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Due to the on going US beef protests, the long chain of anti-US protests, as well as the underlying anti-Americanism prevalent in Korean society, many people have advocated for the immediate withdrawal of USFK. The immediate withdrawal of USFK is something easier said then done. Listed below is my list of reasons why I believe an immediate pull out of USFK is not practical and thus will not happen anytime soon. Take note that my list is no particular order of importance. Also this is my own personal opinion so do not take it as any indication of what the USFK command thinks on this issue. Take it for what it is worth and feel free to debate it in the comments section.
Korean Economic Impact – Despite all the rhetoric no matter who is in charge of the Blue House, they will do everything possible to keep USFK in its present configuration. USFK is a massive gravy train for the Republic of Korea. Much money is made both legally and illegally from the USFK presence in Korea. First of all you have all the jobs that Korean workers hold on USFK bases which is an example of money made legally from USFK. You also have all the businesses outside the camps that are another example of legal ways money is made from USFK.
Blackmarketing, illegal gambling, golf course scams, gate scams, housing scams, shady contracts, etc. are examples of illegal means that Koreans are making millions off the USFK presence in Korea. There is way to much money to be lost that in today’s economic climate in Korea cannot be replaced if USFK pulls out.
This is one of the main reasons why the ROK government will try and stop the USFK relocation to Camp Humphreys. More camps mean more jobs and more black market economic opportunities to further drain money from USFK. By consolidating on Camp Humphreys that means less Korean jobs and easier monitoring of the blackmarket economy with consolidated PXs and commissaries.
Impact on Foreign Investment – With Korea already hurting for foreign investment a loss of USFK would create another major shock to Korean attempts to draw international investors. Think about if you were going to invest your money in Korea, wouldn’t you feel better if your investment was insured by the US military presence in the country?
Korean Defense Spending – Currently the Korean government gets state of the art military capabilities courtesy of the USFK presence in their country for the small USFK upkeep fee they pay every year that mostly goes to pay the salaries of Korean workers anyway. The Korean government has been able to put off paying the full amount to pay for their own defense for decades and are eager to keep things that way.
Loss of Korean Political Influence in Washington – For a country considered a middle power around the world Korea’s has an inflated importance within Washington then a nation of its size and stature should have because of the US-ROK alliance. Korea has one of the few four star commands in the US military with the USFK commander having direct access to senior policy makers in the United States. Losing USFK would also mean a huge loss in political influence in Washington which the Korean government does not want.
Moderating American Reactions to North Korea – The Korean government knows that as long as American troops are hostages to a counterattack by North Korea the United States it is very unlikely the US will ever conduct a bombing attack on North Korea. The 2ID and even soldiers on Yongsan are easy targets for a North Korean response and this tends to moderate American reactions to North Korean brinkmanship. This is one of the main reasons why the ROK government doesn’t want the USFK transformation to happen. By consolidating troops on Camp Humphreys which is outside the North Korean artillery range, an American military response to North Korean brinkmanship is a greater possibility.
Logistics – Just to physically move all of USFK’s equipment off the peninsula will take probably a couple of years. When 2nd Brigade, 2ID deployed to Iraq it took them three months to get all their equipment and personnel shipped off and this was with the aid of rest of the people in the division. There are only so many trains and port space available thus only so many units can transport equipment to the port at one time that will also delay the process of physically moving equipment off the peninsula. Then you add in the fact that the Korean government will do everything possible to further delay work at the port. It will simply take a significant amount of time to get everything through the port.
Lack of Unit Space in the US – Related to logistics is the fact that 27,500 soldiers that are currently in USFK plus their families would need a post back in the US that has room for them to redeploy to. When 2BCT redeployed to Iraq I knew guys that were living in rented college dorm rooms because Ft. Carson didn’t physically have room for them yet. The post hadn’t anticipated the soldiers being posted at the facility in order to build enough barracks for them.
In the US you have units coming back from overseas that are living in squalor, ghetto like conditions because they are a waiting for units to deploy overseas in order to take their barracks space. This is caused by the growth of the military, base closings, as well as the prior force cut backs in Korea and the major force cut backs in Germany.
Additionally next year there will be force cut backs in Iraq in some form, McCain declaring improved security or Obama declaring defeat, either way US soldiers will be coming home and they need a place to live as well. The US military needs to physically make facilities to house and properly service the soldiers they have in the US now and the ones due back from Iraq before it can find room for 27,500 soldiers in Korea.
Camp Closeout Procedures - If USFK was to pull out all the camps currently occupied all the camps would need to be cleaned and inspected before redeployment. Having personally been involved in the closeouts of smaller camps in Uijongbu I can tell you this process took about 4-6 months for smaller camps to get done. I can only imagine how long it will take to get a huge installation like Yongsan inspected and handed over.
Political Apathy in Washington – The fact of the matter is that very few politicians back in the US know much of anything about Korea. Much of their perceptions of Korea is based off the US-ROK alliance that was forged in blood during the Korean War. There have been few politicians in Washington that “get it” in regards to Korean affairs and Congressmen Henry Hyde was one of them before he past away.
Despite all the other issues with Donald Rumsfeld, in regards to Korean affairs he was another guy that understood Korea very well. Rumsfeld as part of his larger global strategy wanted USFK to become more expeditionary and was the driving force behind the USFK relocation plan. When the Korean government balked at the relocation plan Rumsfeld pulled 2nd Brigade, 2ID from Korea with little forewarning to let the Korean government know he was serious about the transformation. The removal of 2nd Brigade is what began the USFK transformation. However, once Rumsfeld resigned from office the Korean government a week later reneged on the deal and the delay games that is preventing the USFK transformation is continuing to be played until this day.
Power of the Status Quo – For anyone to tackle all the issues I have listed above it would take extraordinary dedication and effort to do so that would need to be maintained over a number of years until the pull out of forces from Korea is complete. For many political leaders, putting forth the multi-year effort necessary to withdraw USFK is simply too much work with little political payoff, so why bother trying?
In regards to USFK you have a military unit comprised mostly of people there for one year and then going home. They to have little incentive to undertake a long term project in regards to the withdrawal of USFK. The ones who have spent a long time in USFK and work to change things are often offset by those who have been in Korea a long time themselves and actually benefit from keeping the status quo the way it is. Thus it is difficult to create change in USFK.
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There are a few other smaller issues I can think of in regards to pulling USFK out of Korea but these are the main ones that would need to be addressed that clearly show that withdrawing USFK would require a multi-year effort. Since such a thing isn’t going to happen anytime soon that is why I think the US government should continue to strongly push for the USFK consolidation on Camp Humphreys. The consolidation is an opportunity for USFK to cut troop numbers along with reducing the force footprint in the nation along with being in a better strategic position in regards to North Korea.
The ROK government is going to continue to do everything possible to delay the relocation. President Bush announced in April a delay in troop cuts that were anticipated as part of the Camp Humphreys relocation and he should use that as a bargaining chip in regards to the Camp Humphrey relocation. In due time those troop cuts should be restarted anyway and get the USFK force strength down to 25,000 servicemembers as planned.
