And China doesn't like being pushed around or blackmailed.

I think the US should avoid cutting any deal that requires the US to put foward any material aid that is more than a token for initial, real moves by Pyongyang. And we should demand it takes more than NK allowing in a tiny amount of nuke inspectors to inspect just one nuke facility.

We should make NK show a real move to open up – which it won't – and then we should wait for the North to collapse and push it in that direction through some rather unsophisticated covert pressure (pumping info into the North and trying to line up regime traitors as well as grassroots opposition).

It is dangerous.

NK collapsing is dangerous.

But, it is the only solution to secutiry in the region.

The watchwords for this installment of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing are “optimism” and “caution.” The North Korean negotiator in Beijing, Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan (a.k.a. the “smiling assassin”), has helped perpetuate this: …