Part III is our final Protest installment. It deals with our predictions of future protests. Large scale protests (1000-2000 people) will continue, but only for special occasions. Because the group’s support from the general public is dwindling, the protests with large numbers of protestors will be hard to sustain over a long period of time. Therefore, the activists will attempt to change to (1) Long-term protests; and (2) Guerilla hit-and-run protests. These protests are based upon the principle of ensuring maximum effectiveness (tying up the max numbers of riot police with max media coverage) with minimum amount of people committed at minimum risk. The tactics used during the 1990 protests will be reinvented.

Long term protests are nothing more than nuisance protests, but the solution is simple. Simply ignore these types of protests. The second type of guerilla hit-and-run protests can be divided into two types: (1) Small group hit-and-run operations (10-15 people); and (2) Large-group hit-and-run operations (100-200 people).

The small group operations are virtually impossible to stop. These protests will pop up with no prior warning and no fixed location. These protestors will be mostly gullible younger people — middle school and high school. The people will disrupt a road way or subway station — sometimes by violent means — and as soon as the police are dispatched, the group will disappear into the crowd or alleyways. The group will operate in small cells and receive clandestine instructions from activist NGO leadership — with the end result being that these groups cannot be attributed to any NGO. They will be faceless. There is NO solution to predict or prevent this type of protest.

The large scale hit-and-run protests (100-300 people) will operate differently. The activists have experimented with this type of protest on 20 Jul and 25-26 Jul to back up traffic in the Chongno area Rotary. Basically the protestors will play cat-and-mouse in a choke point (i.e., traffic circle) until traffic is backed up. Then like cockroaches when the light is turned on, they will scatter to their predetermined escape routes. The solution requires the police to be proactive and attack before the protestors are prepared. Though the protestor operations will change to take advantage of advances in technology, they are still the same ruthless tactics by hard-core activists.

PART III. PREDICTIONS IN PROTESTS

A. PREDICTION: LONG TERM PROTEST TECHNIQUE (1-10 PEOPLE) ATTEMPTS:

• 1. PROBLEM: The long-term protests are based upon the principle of unpredictability in order to achieve its goals. The protestors state that the protest is “permanent” on a specific day of the week, but the group will NOT state the number of protestors that will show up. It could be one or it could be 100. The idea is that the police MUST plan for the maximum number and dispatch their troops accordingly. This is exactly what the progressive press needs for spectacular shots of one protestor facing off against 100 policemen. This method has been used successfully at the main gate of Kunsan AB for a number of years. We predict the activist NGO types of protests will try this method.

 

• 2. SOLUTION: DO NOT PLAY THEIR GAME. DO NOT DISPATCH ANY RIOT POLICE TO COVER THESE PROTESTS. No riot police, no confrontation. No confrontation it is not newsworthy and the protest fails. END GAME. If the person attempts to sit in the middle of the street, simply arrest them for public endangerment. Then send the person to a state nuthouse for a psych evaluation as a hassle factor — claiming only an unbalanced person would block the streets with cars operating.

 

• 3. BACKGROUND: KUNSAN AB: The principle of this type of operation is exemplified as to how the group in Kunsan AB has operated for years. Once a week, the protestors were to hold a protest in front of the gate. As a result the riot police were required to gather in force just in case and the USAF Security Forces were positioned at the main gate. The gate was locked down and all vehicular traffic had to be routed to the rear ROKAF gate. Without using a single person, the group was able to tie up one company of riot policemen and 10 or more Security Forces behind the locked gates.But the truth of the matter was that only one — but most times none at all — showed up. Then at other times, 15 would show up at the gate if there was a particular hot topic. It was very irregular, but most of the time it was NONE at the gate. This is the genius of this operation as the protestors did not even have to show up to tie up a company of riot police and a large group of Security Forces on the base. On many occasions, we have seen NO protestors there, but the riot police with their buses hidden in the side street and Security Forces dressed in their flak-vests sweating in the sun.Because the front gate was closed the entire base traffic had to be routed through the back gate. As a result there were long lines of people waiting to enter and leave the base. Onbase construction slowed down as trucks lined up. People attempting to get to work were delayed. The entire base operations slowed down.