Additionally I believe USFK should move units piece meal to Camp Humphreys. USFK should focus on building one unit area at a time on the expanded Camp Humphreys and fill it with soldiers currently stationed on Yongsan. Build another unit area and fill it with more soldiers from Yongsan. Physically moving people from the most visible US military presence in Korea will send a signal to Korea at large that the US is serious about the move. If the Korean government continues to play delay games (ie- the cost sharing and camp pollution issues) then serious consideration should given in regards to removing 2ID completely from the peninsula. This would be a shock to Korean society even greater then when 2nd brigade was withdrawn that should be enough to get the Korean government moving on the relocation of US forces to Camp Humphreys.
What the relocation plan is doing is creating conditions for a slow motion of withdrawal of forces from South Korea. There are already plans being considered that would move the Eighth Army headquarters from Korea to Hawaii that would further reduce US troops on the peninsula. There has been talk in the past of reducing the Air Force footprint in Korea as well. With the ROK military receiving easier access to purchasing US military equipment a time line should be developed in regards to them buying capabilities followed by further US troop cuts.
This may not be the answer people want to hear, but I just don’t see a complete USFK being practical any time soon. However, USFK troop and footprint reductions are definitely possible and is something USFK vigorously working towards making a reality.
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4:59 am on July 4th, 2008 1
GI Korea,
We have had this debate before, and I still contend that withdrawing USFK is much more of a political challenge than a logistical challenge.
- The OIF surge resulted in far more people and equipment being moved in a much shorter period of time than you suggest. And if the ROK Government intentionally tried to disrupt the transportation lines of communication and stall a withdrawal, you would have a situation tantamount to hostage taking. This is where the other instruments of US national power would come into play and force the ROKs to give in.
- The CONUS home-basing issue is only an issue if you try to move USFK as units instead of individuals. When VII Corps deactivated in Europe, units did not return as whole units. They were deactivated in Europe, and the soldiers who did not RIF were then dispersed throughout the rest of the Army. While no single installation could absorb 27,000 redeployees from Korea, that number could be absorbed across DoD’s entire infrastructure.
5:22 am on July 4th, 2008 2
The surge forces were not additional units sent to Iraq but were units that were sent a few months earlier then expected. Plus those units did not have to close down camps and had multiple port facilities to use if they needed to ship their equipment or just fell on equipment already in theatre.
The logistics of moving equipment and closing out all the camps in USFK in my opinion through personal experience will be long and time consuming. It took 4-6 months to close out the western corridor camps and then division focus moved to closing out the Uijongbu camps and Camp Nimble in Dongducheon. It was a year long process to get those camps and units closed out. Now imagine replicating that on all camps and Air Force bases on the peninsula?
When the politics and logistics are combined it will take a multi-year effort to get USFK out of Korea and I don’t see anyone with the will power in Washington to want to take that on. That is why I believe the USFK transformation plan is the next best option.
7:15 am on July 4th, 2008 3
The first thing I noticed was that Korea seems to have far more compelling reasons to maintain USFK. On the US side, the reasons are either short-term logical obstacles or longstanding inertia. Nowhere in your list is a single reason reflecting the interests of the American people or the US as a whole. As you noted, Korea is not on the US radar, so if there is any reduction or withdrawal, it will probably be part of a greater global change.
8:28 am on July 4th, 2008 4
I agree that a total pull out is not in the cards but that doesn’t mean we can not make our feelings known.
1. We can accelerate the Camp Humphreys relocation and reposition other units according to military as opposed to political need. This will put us in a better position to deal with the nutters up north while sending an unmistakable message to the politicians.
2. A lot of the anti-Americanism is allowed to flourish because the Korean political and American military leadership does not want to deal it. So they don’t giving the bad guys a blank check. As the current round of rioting demonstrates, standing up to these clowns will not be cost free but a long hot summer that leads to something better can tolerated.
3 One source of the problem is a Korean national media that perpetrates some rather outrageous fraud. From fan deaths to cows gone wild there has to be a way to hold these clowns to account.
12:46 pm on July 4th, 2008 5
Korean Economic Impact — The point of the illicit activities making the biggest impact to the local economy is not it. It is the close out of the camp towns. Starting two years ago, many of my longtime Korean friends started having big time money troubles as the curfews/changing USFK attitudes hit the economy up there. Their fear is what will happen when the camps go? The ROK thought well great we’ll just make it open for industry — re, LMB’s latest gambit. Only trouble is that Roh tried this low-key selling point when he couldn’t stop the LPP closures — and no major industry in the ROK wanted to bite. For whatever reasons, economic, logistical or psychological, no one seems ready to rush up to Paju to fill the void of the loss of the USFK to the local economy.
POLITICAL APATHY: I believe that for the most part, GI Korea’s assessment of this is true of the GENERAL PUBLIC. However, I believe the political insiders hold the position that the US should leave Korea. Historically, the political groups have wanted the US out of Korea starting in 1949 — BEFORE THE KOREAN WAR. After the Korean War ended, the US stayed because it needed to protect JAPAN — the cornerstone of its democracy movement for Asia. (Don’t get me going on why the US never made a SOFA agreement until after the fall of Syngman Rhee…) It never has and never will love staying in Korea — it only has been a political expediency because there simply is no place else to go based on the past nuclear umbrella scenario — and closure of our bases in the PI. Under present US military programs, the ROK is NOT the best place to be as the ROK does not support the US global positioning strategy. A movement to the US and Guam will fulfill the needs and still support the defense of Korea. BOTTOMLINE: I believe that both the Democratic and Republican parties — behind closed doors — support the removal of US forces from Korea just as they have in every Democratic and Republican administration since the end of the Korean War. The politicians have not been apathetic — there just were no good options in the defense of Northeast Asia other than remaining in Korea.
There’s a lot more, but I agree with GI Korea that it will be a slow process.
12:56 pm on July 4th, 2008 6
CAMP CLOSURE PROCEDURES DEALING WITH POLLUTION: The USFK has it right — IT’S NOT MY PROBLEM!!! The SOFA was renegotiated in 1990 and the ROK in not wanting to pay more money allowed the ORIGINAL provision that the bases upon return were to returned AS IS. The US in 1991-1992 opened working-level groups to appease the push for environmental programs but never changed the SOFA. The USFK cleans up its PCBs and cleans up to the “imminent danger” pollution, then departs.
BOTTOMLINE: US says, “Here’s the base.” The ROK says, “I WILL NOT ACCEPT IT BACK.” US says, “Bye.”
1:03 pm on July 4th, 2008 7
The problem is that once a deal has been made between the USA and Korea. The Koreans get their part up front and then when it comes time to pay, then they want to renegotiate.
The Korean side is dishonest.
6:38 pm on July 4th, 2008 8
Sonagi yes the Korean peninsula isn’t nearly as strategically important to the US as many Koreans think it is.
Kalani in regards to Korean economic impact I lumped both on post jobs, off post businesses, and blackmarketing all into one category because all of it is linked. I don’t think one is more important then the other because of their links.
As far general public apathy I agree. Most Americans cannot find Korea on a map. I still remember when first came down on orders to go to Korea and my buddy back home told me to enjoy the islands.
