Bing West is a well respected military writer, especially for his recent books in regards to the war in Iraq. However, until recently I haven’t read the first book he wrote, The Village
Bing West’s first book The Village
Prior to this US military units had been regulated to staying on their large bases and allowing local security forces to deal with the Viet Cong. The local security forces were not strong enough to provide security against the North Vietnamese supported Viet Cong on their own and thus the VC had de facto control over many areas of South Vietnam. The US Marines felt that by embedding Marines with the local security forces that were known as PF’s (Popular Forces) they would together be strong enough to stop the insurgency.
West’s book describes in great detail the experiences of a squad of twelve of these Marines that were selected to embed with PFs in the village of Binh Nghia. The PFs in the village had been regulated to barricading themselves on a small hill outside the village because the VC had become so strong that they risked death if they came out at night from their hill top garrison. Once the Marines arrived in the village things began to immediately change.
Combined Action Platoon and Popular Forces standing in front of their patrol base in the village of Bihn Nghia.
The Marines made a fortified patrol base which also served as a local government center in the village. Here the Marines and the PFs lived together and patrolled together to secure the town. West was a member of the squad he describes in the book but doesn’t insert himself into the story. He just simply describes what happened in great detail with the squad of Marines. The great detail he uses to describe the lives of both the Marines and the Vietnamese people that they lived with is so great that you begin to feel a connection with the characters and life in the village. This connection makes it feel even more tragic when characters die in the book protecting the village from the Viet Cong.
Life in the village as described by West is really interesting for those interested in Korea. That is because the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army forces were deeply involved in village life. You often hear about how effective a fighting force the Korean soldiers sent to fight in the Vietnam War were, but Bing West has lass then flattering things to say about the ROK Army during the time period he was in Vietnam. This should not surprise anyone familiar with Korea but the ROK Army was closely tied to a blackmarketing ring that was supplying off post clubs and business with products bought from the US military PX outlets. The ROK Army in Vietnam was given PX privileges and they used this privilege to make money.
The ROK Army moved into Quang Ngai province in 1966 where Binh Ngia village is located.
It was actually quite amazing to read about how the Koreans had set up the same ville economic model used for American GIs stationed in Korea for American GIs stationed in Vietnam as well. West writes in one passage:
Nuoc Man was a twisted congestion of ramshackle wooden, thatch and tin huts flung up on either side of highway one. Stocked by Koreans, it was a typical boomtown which catered to the American units. Business was brisk and boondock prices high: cold Cokes were 75 cents, bundles of laundry $1.50, girls $3. [pg 311]
This sounds just like any ville you would find in Korea. Just like in Korea, the US military was powerless to do anything to stop it:
In the town of Bihn Son PX goods, liquor, narcotics, medicinal supplies, American cigarettes, silk, and prostitutes were being sold. The Americans could not take action because Binh Son was in a Korean sector, and the Vietnamese officials did not want to act because they were getting rich. [pg 326]
West also tells the story about how one American lieutenant colonel tried to do something to end not only the blackmarketing but to stop the corruption in the deliveries of material from the US AID agency. Over 50% of the US AID supplies were being looted by corrupt officials who were making a fortune. Since the local Vietnamese government officials were making a fortune from the Korean blackmarketing and the US AID corruption they had no intention of stopping it and put huge pressure on the US commanders to remove the lieutenant colonel. The senior commanders in the area finally decided to remove the commander when it was found out that the Koreans had put a hit out on him to get him removed for meddling in their blackmarketing operations. This is the level of detail Bing West gets into in regards to village life and the parts about the Koreans involvement in it are fascinating.
Korean soldier on patrol in Vietnam.
Not only does West do a great job describing the character and village life but he also describes in the most detailed ways on how the Marines conducted their day to day joint patrols with the PFs. It was literally a cat and mouse game the Marines played with the Viet Cong in order to secure the village because it was so hard to determine who the real enemy is when the Viet Cong doesn’t wear a uniform and often time made accommodations with both the Koreans and the local government that made further identifying of the VC difficult. That is why establishing security through constant patrolling and building relationships with average citizens in the village was so critical to the Marines’ success.
After early setbacks against the VC the Marines’ dedication to staying in the village and securing the people despite these setbacks began to have a cumulative effect on the perceptions that the villagers had of the Marines. As time went on the villagers began to think of them less of a foreign military presence and more of being one of them. Additionally the training the PFs received from the Marines and the confidence building gained through multiple defeats of the Viet Cong allowed the PF’s to eventually begin to assert their authority over the town and they began to take on more and more of the security requirements.