• 4. TACTICS: On 23 Jul, a small group of KBS union workers were still protesting the selection of the new KBS head. They were joined by other media activists that were protesting the new LMB media policies. But the main point is that these protestors were utilizing a small number of 10-15 people to tie up a company of riot policemen — while providing a photo op for the progressive media. The principle of minimum manpower with maximum effect — and minimal risk prevails.

  Again the solution for the riot police is to assess the violence risk. If the risk is near zero, DON’T SHOW UP because it is almost certain that the press is waiting to photograph the big bad police picking on the few protestors. The most likely venue the activists will select in Seoul is the Cheongye Stream — simply because the small size plus large pink shell structure are good backdrops for a small protest. In major cities, the location will be near the city center in a high visibility - high traffic area.As stated before, the best solution to this type of protest is simply to ignore it. If you take it seriously, it will last for years.

B. PREDICTION: SMALL GROUP OPERATIONS (10-15 PEOPLE) WILL INCREASE:

• 1. PROBLEM: There will be small operations that aim to disrupt traffic or services and then the protestors will disappear rapidly. They will operate on the principle of maximum effectiveness (disruption of traffic/services) with minimum manpower (a small group of less than 100) — with minimal risk.

 

• 2. SOLUTION: NONE. This is just about impossible to predict and stop. The protests cannot be predicted. The protestors are nearly impossible to catch as they scatter like cockroaches at the first sign of the police.The only positive note is that they do little damage and are primarily publicity seekers.

  The police will need to actively seek out the REAL organizers of these hit-and-run groups. As in the past, the organizers will most likely turn out to be the violent NGO activist groups. However, proving the NGO activist group connection will be very difficult unless an insider blows the whistle. The groups will funnel funds clandestinely to these small hit-and-run groups.

  Actually the funding will be very small — if at all. What the background organizers will provide is general direction for the group and suggest targets and prevent the duplication of protests from disparate groups at the same location. The local level cells will simply implement their own plans.

  As the operations are very simple and require no sophistication, the background organizers will have very little to do with the actual protest. As such they will leave no fingerprints to trace back to them.The unpredictable nature of these demonstrations upset people’s lives and when people get upset, they will strike out not against the protestors but against the government for failing to prevent these disruptions. People love regularity in their lives. It may sound stupid, but people do NOT like their routines to be upset. If their routines are upset, they will condemn not the protestors, but the government for failing to prevent them. That is why these types of protestors are dangerous as spreaders of anarchy and chaos.

 