However, I am willing to bet many politicians cannot find Korea on a map either. Plus there is a big Korea lobby in DC to keep pulling the wool over the eyes of the politicians to keep the gravy train going.
As far the pollution issue the US is on the right side of this issue but do you think the anti-US groups that will show up and raise hell will care?
7:12 pm on July 4th, 2008 9
“I am willing to bet many politicians cannot find Korea on a map either”
Its easy, just find Japan, and everyone in the world knows where Japan is, then look for the rabbit shaped land mass across from the Sea of Japan.
Just kidding GI Korea. You are right. Korea is not important enough for anybody to know where it is.
3:46 am on July 5th, 2008 10
Start pulling out slowly with out letting the snappers see it being done . Fly out the equipment and to hell with depending on the Korean ports. Just fly a few peices out at a time slowly and that will allow the guys on the receiving end to prepare and make room for hardware and people. Then guwala were gone. HEHEHE kinda sneaky but I think its already being done anyways. Move us back into the PI I think that would be a good stagic move for the US.
Cheers
Mike
6:46 am on July 5th, 2008 11
7:03 am on July 5th, 2008 12
Like Sonagi and other posters noted. The U.S. has virtually nothing to lose while Korea has everything to lose if a pull out were to occur. Which is exactly the reason that Korea by no means should ever indicate that the U.S. ought to behave itself when it comes to negotiating with Korea. I’m not saying that Korea needs to be “put in it’s place”, but the anti-American sentiment needs to stop and Koreans need to be told that they are the ones in the begging position, not the U.S.
4:01 pm on July 5th, 2008 13
It may be a corrct statement that a lot of Americans know little about Korea. However, fewer folks know about the cost/benefits of overseas American bases.
It seems it is cost effective to have American bases overseas for several reasons. First, the countries where the bases are pay a portion (varies with country) of the cost to keep the troops in the country. Second, most countries where we have troops stationed also purchase arms (the sale of arms is very competitive worldwide)and weapons systems from American counties. Hopefully, other American products are also introducted and bought in countries where Americans are stationed.
Third, the containment theory requires oversease bases. If we did not have bases here/there other world powers might. Other benifits include deployment training, etc., and even geography lessons for those Americans who join the military and think every country outside the US is an island.
12:58 am on July 6th, 2008 14
I challenge the premise behind your list, Pete, namely that our national security requires a large military force and long-term, expansive global military presence. Which countries are we containing? China? Modern China’s global interests are very different from those of the Soviet Union. China itself isn’t very communist. It seeks not military or ideological allies but energy and markets. I don’t see how maintaining US forces in Korea and Japan will aid us in our competition with China for shrinking oil supplies and it sure as hell isn’t reducing the federal budget deficit or improving our trade balance.
5:21 am on July 6th, 2008 15
Pete, most of the money the Korean side pays for USFK upkeep goes to paying civilian workers who are mostly all Korean because of the way the SOFA agreement is written and also to pay for maintaining and constructing new barracks and facilities which once again is nearly all Korean workers. Japan by comparison pays much more of the real costs of keeping US forces in Japan where Korea pays much less to keep the gravy train going.
As far as weapons we want the ROK Army to buy more US weapons so they can begin to take responsibility for certain capabilities the US is currently providing for them. Their arms sales status was recently upgraded in order to allow them to buy more US weapon systems which of course they will delay and delay doing so in order to keep USFK in place as long as possible.
I see little to no strategic value for the current US bases in Korea. Their was at one time strategic value but not any more. In fact having US bases in Korea hampers are own ability to respond to North Korea because of 2ID currently being held hostage to a North Korean response.
I agree with Sonagi that trying to view the rise of China through the prism of the Soviet Union is incorrect. China is going to compete against the US economically and for energy supplies compared to the Soviet Union which was about gaining territory and spreading their ideology.
5:51 am on July 6th, 2008 16
Pete sounds like a VANK plant.
8:22 am on July 6th, 2008 17
I find this list funny. Not because I disagree with them, but it fails to mention the most important and obvious reason. US presence assures superior national security.
3:10 pm on July 6th, 2008 18
Sonagi “It seeks not military or ideological allies but energy and markets.” This statement lends support to my position.
GI “Their arms sales status was recently upgraded in order to allow them to buy more US weapon systems which of course they will delay and delay doing so in order to keep USFK in place as long as possible.” More support for my position - at least they are not delayking the purchase of weapons from China.
Shattered “a VANK plant” Not sure what this is so I will consider it support for my position.
Actually it really does not matter how I see things - the powers to be already have long term plans developed by people a lot smarter than I am. However, if there were no troops in Korea we could not be having these meaningless conversations.
3:40 pm on July 6th, 2008 19
Made in China is whats on the labels that I see, Samsung, Sony and GE. Cheap labor equals, keep it going, but don’t fire any bullets.
Korean protests are not nation wide.
10:53 pm on July 6th, 2008 20
“I see no strategic value for(sic)U.S. basese in Korea…In fact(sic)U.S. bases in Korea hampers our own ability to respond to North Korea because of 2ID currently being held hostage to a North Korean response.”
So according the logic you’re deploying here then GI, the United States should begin an alacritous withdrawl of all military personnel in Iraq in order to have a more unencumbered hand in dealing with Iran.
It’s pretty obvious, after all, that the reason the United States can’t unilaterally bomb Natanz or engage in other more militarily aggressive operations is because should the U.S. do so, the Iranians would literally unleash a far more furious response against U.S. troops than what they are currently engaged in right now.
2:14 am on July 7th, 2008 21
Please clarify how maintaining 70,000 US troops in Japan and Korea facilitates our acquisition of global energy supplies and opens markets to our exports.
3:25 am on July 7th, 2008 22
No need for any clarification Sonagi. You’re correct to argue that deploying sizable garrisons in Japan and Korea does nothing in facilitating America’s access to energy supplies nor does it contribute to America’s overall energy security.
However, what you seem to be implying is that the current forces presently in Japan and Korea should then therefore be diverted to places where the U.S. can more effectively compete against the Chinese in order to gain access to energy supplies(i.e. Nigeria, Chad, Sudan and a other nations in Central Asia).
This notion is misguided at best. If the U.S. wants to strengthen its energy security in the near and long term future, the best policy would be for the United States to finally push through a comprehensive national energy policy. Such a policy would include investment in searches for alternative energies and public transportation, a gas tax to discourage profligate consumption, a raising of corporate average fuel economy(CAFE) standards, and most importantly an end to nonsensical zoning policies that force Americans to drive needless distance in order to engage in basic social and economic activities.
7:15 am on July 7th, 2008 23
When it comes time for the blockade-enforced oil embargo of China because… uh… their unchecked pollution is causing Global Warming, we will be very happy to have regional air superiority and ground forces to back them up.
8:39 am on July 7th, 2008 24
Gaetano, the eployment of US troops in Iraq is vastly different from the deployment of US troops currently in Korea as you well know.
It would have better to say using your logic the US should start pulling its troops out of Korea in 1955, five years after the start of the Korean War which is where the US is at today in Iraq.