The Marines eventually went two and half months with no contact because the VC had moved away from the area because their resources and manpower had been seriously depleted by the Marines and their Popular Forces allies. This lull in contact caused the decision to remove the Marines from the village 17 months after they had arrived. The US military command had decided that the PFs were now strong enough to hold the village on their own despite the PFs and the people of the village wanting the Marines to stay. Whether or not the PFs held the village on their own you will need to read the book to find out.
Bing West on right with Popular Force commanders.
However, everything in this book should sound very familiar to people who have been following events in Iraq closely. The counterinsurgency strategy implemented by General David Petraeus is nearly identical to what the Marines used during the Vietnam War. Instead of being called CAP’s, the embedded teams today are called MiTT’s (military transition teams) and the Popular Forces are now called “The Sons of Iraq”. Like in Vietnam, the counterinsurgency strategy has had great success in Iraq. When reading this book I couldn’t help but think that once again we as a military are reinventing the wheel.
Likewise reading this book also brings home a lot of ideas about how the US military must avoid mistakes in operations today that were made in Vietnam such as the corruption in regards to the US AID agency, the poor local governance, and US allies with ulterior motives. In regards to mistakes this is something else I liked about the book is the fact that West does not label any of these incidents as mistakes. In the book he just simply describes what happened and provides little to no opinions. He leaves readers to make their own decisions based off what he saw. The mistakes listed above are simply what I believe are good lessons to be learned for operations today, others reading the book may draw out different opinions.
Bing West in Iraq with his son Owen who is also a US Marine.
Bing West also does not get into the politics of the Vietnam War either, but when reading about the success of this squad of Marines in this one village you can’t help but think what could have been if the counterinsurgency strategy had been implemented across the board from the start of the war? The book really makes you rethink everything you thought you knew about the Vietnam War almost as much as B.G. Burkett’s Stolen Valor
As it is, West has done a great job remembering the actions of the Marines who lived and died to protect this one Vietnamese village. If it wasn’t for this book no one except the Marines and the Vietnamese people that lived in Binh Nghia village would even remember what happened there. For those that read the book you will see that the village does remember what happened there to this day and I’m glad Bing West wrote this great book so the rest of us could remember them as well.
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Note: You can read more reviews and purchase The Village
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12:28 pm on June 4th, 2008 1
Didn’t get to Ton San Nhut very often, but whenever I did and had a chance to go to the BX (don’t know why, because I rarely bought anything) the Korean soldier was always somewhere around asking to change MPC for dollars or to buy stuff in the BX. I always ignored them, despite thier constant pleas. It was just one more thing that you had to put up with at the time. It was well known the Koreans were into the black market big time.
2:25 pm on June 4th, 2008 2
I can only speak for the Danang area. The biggest black market came from the USO and and commissioned officers who had influence with it. Troops would hump the boonies for 30 days, come in for 2 days rest, go to the USO and order something from a catalog, pay, go back out and never see the product arrive. Almost all packages, red cross etc. sent to Vietnam for the troops never made it to post. Stolen and sold as they were taken off the ship. The PX was a crooked as a snake - could not even by a comb or a candy bar. The limited items for sale were double priced. At least in 1971 ROK personnel were not allowed inside the PX. Can’t speak for earlier years. The PF, for the most part were a bunch of untrained, undiciplined teenagers who were given M-16s in a program that was suppose to make their town (village) secure. How many of these same weapons were used against US forces? Vietnam was a contrast of some of the best soldiers in history, most drafted, lead by the worst commissioned officers in history.
4:43 pm on June 4th, 2008 3
Gerry and Pete thanks for your excellent insights. It is sad to hear how corrupt the USO and Red Cross was back then. Very unfortunate you guys got treated so poorly back then.
Fortunately when I was in Iraq the care packages from average Americans and various organizations were getting to us. We had more toothbrushes, shaving cream, razors, tampons, etc then we knew what to do with because people kept sending them to us. My unit was all male so we no use for tampons but we eventually found a good use for the tampons though to put in the M16 muzzle to keep sand out of them.
9:46 pm on June 4th, 2008 4
“It is sad to hear how corrupt the USO and Red Cross was back then. Very unfortunate you guys got treated so poorly back then.”
Any of this in the book? Guess not. Only Koreans were into black marketing. Right. Gotcha.
10:17 pm on June 4th, 2008 5
Bing West wrote the book after he came back from Vietnam. The Marines lived in a Vietnamese village with no USO, Red Cross, or a PX. Plus the comments left by Pete and Gerry are from different time frames then when Bing West was there.
I mentioned in the posting the corruption of the US Aid agency which Bing West saw because they operated in coordination with the local Vietnamese government in the area West was stationed.