• 3. BACKGROUND: The idea of hit-and-run was perfected by the communist guerillas of Chiri Mountain before the Korean War in 1948 — and extended till 1954. The key to their strikes was unpredictability. The police never knew from what direction they would come, so everywhere had to be on alert. The operations were swift to move in and get out before the government forces could react. They always operated in small groups. If one member became separated, he was expendable. They were nearly impossible to catch. And above all they were ruthless — committing arson, theft, murder and summary executions.The 57th division and the 4th brigade led by Lee Hyun-sang fought their last battle at Daesung-gol about 50 years ago in 1954. The partisans, numbering only a few hundred, were attacked by a force of over 100,000 troops supported by heavy artillery and US war planes. The villages on Mt. Jiri were bombed and napalmed to the ground, and the inhabitants were summarily executed. Only a small number survived and surrendered — most were executed and a few were spared and spent decades in prison. Of the survivors, about 100 or so are still alive. Until recently, it was against law to sing ‘Communist’ songs or to mention the bloody guerrilla war that began in 1948 and went on until 1955 when the last guerrilla band was tracked down and killed off at Daesung-gol. (Source: Association for Asia Research and Korean War: Volume 1.)The modern day version of hit-and-run guerilla tactics were a result of the democratization movement and smaller NGO activist groups attempting to fight for their share of the public attention against a backdrop of violent workers strikes in the mid-1990s. Korean democratization began in 1988, but by the early 1990s had failed to bring tranquility to the streets or to replace protest with institutionalized political participation. Throughout Korea, the students took to the streets. However, in the mid-1990s, the job situation became critical and the democratizaton movement found it harder to find popular support in the colleges. It appeared that the violent street battles that it had waged in the early 1990s were coming to an end.At the same time, many grassroots activist NGOs were springing up. For example, the environmental movement in Korea was characterized by grassroots activists seeking to influence policy and challenge powerful polluting industries. In response to the environmental degradation caused by South Korea’s high-speed industrialization, small anti-pollution groups arose in the early 1980s. In the 1990s as more “green” groups emerged, Korean environmental activists created larger umbrella organizations to empower themselves. Soon Korean green civic groups undertook activities beyond the environmental sphere. Korean environmental groups became “department store” advocacy groups attempting to address a large number of issues both within and outside the environmental sphere. Many Korean environmental NGOs became active in the anti-war and peace movement. (Source: Green Activism and Civil Society in South Korea.) Some green groups joined other civic groups in the anti-war movement in inter-locking arrangements — thus such protests as the Maehangri Bombing Range.However, at the same time in the mid-1990s, large and violent workers conflicts broke out between the workers and the Kim Young-sam government. For example, in Dec 1996 the largest series of strikes and walkouts in South Korean history, involving hundreds of thousands of workers, took place to protest the new labor legislation that allows companies to lay off and fire workers more easily and to avoid paying overtime in a more flexible work system. In Jan 1997 150,000 workers, according to the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, walked off their jobs to protest the new labor legislation. The wave of strikes had already “cost” South Korean corporations about $3 billion in lost production. (Source: Chronology of Asian and Oceanian Workers’ Struggles.)Against this background of workers protests, the attention for the various NGO activist groups and democratization protests was drawn away from their causes. To gain attention for their causes, the protests by NGO activist groups adopted guerilla hit-and-run methods. Small groups would stage “hit-and-run” protests to get publicity for their cause. The aim of the groups was to publicize their agendas that were not heard over the din of the large-scale protests of the worker strikes.These protests would mainly disrupt traffic and as swiftly as they appeared, the protestors would disappear. Many times these protests were so quick that the protestors would have to call in later to radio stations to confirm their groups action.Most of the hit-and-run guerilla demonstrations at the time were at train stations or streets leading to the train stations. It was thought the protestors were using the subways to escape.Later more bold demonstrations were held to block traffic, but mainly this was done on side streets — with the aim of backing up traffic and at the same time preventing the police from reaching them. These protestors disappeared into the side streets.These types of demonstrations were short-lived and the entire protest movement seemed to go into hybernation for a while after the “IMF Crisis” hit in 1997-1998.

 

• 4. TACTICS: The main idea of guerilla style demonstrations is that they must do the maximum amount of damage with minimum numbers of manpower — with minimal risk of capture. It will be a swift demonstration lasting no more than an hour. To accomplish this task, the demonstrators must plan on swift disruptions to traffic that back things up. Then once that is done, it will take hours for the traffic to start moving smoothly again. They can announce their agenda at the protest with banners and ensure that the media is on hand to document their protest in photos — or they can announce their aim afterwards by phoning in to the media to take credit.The groups must maintain their unpredictability. These small group protestors — though working for different activist causes — cannot hit the same targets repeatedly. They need to rotate and mix up their protest locations to keep the police off balance. Thus this means there must be a central controller — probably from one of the main activist NGO “umbrella” groups — who will remain in the background and untraceable.Notification of progressive news media (i.e., KBS crews) for coverage will probably be done. The progressive media seem to have a close relationship with the progressive activists dating back to the 2002 anti-American hate fest. At that time, we noticed that the KBS new crews were always on-hand whenever there was a “spontaneous” protest or if there is a “spontaneous” anti-American incident. Throughout the past anti-US beef protests, the progressive media in their well-marked vehicles have been at every protest throughout the country mingling freely with the protestors — while conservative press representatives had to disguise themselves to mix with the crowds.