10:13 am on July 7th, 2008 25
“…the eployment(sic)of US troops in Iraq is vastly different from the deployment of US troops currently in Korea…”
Correct GI. The reason for the deployment of US forces in Iraq and Korea, respectively, is different. In the case of Korea, the United States initially went in with full and meaningful international support in order to combat a real and serious threat. In the case of Iraq, the US went in with what was essentially a joke in terms of international support against an “enemy” that turned out to have been no real threat at all. (And please spare me all the usual bullshit doublespeak about how Saddam really was a threat and how the invasion wasn’t and excercise in unilateral aggression. Really, it’s an excercise in delusion.)
My comments, however, weren’t about the reasons in which U.S. troops are garrisoned in each country. No, what I’m trying to get you to understand is the EFFECT that such deployments have on U.S. foreign policy.
If you’re able to recognize the fact that having US troops stationed near a hostile North Korea can in effect limit and proscribe the options of the US in terms of actions in can take against North Korea, then why is it so difficult for you, GI, to recognize the same effect that US troops stationed in Iraq are having vis-a-vis our policy toward Iran?
11:02 am on July 7th, 2008 26
Yes, it is misguided, but I was not implying at all that the US should divert its military resources. In fact, I wrote this in an earlier comment (boldface added):
I challenge the premise behind your list, Pete, namely that our national security requires a large military force and long-term, expansive global military presence.
I am actually sympathetic to growing Chinese energy needs. We consume far more per capita, than the Chinese, who have 1.3 billion people to support. We can and should make reduced consumption a priority.
I see your point, Gaetano. We are still struggling with insurgents in Iraq and Iran could interfere more directly if we were to launch a military strike.
12:59 pm on July 7th, 2008 27
Please muzzle your howitzer #25, you don’t have to take b.s. doublespeak pot shots if you want to stray off topic into Iraq. By the way, you seem to have forgotten Saddam’s unilateral aggressions into Iran and Kuwait in your snapshot assessment of conflict in SW Asia.
1:01 pm on July 7th, 2008 28
Pete’s cost/benefit:
Cost: US citizens pay for salaries, assets, movement, service-persons’ lives (blood & treasure).
“First, the countries where the bases are pay a portion (varies with country) of the cost to keep the troops in the country.”
Benefit: 2nd country pays for portion of cost of maintenance.
“Second, most countries where we have troops stationed also purchase arms (the sale of arms is very competitive worldwide)and weapons systems from American counties.”
Benefit: Arms sales equating to millions and introduction of American goods (commercial), ie, Pepsi and Fubu, also potential millions.
“Third, the containment theory requires oversease bases. If we did not have bases here/there other world powers might.”
Benefit: Stop other potential powers from establishing foothold.
“Other benefits include deployment training, etc., and even geography lessons for those Americans who join the military and think every country outside the US is an island.”
Benfit: education, joint training.
Pete, I think most of the benefits can be accomplished without the use of the military. You’re talking about sales. Our companies and defense contractors can produce superior products and can work out deals with the prospective governments without establishing a military presence.
Also, for joint training exercises, is it necessary to have a base locally? How about an inter-government agreement? Why not use space at the local military’s base? It really makes the exercises realistic when deployed to a tent or ship instead of a barracks with xDSL.
As far as the containment policy (Truman doctrine?) goes, who cares? Troops in Korea - are we containing China? Troops in Germany, are we containing France? (ahahahhahaha) Troops in Saudi Arabia - containing UAE? We defeated the evil Soviets. There’s no one left. Rising powers? So what. If someone else thinks it’s good to have a base in another country, let them. Let them deal with all the negatives that we’ve had to face (costs, protests, etc).
Finally, to address your first benefit, I can not even see how the initial and continuing costs can even compare to what the other nation contributes.
The costs of continued overseas bases is too high. Not only is it un-Constitutional (no declared war), but we weaken ourselves. There’s less troops to protect our borders, there are more places for our enemies to attack, we increase resentment in the local population, money better spent is wasted in maintaining bases that do not affect our national security. If China invaded North Korea, shouldn’t the local governments be the ones to react? Let Japan, Russian and SK deal with that. Must we continue to be the world’s policeman? How often our sacrifices go unremembered. American soldiers should protect Americans and only go to war when war is declared or when the President gives the 90 day go order.
The benefits, on the other hand, of a humble foreign policy [few or no bases overseas] are innumerable.
Just to name a few:
Less or our blood lost on other peoples’ problems.
More money for domestic programs, if necessary.
Paying off our debt.
Increased border security.
More soft power and influence.
2:34 pm on July 7th, 2008 29
Gaetano, you need to read your Korean War history because the US intervened in Korea before any UN resolution was ever passed. The resolution that was passed many scholars have debated the legality of it because it was approved without the consent of the Soviet Union which was boycotting the UN at the time. If the Soviet Union had not done a boycott the resolution would have never passed because they would have vetoed it.
The US ground invasion of the country was done with no international forces. The closest thing the US received of international support was from Aussie aircraft that were conducting missions over Korea from their base in Japan. US forces invaded the country and eventually formed the Pusan Perimeter and follow on Incheon Landing with no international assistance. It wasn’t until the Chinese entered the war did UN forces get involved in combat. If the Chinese did not get involved in the war the international forces would not have even seen any combat.
Compare that to the Iraq War where the US coalition had a UN resolution and more international participation then the US had in the Korean War. During the Korean War 15 countries sent combat forces and five more sent medical teams. Total international troops that served during the Korean War was 135,124.
The US coalition in Iraq has had 39 countries send troops and I couldn’t find a total number of troops that have rotated through the theatre but when each country’s peak troop strength is added together it comes out to 68,998. (If anyone knows the actual number please post it.)
You figure these nations have been rotating people which means the number of soldiers who have served in Iraq is actually much higher and probably at least equal to or greater then the Korean War number. Plus unlike the Korean War three nations, the UK, Australia, and Poland participated in the initial invasion. The argument about the lack of international forces aiding the US in Iraq is a very weak argument when compared to the Korean War.
Your comment is suggesting the US should have pulled out of Korea in 1955 before the ROK institution of government were strong enough to repel a North Korean attack. No matter what anyones opinion was about Truman getting the US involved in the war in the first place, at the time everyone knew letting South Korea collapse was not an option.
I am going to continue to maintain that the Iraq War is at best as big as a mistake as the Korean War. If you think the Iraq War is a mistake then the Korean War was as well. I am going to write a separate posting on this topic to clarify some of my points because I am getting tired of repeating myself on this issue.
3:13 pm on July 7th, 2008 30
From all that I have read it seems to me we are building up our strenght in the Pacific/Asia theater rather than removing it. We are increasing the deployment of our more advanced weapon systems, increasing what we will allow our current allies in the area to purchase, changing our command and control structure to cover a larger area, building up on areas that we control (Guam), and even “accidently” shipping powerful arms to Nationalist China. I recall a former 8th Army commander discussing using the military in Korea as a regional force.
It would be a great mistake for the US to revert back to a pre 1920 foreign policy.
3:21 pm on July 7th, 2008 31
Pete,
You noticed that, too. I bet if one were to look up why Japan bombed Pearl Harbor, this would make a lot of sense.