Your attempts to claim an anti-Korean bias by Bing West are really quite pathetic. He simply explained what happened in the area he worked in which as the facts show the ROK Army was extremely corrupt.
10:55 pm on June 4th, 2008 6
” Only Koreans were into black marketing. Right. Gotcha.”
“were” Yes and stil are.
There are no black markets in Japan selling US goods. None anywhere besides Korea. So, I guess you are right for once Tommyboy.
7:49 am on July 6th, 2008 7
GI Korea, i know i’m really late with this but… i needed some more clarification of what you said:
“Like in Vietnam, the counterinsurgency strategy has had great success in Iraq.”
I’m not a soldier, so I really don’t know what you mean by this. Are you saying that training Popular Forces was the success in Vietnam like training Iraqi Army is a success in Iraq? Or are you referring to something in the book that you have not mentioned?
I’m not really sure what success you are paralleling. What I want to know is what exactly do you think was done in Vietnam that had US done more comprehensively, would have won the war–far as counter-insurgency–and what you think the US needs to do to win the current war in Iraq?
8:14 am on July 6th, 2008 8
Virtual wonderer. From my perspective the counterinsugency ended after TET of 68 when the VC came out in droves to “free the people”. It backfired as the majority of the people still did not want communism, did not join the “uprising of the people”, and the VC were decimated. As far as Iraq, we have already won. Nothing needs to change other than more US combat troops coming home. That will probobly be sooner rather than later. The Iraqi army is past the tipping point and can take over the security of its own country as it is in the process of doing already. If you would like the current “order of battle” for the Iraqi army go to “The Long War Journal”. They have posted it numerous times as it is being updated as well as the best reporting of the war. Very in depth. The comments are first rate as well.
8:28 am on July 6th, 2008 9
Thank you for the link info, i’ll look into that.
I’m just curious, I have often heard, but don’t really understand the saying, “TET offensive was a tactical blunder for the Viet Cong, but a strategic victory as it reduced American willingness to stay in Vietnam.”
Now, if Viet Cong guerilla/terror capacity was severely crippled after TET… how did US still lose? It’s hard for me to imagine US would lose conventional battles against the NVA…
8:43 am on July 6th, 2008 10
The US didn’t lose conventional battles, nor the war. A combination of anti war protests, draft resistance and protests along with the media turning against the war all made the war untenable for politicians. As they say, when the going gets rough, politicians run as fast as they can. If you remnember, when things looked bad in Iraq last year, politicians did the same thing again. Anyway, Nixon was elected president on his secret plan to withdraw US troops. (It was basically just withdraw US troops). In return the US was to train and support the South Vietnamese with weapons and air support as necessary. A few years after US troops were withdrawn, congress saw fit to cut off funds and any further military support for the South Vietnamese. The NVA who had been rebuilding, invaded and the rest is history.
10:53 am on July 6th, 2008 11
virtual wonderer, if you read the book you can see how successful the Marines were in training the PF’s and they were eventually able to hold their own against the VC.
They were successful enough that the VC had to launch the Tet offensive to discredit the security gains the American military and government were highly touting at the time. The Tet Offensive was a tactical disaster for the VC because there numbers were greatly decimated in the offensive’s aftermath. However, strategically it was brilliant because it allowed anti-war types to claim that the government was lying to them and that the security gains were not true and the war is hopeless.
In Iraq you see the same thing going on. Petraeus is training the “Sons of Iraq” just like the Marines trained the PF’s however, Petraeus is doing it on a much wider scale then what was done in Vietnam. It took the Marines 17 months to have success with the PF’s which is nearly identical to the time it has taken Petraeus to have success with the “Sons of Iraq”.
The improved security has allowed the Iraqi military time to train and now they are launching military operations of their own to take out the last remaining bad actors such as Al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army and other criminal gangs.
The US military has been trying to keep expectations down as much as possible by saying security gains are “reversible” and it only takes one car bomber to create a perception of instability, etc. They are doing this because the US commanders know the bad actors in Iraq may try to mass the forces for one big Tet style offensive before the US election in order to influence the vote. There rank and file numbers may be devastated but if it gets the US to elect Obama to pull the troops out immediately then it doesn’t matter.
The Iraqi forces have made huge improvements in training but are still dependent on the US for artillery, air strikes, and logistic support because they have not developed those abilities yet and will take years of training and buying of needed equipment to gain those capabilities. Artillery, air strikes, and logistics among other critical skills is not something easily acquired and will require US military help for the next few years until they can do it for themselves.
