Korea on the Brink is the title.

On page 126 of the google version (127 on the printed text), it mentions May, leading up the Kwangju Massacre, as witnessing student riots along with “massive labor unrest in urban areas such as Masan, Pusan, Inchon, and Seoul.”

I can vaguely remember specific references to violent protests involving miners in the Wonju area - but can’t remember the specific time.

The page goes on to mention demonstrations in Seoul on May 17th.

Wickham specifically claims that the Seoul protests sent Chun into a panic.

I read a little further then came here to comment.

None of this is offered as an excuse for the actions of the special forces unit and certainly not Chun. I thought commuting his death sentence was the right thing to do — solely because I think South Korea has advanced too far as a nation to execute a former president - even if he deserved it.

I would guess on what the parameters you place on “this time” - because there was a lot going on in different places in Korea before Kwangju. I don’t have the books handy, nor the time to find them, and I don’t have the timeline well in memory, but Masan, Wonju, Pusan, Teajon and Seoul come to mind. I also remember in the US Amb’s book, he noted the violent protests that had been going on as far back as the lead up to Park’s assassination - which did produce an immediate lull in activity. The Amb. says that one reason why the US in Korea was slow to appreciate the events in Kwangju is that violent protests had become common but nobody expected the scope of the Kwangju violence.

I also vaguely remember, and could be wrong, that the special forces were in Seoul in part due to protests that had been going on there. Or was it fear of protests at the universities???…

Whatever the case, from what I’ve read, I don’t think you can say that things were quiet before Kwangju.

Also interesting is the fact that the normal chain of command was ignored. When the commander of the 31st division was ordered to send the 7th brigade downtown, he replied that it wasn’t necessary, that the police could handle it. Told to pass on the order, he found that the troops were already marching. The orders were coming straight from the top, and the commander was actually lied to and told, at the end of the day, that the protests had been put down. When friends from Kwangju called him and told him what had happened, he gave orders to the 7th brigade to stop being so excessive, but these orders were not followed. When you consider 12 out of 22 of the soldiers killed in the uprising died from battles with other units, it makes sense when you realize the chain of command wasn’t being followed, and officers on the ground had no idea where the other troops (and their were many more than the paratroopers after the 21st and 22nd) were.

This information comes from “Memories of May 1980: A Documentary History of the Kwangju Uprising in Korea”, by the way.

The actions of the military after the main couple of days of bloodshed are much easier to defend - and it becomes much more clear that the younger and more pro-North elements of the protest leadership took over that leadership and wanted further bloodshed/deaths to take place.

Chun is not close to being a positive or even neutral character in my book. He led a military coup to continue the strong-armed, authoritarian rule that finally came into question with Park’s assassination. He short circuited the democratic process before that process had a chance to get going. Ultimately, he was a traitor to his government and people. The fact he stashed away massive amounts of money for his own personal use just adds a cherry on top.