11:50 pm on July 7th, 2008 32
So much for sparing me bullshit doublespeak. Oh well. Listen GI, if you really think that what occured at the UN was a whole-hearted attempt by the Bush administration to garner international for the invasion of Iraq then you’re a lot more dense than I ever imagined you to be.
Anybody whose anybody who carefully followed what was going on prior to the invasion could see the writing on the wall: the US was going to invade regardless of UN authorization. How else to explain the massive build of troops and supplies on the Iraq/Kuwaiti border? Or more importantly the utter contempt and disregard the US administration showed toward the new round of weapons inspections.
So yeah, GI, on a purely shallow, semantic level there was “international support”. But really, let’s not kid ourselves here, at the end of the day it was a pretty insubstantial one at best. Tell me, if the US’s international support was so great going into the Iraq War, how has it come to pass that after the invasion perceptions of the United States are at their all-time lows? How has it come to pass that anti-Americanism has increased? How has it come to pass that some of America’s most cherished alliances have seen significant damage?
Let’s be honest though, all the above arguments are supererogatory to the real issue at hand: the effect that US troops stationed overseas has in terms of the policy options the US has at its disposal when dealing with hostile nations. According to your logic GI, if ever there is a possibility that US forces in a neighboring country could be attacked in response to US military aggression, then those forces are in effect strategic deadweight. Frankly, this sort of thinking becomes prominent when one becomes enamored with military might as a panacea to diplomatic controversies.
6:33 am on July 8th, 2008 33
Don’t get mad at me because I shot down your argument. I clearly showed the Iraq War had more international support then the Korean War. Your problem is that you define international support as France and Germany and consider a nation like Poland that sent thousands of soldiers to fight in Iraq to include fighting during the invasion as a country not worthy of being called an ally which is very arrogant. Poland sent more soldiers to fight in Iraq then the one battalion France sent to the Korean War.
Now you are bringing up a separate issue in regards to whether the Bush administration was committed to war or not. They were committed to going to war just as much as Truman was.
You are also speculating on things I never said. I said the US presence in Iraq is comparable to the US presence in Korea 1955. I will also repeat that no matter what anyone’s opinion was about Truman getting the US involved in the war in the first place, at the time everyone knew letting South Korea collapse was not an option.
9:11 am on July 8th, 2008 34
First things first. There’s no possible way I’m “mad”. For that to be the case you would have had to actually shot down my argument rather than merely assert so.
Second, if you think that the Bush administration was really serious about gaining international support for the invasion despite a lot of evidence to the contrary, fine. If you really think that having received an empty bureaucratic stamp of approval from the UN and still have an global uproar that materialized against the US after the invasion constitutes as “international support”, fine again. We’ll just have to agree to disagree.
Again though GI, the reason I’m bringing up to issue of the US prescence in Iraq is not to re-litigate with you about the pro/cons and yes/no’s about the Iraq War itself. No, I bring it up because it clearly shows an inherent inconsistency in one of your arguments about the US garrison in South Korea. To paraphrase your argument, the ROK government wants to maintain the US presence in South Korea so as to truncate any action the US might make against North Korea. In effect, you see the US troop presence in South Korea as being a detriment to any possible US strike against North Korea because those US forces in Suth Korea would be very vulnerable to a devastating North Korean retaliation.
The irony is that you apply this standard to the US troop presence in South Korea but totally ignore the fact that you have a similar situation with US troops in Iraq vis-a-vis Iran’s development of nuclear weapons and support Iraqi Shia militia. Given the post you wrote in support of the US-Iraq SOFA, you clearly support a continued US neo-colonial suzerainty in Iraq despite the fact that said forces would clearly be in the sights of the Iranians should the US decide on a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities. I’m I the only one whose seeing an inconsistency here GI?
Finally, the notion that the US presence in Iraq in like the US presence in Korea circa 1955 is….Well how does one say it diplomatically? I guess one can’t.
Let’s just be frank GI, your above argument is complete and utter horseshit. Last time I checked, in 1955 the US wasn’t engaged in a massive counterinsurgency war in Korea like it is today in Iraq. Last time I checked the US wasn’t refereeing a full-blown or barely contained internicine sectarian war in Korea during 1955. Circa 1955, from the literature I’ve read, there wasn’t a pervasive and acute anti-US sentiment amongst the South Korean population that could at any minute turn against the US like you have in Iraq.
The really ironic thing here GI, is that you have this zest for attempting “trenchant” commentary that clearly far exceeds any real talent or ability you actually have for it. Your puerile analogy that somehow Korea circa 1955 is somehow like Iraq in 2008 only underscores that fact.
9:32 am on July 8th, 2008 35
Not exactly. UN Resolution 1441 did not provide an automatically authorized military response if Iraq was found not to be in compliance with the ongoing inspections. That is why the US, UK, and Spain pushed for another resolution with an automatic “trigger.” That resolution failed because a majority of the Security Council members and most of the UN did NOT want the US-led coalition such powers.
Moreover, among the coalition members, only the US acted with the support of a majority of its citizens. Other strong allies like Britain, Australia, and Spain sent troops in defiance of public opinion.
Yes, but only 6 participated in the actual invasion. The others sent mostly token forces after the US had taken control.
That is true if one limits the definition of “international support” to the number of countries participating. As I stated previously, the governments of most coalition members acted contrary to the will of their citizens, and global opposition to the war in Iraq has been far more vocal than it was in 1950, when people were busy trying to rebuild their lives.
Sixty years ago, the American people were hesitant to get tangled up again overseas after fighting in two bloody world conflicts, hence, the near total US military withdrawal from the Korean peninsula. Truman respected the American people’s wishes to avoid sending a continual stream of young men and women to die in a foreign war, and he was wise to negotiate an armistice in 1953.
3:35 pm on July 8th, 2008 36
Gaetano you were arguing that Bush did not have international support which I clearly showed he did when compared to the international support Truman had during the Korean War. If you would have argued more international support compared to Desert Storm then you would have had a better argument, however how many of those countries who joined the coalition in Desert Storm would have joined if the objective was to remove Saddam?
Also the US presence currently in Iraq is not similar to the US presence in Korea right now. I have been saying this continually a better analogy is Korea 1955. There was an insurgency going on in Korea and US soldiers were still dieing in Korea in 1955. In fact US soldiers were dieing in Korea in the dozens as late as 1969, sixteens years after the war ended.
There was an insurgency still happening in Korea after the war officially ended but the ROK Army was used to quell it. This is what is happening in Iraq now which is a transition of the Iraqi Army to conducting more of the dangerous infantry work backed by US artillery, air support, and MiTT teams.
Your logic about pulling the US military out of Iraq now is about as logically sound as pulling the US military out of Korea in 1955. It is quite obvious your thinking has more to do with Bush hating then any actual strategic concerns.
Sonagi, I will repeat what I said before that Bush put as much effort into an international coalition as Harry Truman did. Harry Truman was committed to go to war because he already dispatched US forces to defend South Korea before the UN ever gave authorization. So he tipped his hand what the US was going to do and the UN was a mere formality which arguably the vote may not even be legal with the Soviet Union boycotting.