 

• 5. TARGETS: Targets will be choke points to create the maximum amount of confusion/disruption. Escape routes need to be planned beforehand. If during the day, the best escape routes are through crowded shopping areas where it will be easy to blend in with the crowd. If the operation is at night, there should be dark alleyways to disappear into if the primary escape route becomes blocked. If possible, getaway cars should be parked on streets that will not be affected by the choke point.The operational plans for these guerilla operations need to be simple and of short duration. The targets will be choke points to do maximum damage by backing up traffic. What they want is the police to be dispatched to the area to investigate the traffic jam, but disappear before the police arrive there. Judging from past performance, it usually takes the police about an hour to appear because of the time lag from telephone complaints to assigning personnel to investigate. As a traffic incident, police do not react with great speed.If there is a minor fender-bender during the protest all the better. A small blockage of a choke point on a major artery will back up traffic rapidly — perhaps extending to the rear for miles. Then the protestors will disappear as swiftly as they started leaving the mess to sort itself out. The key is to disappear before the police have time to react and dispatch people to the scene.Again the goal is maximum effectiveness (disruption to traffic or services) with minimum personnel (10-15 people) — with minimal risk (swift escape from capture).

 

• 6. DEMOGRAPHICS: YOUNGER GENERATION: We believe that the demographics of the hit-and-run guerillas will change to include even younger kids in middle school and high school. Police explained that while most of the instigators of violent anti-US beef protests were young men in their 20s and 30s with a few middle-aged ones in 40s and 50s, arrested people are mainly those who are dissatisfied with society like the homeless. The middle-aged activists are usually associated with organized groups (i.e., KCTU) while the homeless (living on the steps of Seoul Station) joined the violence simply as opportunities to vent their anger at society in general. These middle-aged and homeless do not fit well into the framework of a guerilla hit-and-run operation.Thus we believe the small group will be made up of those in the 20s or younger who are NOT linked with an organization, but formed through the internet to protest a specific cause. They will be those who meet on bulletin boards (i.e. Agora) and will be asked to join a specific protest as “volunteers”.These operations will be anonymous to prevent prosecution of the organizers. We believe that the group will be made up of small cluster groups that join together — most likely from bulletin boards that solicit “volunteers” via the internet and then cement the group through cellphone contact. Attempting to track these “phantom” groups will be very difficult as they will operate from PC bangs rather than homes or offices.There should be no lack of volunteers for these groups as they possess a mystique of being masked freedom fighters. Most of those attracted will be middle school and high school kids that are easily impressionable. During the 26-27 Jul protest, four of the 42 arrested were minors.A WORD OF CAUTION: We believe these types of guerillas pose a safety risk to the general public. These are NOT normal protestors, but anarchists spreading chaos and disorder. The ultimate goal of these people is to destabilize the government. If people feel “unsafe” in their daily lives, they will turn against the law-and-order elements for not doing their jobs. Yes, many will be youngsters duped by organizers, but this does not excuse them from being what they have become.The one principle that these new hit-and-run guerillas will learn is ruthlessness. In other words, they must not care if the small shop owner loses money in his business. They must not care if the auto with the punctured tire caused by his nails slams into a telephone pole. They must not even care if innocent bystanders are hurt in traffic accidents. Their purpose is to disrupt transportation and services to make a point — for whatever agenda they are supporting. They will have to truly believe that the ends justify the means.For this reason, the police need to treat these guerillas differently from the large scale protestors. These people are dangerous. Regardless whether they are very young or not, they need to be punished to the maximum extent of the law.There will be many younger people who will be duped into joining these groups under the mystique of “fighting for democracy” or fashioning themselves after past “student freedom fighters.” During the anti-US beef campaigns, many volunteers were duped by misinformation and outright lies to gain their support in the protests. The Korean youth are highly impressionable and can be used easily as shown by the violent demonstrations.These are misguided dupes will do all the legwork and dirty hands work with the protest, while the real culprits — activist NGO organizers — remain safely hidden in the background. Unfortunately, if these youngsters are caught in the act, they must be punished as though they are criminals because of the danger they pose to society.