The big thing to remember is that the Iraqi army is becoming less dependent on the US military for infantry help which is where casualties happen. That is why the US death toll is dropping because the Iraqi army is taking on more of the infantry work. Next year I fully expect troop cuts. I suspect Petraeus doesn’t want to announce any troop cuts this year because it could be interpreted as a political move on his part to help McCain. Any troop cuts should be announced after the election in order not to appear to be political on Petraeus’ part. Remember he needs to work with Obama if he needs to get elected and appearing to be helping McCain before the election is not going to help his position to make sound military policy in an Obama administration. So far I think Petraeus has done a good job staying out of the political fight and hopefully it stays that way.
Anyway as recommended before the Long War Journal by Bill Roggio is what you need to be reading. There is not a better analysis of what is happening in both Iraq and Afghanistan then on LWJ. I have pretty much quit reading MSM reports because the information is just so poor (television is even worse) and just read LWJ and a few other professional sites such as Small Wars Journal to get real information about what is going on.
9:22 am on July 23rd, 2008 12
8:13 pm on November 23rd, 2008 13
Please mention what you may know of RoK commanders interrogating vietcong. Thanks
8:56 pm on November 23rd, 2008 14
We had an american interrogator where I was at, but he was a small beady eyed intellectual type who seemed to enjoy the job and had been at it for a number of years. I suspect he was well educated (considering the airmen I was used to). He had his own little office. Only saw him a couple of times, and never at work.
11:04 pm on November 23rd, 2008 15
“The US didn’t lose conventional battles, nor the war. A combination of anti war protests, draft resistance and protests along with the media turning against the war all made the war untenable for politicians.”
As Gen Giap stated in an interview with an American war writer (Harry Summers, I believe)…”It is a moot point…” we left in disgrace and COMMUNIST Vietnam is now in charge.
As far as Iraq…we can do all of the surges, etc., but the fact remains that once we leave in force Al Qaeda will take right over. The current Iraqi military is a Farce (not a force) and they have & will continue to capitulate in the face of the enemy.
Sure, we have put out plenty of press releases, etc. that all is going good, but people on the ground know better.
Notice how there is heavy debate amongst Iraqis on ratifying the current agreement of US pullout, etc.???
9:21 am on November 24th, 2008 16
CALMSEAS,
Thats not what I am hearing about in Iraq. Most of the remaining fighting is being done by the Iraqis. And while more training and support is still required they appear to be standing up quite well.
The only time the Iraqi military had a problem, was in Basra when a very green unit was sent in, in a hurry, and several hundred of them threw down their arms. The arrival of the 1st Iraqi Division from Bagdad rapidly turned the situation around. The Iraqi Army did well in Basra as well as other Iraqi units in Sadr city and the surrounding countryside.
I would not compare the situation to Vietnam when the Vietnamese military was mostly conscript and did not want to fight a well trained, heavily armed foe. The Iraqi military is all volunteer, well trained, well led, well equipped, and receiving more equipment every day, and has shown a willingness to join the battle.
Wether or not Iraq can handle a democracy is the big unknown. I am not so sure the people and culture are made for democracy.The Iraqis may, in fact, do better under a dictator or strongman rule.
At this point in time if the US leaves or is forced out, the government may collapse. It is still fragile and most members of government appear to see others as their enemy, rather than fellow legislators. If that happens, it will be the generals who step in, not Al Qaeda. Any uprisings I suspect would be brutally put down. Then a return to strongman rule.
But that would be an Iraqi issue and not a US issue, as the US would be gone or in the process of doing so. I doubt congress would want to get reinvolved. “A moot point, and a loss?”. I’m sure some would see it that way. However, as in Vietnam, the US military upheld its end of the bargain.
10:01 pm on November 24th, 2008 17
Site is messing up, so here is the condensed version of my earlier post:
Iraqi Generals are mere puppets & will cut & run at the first sign of trouble when the US is not backing them up…i.e. Basra.
Do Not believe all of the reports be passed around by CENTCOM…of course they have to put a positive spin ojn it.
10:29 pm on November 24th, 2008 18
The reports I have seen have been from “The long War Journal” on the web. Their independent journalist, Bill Reggio(and web site owner) was there in Basra and giving the day by day account of what was actually happening.
I believe he was the first to report the British staying out of the fight as well as after five days he had yet to see a major news media reporter, yet they were all reporting as if they were on the scene.
Bill Reggio also did indepth followups on exactly what happened with the green recruits as well as how much better the 1st division reacted to the battle compared to the year before when it had to move into Bagdad. He pursued the reporting so well that the MSM had to call it an Iraqi win instead of the fiasco they were trying to portray. (At least thats my opinion)
The fighting continued for several weeks after the MSM lost interest,(no American blood) as the Iraqi army cleared the neighborhoods one by one, including the worst of the worst. Many Iranian weapons were found and a significant number of Sadrs followers were killed.