Same thing in Iraq, the Bush administration was committed to go to war and the UN resolution was a mere formality. Nevertheless the US did have more allies fight in the invasion then during the intervention to protect the ROK from North Korea where the US had no countries supporting them. If China did not intervene the UN forces would not even have seen heavy combat like some of them ended up seeing against the Chinese. Likewise more nations have contributed support to mission in Iraq then in South Korea overall.
Also Sonagi Truman was out of office when the armistice was signed. Truman was so unpopular for getting the US involved in the Korean War that he is the only president with lower approval ratings then Bush and didn’t even seek reelection. Eisenhower ran on a platform of ending the war won the election and then proceeded to end the seven months after taking office with the signing of the armistice. However, Eisenhower was smart enough to know that a full withdrawal was not a possibility and still committed the US to the stabilizing and building of the ROK government, military, and national institutions.
This all goes back to the point I made before, the Iraq War is as big of a mistake as the Korean War.
10:01 pm on July 8th, 2008 37
I’m sorry GI, but you can’t have your MRE cake and eat it too.
You want to sit there and make a fool of yourself arguing that the US had unqualified international support to go into Iraq, fine. Like I said, we’re just going to have to agree to disagree on that matter. I said it before and I’ll say it again: I’m not here to re-litigate with you about the Iraq war itself.
What I will not countenance from you, however, is that somehow Iraq in 2008 is like Korea in 1955. Now, you cite that there was an insurgency going on in Korea circa 1955 and that there were still US fatalities. Moreover, you state that as late as 1969, US personnel were dying in the dozens. I haven’t perused the literature in which you got this information from and would be very grateful you could link to it or provide the titles of the books in which your citing from. But just from reading the little vague tidbits you’ve provided I’m pretty confident that your taking something minor and trying to exaggerate it so that it fits into your argument that in 1955 Korea was the sight of an insurgency on the magnitude of Iraq in 2008.
From my understanding of Korea in 1955, the threat was mainly 1)a possible re-invasion from the North and 2)abject poverty following a devestating war. To my understanding there never was in Korea, in 1955, a powerful and influential individual such as Moktada al-Sadr with his well-armed Mahdi Army threatening the stability of the central government. Moreover, while the incipient armed forces of the South Korean nation did have it’s share of problems, I’m hard pressed to find and instance, or trend in 1955 South Korea, where said armed forces were essentially the institution of one sectarian group being deployed against that of another sectarian group.
Your analogy GI, that somehow Iraq in 2008 is like Korea in 1955, falls apart once you do a simple cursory reading of the clear headed reports coming out of Iraq.
Honestly, I find these arguments about Iraq being like country X,Y, or Z in the year this or that to be to be an incredibly shallow way to think about a serious foreign policy issue. By comparing Iraq to say South Korea, Germany or Japan after WWII, the US war in the Philippines, Napoleon in Spain, Caesar in Gaul, or any other remotely analogous counterinsurgency war or occupation in history only serves to obfuscate from the real issues that are unique and endemic to the Iraq conflict.
Finally, in all this time I’ve been arguing with you, GI, not once have I made an explicit argument that US forces should withdraw from Iraq. Again, to repeat what I’ve mainly been trying to argue: You say that US forces in South Korea narrow the range of options that the US has in dealing with North Korea due to the fact that such forces would be the target of a counterattack by the North. Therefore, US forces should leave South Korea. If that logic is so transparent to you in the case of Korea, why isn’t you can’t have the intellectual honesty to man-up to the fact that such is the case with US forces in Iraq vis-a-vis the US’s confrontation with Iran?
1:09 am on July 9th, 2008 38
GI maintains that in 1955 South Korea was in the thralls of a counterinsurgency and other forms of internal subversion along the lines of what Iraq is witnessing at the present moment. Where GI came to get this notion is beyond me and my hope is that he’ll provide the sources in which he basis his argument on.
If I could, with greater clarity, state why I find GI’s analogy that South Korea in 1955 is like Iraq in 2008 to be ludicrous, I’d like to cite a passage from the book “Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy” by Professor Gregg Brazinsky out of George Washington University.
The passage is taken from the 2007 hardcover edition put out by The University of North Carolina Press.
Quoting from pages 102-103:
“American fears of internal subversion subsided along with those of a renewed DPRK invasion. Although US policymakers remained concerned about the issue, from the mid-1950s onward their reports on the subject tended to indicate that IT WAS NOT ONE OF SOUTH KOREA’S MOST SALIENT PROBLEMS. A 1955 State Department document, entitled ‘Report on the Counter-Subversive Capacity of the Republic of Korea,’ argued that the ‘threat of Communist control of the ROK through subversion is at present a POTENTIAL, RATHER THAN AN ACTUAL, DANGER.’ It added that the ‘North Korean directed guerilla elements in the ROK’ active before and during the war had ‘almost totaly been annihilated’ and there were ‘relatively few manifestations of internal Communist activity.’ Although two years later an increase in such activities was reported, ‘there has been no evidence…indicating that the integrity of the ROK government or the ROK military est. or other ROK institutions was endangered by Communist subversion.’ The point was not that US officials no longer worried about the…subversion but that, with an improved security situation, suppressing Communism in South Korea NO LONGER ECLIPSED OTHER AMERICAN OBJECTIVES.”
Reading the above and then comparing it to what the US military and other civilian agencies are doing right now in Iraq, clearly belies GI’s comparison.
3:54 am on July 9th, 2008 39
@GI:
You are correct about Truman and Eisenhower. I knew better and was careless when I typed that. My bad.
You are also correct that Bush was committed to invading Iraq and only sought a UN resolution as international cover. The seeds of Saddam’s destruction were planted back in the 90s after he scared the crap out of Israel by lobbing Scuds at them. Certain members of the Bush administration saw a golden opportunity and didn’t waste time trying to link Saddam to Al-Qaeda and 9/11. The invasion of Iraq was always about regime change.
The final judgment on the invasion of Iraq will rest upon the eventual outcome. Moreover, I would argue that while the people of South Korea are MUCH better off, the American people have not benefitted much from a free, democratic South Korea, especially when one considers the money spent all these years defending it. My uncle served in Korea. If he had died, I would consider it a waste of human life. Eisenhower scaled down the military and governed us through eight prosperous and peaceful years. Since then a string of mostly mediocre Democratic and Republican presidents have entangled us in overt and covert foreign wars and conflicts not vital to our defense, and our post-war prestige has sunk.
7:02 am on July 9th, 2008 40
Gaetano in the two years after the Korean War 641 servicemembers died:
http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/topics/casualties/obrien/obrien_chpt3.htm#Chapt3PartII
Between 1966-1969, 211 servicemembers died in Korea. Here is a list by name of who died:
http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/topics/dmz/p_dmz_deaths_army_1966_69.htm
There are a number of books that discuss the insurgency launched by North Korea in the South before, during, and after the war. Paek Sun-yeop’s book discusses how the entire ROK 1st Division was pulled from the frontlines in order to deal with insurgents in the Chiri and they still couldn’t eliminate them all.