  CURRENTLY THE POLICE ARE RELEASING THE MIDDLE SCHOOL AND HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS IMMEDIATELY. WE RECOMMEND THAT THIS STOP AT ONCE. Currently students are getting off scott-free because of their age. We recommend that these students be released to the custody of their parents — or principals of their schools if in the local area. Punishment will be meted out later — out of the sight of the police.

C. PREDICTION LARGE GROUP HIT-AND-RUN DEMONSTRATIONS (100-300 PEOPLE) WILL INCREASE:

• 1. PROBLEM: There will be larger group operations aim to disrupt traffic or services. These groups will target traffic circles near major open markets in major cities to cause traffic jams. With their larger numbers, the group will also confront the police. As part of the protest, small groups will attempt to isolate members of the police and inflict violence upon them. When the police appear to be ready to strike back, the protestors will scatter in all directions on cue. The protestors are nearly impossible to catch as they scatter like cockroaches at the first sign of the police.They will operate on the principle of maximum effectiveness (disruption of traffic/services) with minimum manpower (a small group of less than 100) — with minimal risk.

 

• 2. SOLUTION: PROACTIVE ACTION. Action must be swift before the protestors are allowed to inflict any damage. Unlike small group actions, these larger groups will be more predictable in the selection of their targets. They will select traffic circles with major open markets or red-light districts nearby. The markets or red-light districts are their escape routes. As such, police can plan in advance how to block the escape routes. However, the problem comes with unpredictability in when they will strike.Therefore, the police must be proactive and (1) Anticipate the actions of the group; (2) Strike immediately.By striking immediately we mean a two-prong approach with simultaneous action to (a) contain the protestors and (b) block their escape routes. The method would be what we call the Modified Ghenghis Khan Circle of Death — where the protestors are surrounded then the circle tightened.For a large group, this will mean encircling the entire group in the traffic circle — at the same time blocking escape routes. For smaller groups of the main group, the riot police would advance in a line and quickly spread out the wings — at the same time a rear echelon is moving up from the rear to block any escape. When the wings touch, the rear echelon will quickly move up to reinforce the wings.

 