So many GIs died between 1966-1969 because Kim Il-sung was infiltrating special forces members in South Korea as part of greater effort to create a mass uprising against Park Chung-hee. The effort failed:
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Bolger/bolger.asp
I have been posting here on the ROK Drop the details of a number of these attacks during this time to include ambushes, camps being attacked, and even barracks being bombed:
http://rokdrop.com/2008/04/03/dmz-flashbacks-the-bloodiest-dmz-shootout/
http://rokdrop.com/2008/05/20/dmz-flashpoints-the-camp-liberty-bell-attack/
http://rokdrop.com/2008/04/09/dmz-flashbacks-the-camp-walley-barracks-bombing/
You also have this tendency to put words into my mouth I never said. When did I say “unqualified international support to go into Iraq”? I didn’t say that I said that Bush put as much effort into an international coalition as Harry Truman did if not more.
Also notice I said “there was an insurgency still happening in Korea after the war officially ended but the ROK Army was used to quell it.” The book you cite makes my point that there was an insurgency going on but by the mid-50’s it was no longer one of Korea’s major problems.
Once the insurgency was put down nation building became the main objective in Korea. What is happening in Iraq now? The insurgency is largely defeated with the Iraqi Army taking a greater security role and a transition to nation building beginning. Much like Korea in the mid-1950’s Iraq appears to be entering a nation building phase as Iraqi security forces begin to take more control of the country.
The Korean War is not a perfect analogy and I never claimed it was but there are many good points that can be learned from it instead of simply ignoring it.
Once again you are putting words into my mouth by saying I want US forces to leave Korea. I have never advocated for the withdrawal of US forces from Korea. I have made it quite clear for some time that I am for the USFK transformation plan to consolidate USFK at Camp Humphreys. I want force reductions and decreased force footprint in Korea. Where you got that I want full withdrawal is beyond me.
Also your claim that US forces should be pulled to give the US more options to attack Iran I disagree with if you haven’t figured that out already. Bombing Iran will likely have no effect on stopping their nuclear weapons program due to their key nuclear capabilities being buried in deep fortified bunkers. A credible ground invasion threat gives the US more leverage then bombing them.
However all this is irrelevant when the Bush administration isn’t going to attack Iran anyway when the latest National Intelligence Estimate says Iran ended their nuclear weapons program in 2003:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/03/world/middleeast/03cnd-iran.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
It was reported that Iran tried to continue their weapons program covertly through the nuclear facility in Syria but it was bombed thus setting back its weapons gains they made:
http://rokdrop.com/2008/06/22/syrian-al-kibar-facility-linked-to-iranian-nuclear-program/
Anyway this conversation has gotten way off topic and I’m going to leave it at this point.
7:19 am on July 9th, 2008 41
Sonagi it is pretty clear that the Bush administration invaded Iraq for regime in order to plant a democracy in the Middle East and used the WMD issue as cover because they thought it would have gone over better with the US public considering 9/11 was still fresh in everyone’s minds.
They were sure just like just about everyone else that the WMDs existed and ignored any intelligence that said otherwise. For the best documented history of what happened I recommend reading Douglas Feith’s book. The problem is that the Bush administration thought that the toppling of Saddam would be easier then what in turned out to be because they failed to look at the follow on effects.
This is another reason why I like to mention the Korean War as a historical reference because Truman thought defending South Korea would be easier then what it turned out to be as well.
It is arguable that the invasion of Iraq was a mistake but it would only compound the mistake by withdrawing now and letting the government collapse and allow a civil or even a possible regional war break out. A stable Iraq is an outcome in the national interest.
Likewise that is why I have been saying that if the US pulled out of Korea completely in 1955 it would compound a mistake made back then. As it turned out by sticking with South Korea an outcome favorable to the national interest turned out of it which no one I’m sure in 1955 thought was possible. The Korean War was officially won in 1988 with Seoul hosting the Olympic Games.
The Iraq War will be won in much the same way. If the Olympics are held in Baghdad in 2040 then we won. Anyone saying the US won or lost right now doesn’t know what they are talking about.
12:00 pm on July 9th, 2008 42
So if I understand you right, GI, we’ll have to wait a couple of generations for the fruits to flourish. Meanwhile, we’ll, correct our mistake of going in to Iraq by staying there. So…we’ll continue paying for their freedom with American lives and taxpayer money for the POSSIBILITY in a generation or two of democracy taking root? It’s not a guarantee?
Doesn’t this seem a little arrogant of us to do something like this? We occupy a foreign nation, tell them to accept democracy, they may or may not want, and accept that a foreign power will stay for at least a generation based on an oopsie? Damn, I hope the IRS makes an oopsie on my tax return so that my grand-children can benefit. In some ways this does sound like Korea, but in others it sounds an awful lot like Vietnam. I dare say it is closer to Vietnam in the fighting style.
Somehow, if we left or if we left these other nations alone to their own devices, they’d figure things out. Castro is on the way out. Vietnam, after some turmoil, is flourishing *gasp* without our intervention. Prior to 9/11, relations with Iran were getting better. If we had stopped the I’m-not-touching-you game with them, and played the mutual-respect-and-trade game, we might have made friends with them and gotten rid of an axis of evil.
Why must WE be the stabilizing factor and spend our money and lives on other people? Let us worry about ourselves and let others watch and emulate, as we enrich ourselves, not through force, but through sound and humble doctrine.
11:42 pm on July 9th, 2008 43
Some folks on the net need a serious reality check, breath of fresh air, break off the backwater lily pad of life they live on… Why so much venom, haughty invective, self-licking prose? What else is it about life in the world that upsets them so? Thesis rejected at school? Turned down by a publisher? Hemorroids flaring in the summer humidity whilst trolling in front of the computer screen? Might ye be so miserable in person? I hope not! Caramba! TAKE A VACATION!! Or something to cool off…
3:59 am on July 10th, 2008 44
Wow! That’s a lot of service members being killed after the end of the Korean war. No wonder Jenkins felt as he did. Of course Vietman was looming.
6:15 am on July 10th, 2008 45
South Korea will never allow the US to leave Korea. The economic burden of the small towns that are near the bases will dry up and die without the Americans. Take a look at Songton (outside of OSAN AB), most of the businesses there cater to Americans. What will happen to all of the bar employees once the American military leaves? That puts alot of Jucy Girls out on the street looking for a job.
North Korea also adds in here as the South surely knows that if Mr Kim ever decides to invade, they are going to need the US forces. Why use your own troops when you have another nations sitting here for nothing?
The South Korean government needs the jobs that the US government suppiles. Who do we use for building all of those new doorms? Who do we use to fix those doorms when stuff breaks? All of these folks put alot of money into the South Korean economy, not having them employed means loosing out of countless millions of mostly free dollars.
Although in a military sense we really don’t need troops in Korea, it does help to protect Japan from that short idiot up north. South Korea we could live without, Japan we can’t.
6:31 am on July 10th, 2008 46
Not quite right, GI. The US’ primary aim was ousting Saddam and installing a friendly regime that wouldn’t invade or lob missiles at its neighbors. In fact, another point that Korea and Iraq have in common is that the US collaborated with local government officials to neuter or exclude the political participation of groups seen as unfriendly or even hostile to the US. Hamas came to power in Palestine through a multi-party election, and if totally free and fair elections were actually held in Iraq, I’d not be surprised to see an Islamic party either gain an outright majority or win as part of a coalition.
7:13 am on July 10th, 2008 47
If by friendly government you mean installing a dictator friendly to US interests would have been acceptable I would not agree with. Installing a dictator in Iraq to replace the one we ousted would never fly with the American people. I have no doubt the Bush administration from the beginning was going to install a democracy of some kind in Iraq. I think are biggest issue was trying to form an American style democracy.
I think the British Parliamentary system is the best thing for Iraq. Iraq currently needs something like the House of Lords that gives the tribal sheiks more of a voice in the government because the State Department initially did not realize the influence the tribal sheiks have.
Also the religious parties have already been elected in Iraq, the problem for them is that none of them is large enough for an outright majority. That is why Maliki is PM because he is from a smaller political party that the larger religious parties like SCIRI and the Sadrites could agree on as way to ensure neither of the parties had more power then the other.
7:48 am on July 10th, 2008 48
An impressive response GI, but I’m afraid it’s still full of holes.
First, just like I surmised the historical factoids that you present as proof positive that South Korea in 1955 was in the thralls of an insurgency a la Iraq in 2008, have been spun and exaggerated to fit what was to begin with a flimsy argument. Hate to be the one to tell you this GI, but what’ve you’ve provided was not evidence of an insurgency but rather a collections of disparate military skirmishes and incidences. Despite your cornpone, History Channel-esque write up of these seperate events, your “evidence” doesn’t wash.
If we’re to go by the parameters that you use to define an “insurgency”, then South Korea is still experiencing one. According to your way of thinking seperate incidences and skirmishes such the ROK/DPRK naval battle in 2002 and the discovery of spy rings in the 1990’s all constitute as evidence that an insurgency is going on right now. But you and I both know that’s all hogwash.
Just for your own edification, when people think of the word “insurgency”, most people have things such as the Algerian revolt against the French, the Maoists in Nepal, the Palestinines in the occupied territories, the FARC in Columbia, or something like the Indian Independece movement against the British Raj in mind. In other words, what most people are thinking of is a social, political, or military movement that has continued and sustained influence and power within a given society. Unfortunately, the Communist movement in South Korea, circa 1955 does not match that criteria.
Given the critiera and examples I’ve provided, it’s pretty clear that your argument that Iraq is somehow past the insurgency phase and well into the nation building is nonsense at best. Reading some of the things that you’re saying about Iraq at present, I seriously wonder where the hell you’re getting your information from. Anybody whose done a real serious reading and study of the situation in Iraq should be well aware that things are still incredibly precarious and fragile. Unfortunately for the average Iraqi, their country is nothing like South Korea in 1955. South Korea in 1955 would be the average Iraqis wet-dream right now.
In order for the argument that Iraq in 2008 is like Korea in 1955, the following things would have to be true about Iraq today: the Iraqi central government passed a national oil law that is accepted by all sides, armed Sunni factions are fully incorporated into the national Iraqi security forces, the Sadrist movement has been fully vanquished, and ex-Baathist are brought into crucial government posts. You know, I know, and the most recent GAO report knows, that even progress on such issues has been tepid at best.
8:17 am on July 10th, 2008 49
@GI,
Yes, of course, the US wasn’t going to install a dictator. Rather, just like Korea, the US used the ballot box to legitimize an acceptable government. As I stated before and I’ll repeat again: the primary objective was not democracy but getting rid of Saddam. Post-war elections were a means, not an end.
5:23 am on July 29th, 2008 50
[...] Buchanan has not been reading the ROK Drop because if he was he would already have his answer to why US troops are still stationed in Korea and empire has little to do with [...]
10:08 am on July 30th, 2008 51
GI,
Very nice post. Sorry for the late comment.
5:10 am on August 1st, 2008 52
4:30 pm on August 16th, 2008 53
I’m an exchange student at the Korean AF Staff College and the longer I’m here, the more I’m convinced we should leave the peninsula. The ROKAF doesn’t think it will ever have to fight (except maybe Japan over Dokdo) and therefore their attitude/professionalism is quite poor. Fortunately for them, the NKAF is in far worse shape.
I don’t think we’ll be moving anytime soon for the same arguments that GI Korea makes. However, once the Army four-star billet moves to Japan and the Army has to send a 3-star here to work under a Korean general, there might be more of a push for us to leave. Justifying that four-star billet, in my mind, is one of the reasons we’ve stayed so long.
I don’t think we get anything out of the US-Korea alliance that is worthwhile. Some people say we want to stay here because of the proximity to China but the Koreans would never allow us to make attacks on China from their soil unless China directly attacked South Korea. The South Koreans are too afraid of China (and not afraid of us at all which is one of the reasons they walk all over of us). Anything that needs to be done strategically in NE Asia can be done from our bases in Japan.
Don’t get me wrong, I love Korea and its people. I’ve invested a lot of sweat and tears to learn the language and have a Korean wife but it sickens me to watch them walk all over us (witness the Vonage deal).
11:17 am on August 17th, 2008 54
We pulled out a the PI when we wanted too. Seem to remember us taking our flooting dock with us.
The operative words are, “when we wanted too”.
We lack the desire. All the rest is just excuses for non-action. We serve no purpose in Korea. But the Military has always found it easy to stay the course rather than make a change.
(do we still have soldiers living in condemed barracks @ Humphreys aviation battlion)? C co. 52nd
9:26 am on August 18th, 2008 55
“Retired-We pulled out a the PI when we wanted too. Seem to remember us taking our flooting dock with us.
The operative words are, “when we wanted too”.”
I would disagree with this satement “Retired.” The Flips were trying to gouge us out of something like $1.2. billion in annual rent for Subic only, and this was post-Pinatubo. Yes, The U.S. told them to pack sand up their butts and YES, we did remove our floating dry docks, etc. (but not enough in my opinion), but we did not leave at a time of our own choosing, but as a matter of a natural disaster, and more importantly, the GREEDINESS of a host country…NOT their sovereignity issues as they would like to think.
Now putting this all into perspective in the entire Pacific Arena…IMHO we are exactly where we were with the Philippines in 1990, etc. as we are with Korea today (obviously there are additional factors involved).
We are NOT wanted, as in the case of Japan, but only needed as a bargaining chip, which should not be the case. We allow our troops and citizens to be abused by the local authorities, because we are so chicken-shit that we do nothing.
Again, IMHO, we should be slowly, but surely packing up, via unit rotations…ONE WAY, and bring our forces down to a token size only. Key billets should be replaced with contractors, who are below the skyline as far as political pawns, and can leave in a moments notice w/o any political repurcussions.
In reality, the U.S. forces are nothing but a trip wire against agression from the North (and still, possibly China) and rely on immediate support from Japan/okinawa & Hawaii, so let the ROK miltary be their own trip wire and we will reinforce them at our convenience…again IMHO.
11:08 am on September 25th, 2008 56
[...] can put me in the gradual withdrawal category because as I have written about before, immediate withdrawal is not going to happen for a variety of reasons. If the Korean public wants a gradual withdrawal of USFK then they can [...]