• 3. BACKGROUND: The basic idea of the hit-and-run tactic was from the communist guerillas of Chiri Mountain before the Korean War in 1948 — 1954. The key to their strikes was unpredictability and speed in completing an operation.This is actually a variation of the large scale protest with 1000-2000 people. However, the large scale demonstration is primarily against static defenses of bus barricades and police line. It also involved some well-publicized protest marches. On the other hand, the large group protest (100-200 people) are focused on causing a disruption at a major traffic circle or choke points in arteries leading to selected targets only.These protests are based on the principle of creating maximum disruption to services or traffic with minimal manpower — and minimal risk of capture.
• 4. TACTICS: Unlike past anti-US beef protests, these will be of short duration, but high intensity. In other words, these people do not have the manpower to attack the static defenses (bus barricades), so they will create as much disruption in as short a time as possible. The large scale group (100-200 people) is a variation of the large scale protests with 1000-2000 people. The difference is the large scale protests normally attacked fixed static defense positions (bus barricades) and any police lines set up to block their advances. Protest marches were more for show and normally peaceful.On the other hand, the large group will only attack a police line in the initial stages — not with any hope of breaking the line, but more as a taunting mechanism to display a violent outburst in front of the waiting progressive camera crews alerted by the protestors prior to their arrival. Their operation is to evade the police. There will be no protest marches along a set route associated with their operations.The goal of the large group is to play a cat-and-mouse game with the police to exacerbate the traffic jam they have created in a traffic circle. The longer they keep the protest going, the further the cars will be backed up. A short 20-minute demonstration may back up cars that takes two hours to unsnarl. An example of this type of guerilla hit-and-run was seen on 20 Jul at the Chongno traffic circle when the protestors would simply run away from the police and start in another direction.On cue, these groups will scatter like cockroaches with each person heading for the escape route he/she has preselected. Like the protests in the 1980s-1990s that used this technique, the majority of the protestors will usually escape. The key will be to be able to break and run BEFORE the police start their actions to block off the exits and encircle them.
• 5. TARGETS: The primary targets will be traffic circles and choke points leading to the major targets. For example, instead of protesting in front of Yongsan’s Main Gate, the protestors will attempt to block the main arteries leading to the Main Gate. These protests will be unpredictable and occur without warning. Thus people normally using the Main Gate will be caught in a traffic jam lasting hours. There can be many variations of this with the main purpose being to disrupt the traffic and services — allow the traffic to back up and disperse if possible before the police arrive.The targets will be planned carefully to find areas which have escape routes for the protestors. If traffic circles, the protestors will look for locations with an open market or red-light district nearby. If the target is a choke point, the protestors will look for residential areas; or in older areas, where the shops have many twisting backalleys.

6. DEMOGRAPHICS: HARD-CORE ACTIVISTS WITH INTER-LOCKING AGREEMENTS: For larger demonstrations there will have to be an organization. The current inter-locking agreements between activist NGO groups, a small group of 10-15 could call up other groups to supply manpower for a short demonstration to lock up traffic and then disappear. The promise from the small group is that next time their group would join the other group’s protest. In this way, different activist groups with disparate agendas could support each other with manpower.Contact could be through cellphones and anonymity of the group protected if they operate outside the leadership of the group. The object is to provide the leaders of the various NGO groups with deniability (i.e., “I didn’t know beforehand about the protest.”).The use of interlocking groups was formulated in the late 1990s under the idea of a umbrella cover group — normally with an inflated title such as “Pan-Korea XXX” or “Unified Council of XXX”. For example, in the mid-1990s, Green Korea United joined with the anti-war groups to battle the US possession of Maehangri. During the past anti-US beef protests these interlocking agreements were used by environmentalists, unification groups, anti-war groups and activist religious groups to form a committee to organize the protests.However, now that the government is going after the organizers of the groups, the new guerilla tactics will be anonymous. The signs of the demonstrators may show the cause, but they will not show the identity of the group or homepage URLs on the banners as seen in past protests.A recent example of this interlocking agreements was when over 100 KCTU officials and some 300 civic activists staged a sit-in overnight on 25 Jul at the KCTU headquarters as some 600 police officers surrounded the area in an attempt to arrest its three leaders. This protest was peaceful, though the leaders are fugitives holed up in the Jogye Order temple.Though they may believe they are fighting for a just cause, they are simply hooligans with no regard to the safety of the general public. These people have consciously chosen to endanger the lives of the general public — with the goal to disrupt society as anarchists. The majority of the people involved with large scale protests are hard-core activists from the Hanchongryeon and NGO activist groups — with assistance from leftist unions such as the KCTU or KEWTU.

D. PREDICTION: FUTURE TARGETS = “CHOKE POINTS”: Primarily they will seek to block the roads at choke points to disrupt traffic and/or cause a traffic jam.

The most important part is they need photographic evidence of their protest for publicity. The progressive media (i.e., KBS) has in the past always been notified of the locations in advance and could be trusted not to notify the police. If not, photos taken by the protestors themselves and then published on the internet will suffice.

The intent is to create a disturbance that is large enough to be news-worthy in order to get the publicity. For example, drivers in the downtown area of Seoul were caught in the middle as protesters suddenly appeared on the roads, and the police could do nothing but watch. Demonstrators began their all-out guerilla strategy from 1 a.m. 20 Jul, simply changing direction when police blocked their way. This lasted for seven hours in the pouring rain. About 400 cars were caught for more than 30 minutes between the Seodaemun Station and Dongnimmun. (Source: Chosun Ilbo

The police in the 20 Jul protests showed the changes from static demonstrations (attacks on bus barricades) to the new hit-and-run tactics. The police could not cope and stood by helplessly. The police need to develop tactics and strategics to block the escape routes BEFORE attempting to confront the protestors. They need to be PROACTIVE in attacking the protestors without notice and encircling them before they can react.

• 1. Roads: The accustomed gathering places and venues for past protests will no longer be selected. In selecting a road to block there will be two considerations. (1). Is it a major artery where traffic can be backed up? (2). Is there an escape route easily accessible from the street stoppage area?In the past, large open areas were chosen for large scale protests, such as Seoul Plaza or Yongsan Main Gate, but these areas provide no means of escape. With the diminished amounts of people involved, the guerilla tactics will probably concentrate on immobilizing choke points instead.Choke points provide maximum effectiveness with minimal manpower. For example, if one wanted to protest at Camp Humphreys, the attack would not be at the main gate of Camp Humphreys, but at the Pyeongtaek off-ramp leading to Anjung-ni. In addition, the attack should also block traffic leading from Anjung-ni right where it turns into Pyeongtaek. Once the traffic is backed up, it will take hours to untangle — and the protestors will be long gone by then. The protestors would disappear to awaiting cars on the side roads that are not blocked.For military camps, the roads leading to the older camps are usually very narrow and easy to block. Most of these roads are two lane traffic until they near the main gate areas where once blocked in, a car usually doesn’t have room to backup and leave the area. Once the traffic is backed up, the protestors can disappear leaving a traffic mess to clear up for the police who will be struggling to get to the scene.
• 2. Traffic circles (Rotaries) Ideal chokepoints are traffic circles in major cities. A stoppage will back up traffic in four or more directions. As these are normal chokepoints, the traffic will be traveling at low speeds minimizing the risk to the protestors. Once traffic is stopped, a traffic snarl will develop in minutes. Once traffic is backed up, the group will disperse before the police arrive.The traffic circles that will be selected are those with a large open market or red-light district nearby. These will be the planned escape routes for the protestors.
• 3. Subway/Railway Stations: If disrupting services such as the railway transportation flow of traffic, there is always a danger of being trapped within the station itself. Therefore, the disruption should be in areas feeding the railway station rather than at the railway station itself. As most railway stations also have a redlight district nearby, it is an ideal location to use as escape routes. During the daylight hours, an area near a outdoor shopping area or open market are ideal escape routes — especially if filled with innocent bystanders.On 23 Jul, college students gathered at Seoul Station to protest. The pattern will be of disrupting a large amount of people attempting to head home with minimal amounts of protestors — and if the riot police show up, the disruption then becomes even greater. With 200-300 people, you can create a major disruption in the transportation system by blocking people’s entrance/exit to and from the subway. Probably the most popular method will be the sitdown strike to block the stairs leading up and down to the platforms at a subway station. There will be a lot of angry people but most will not attack the protestors and simply look for another exit. They will notify the police, but by the time the police arrive, they will have dispersed. This is simply and inconvenience method — but still effective. The protestors will have the advantage of being able to meld into the crowds and depart the area using the subway.
• 4 Public bus transportation: This could be as simple as creating a blockage of the intra-city bus lane of a major city where at a large number of intra-city bus lines intersect — or better yet blocking the entire street. For example, at major subway stations the bus lines intersect. There are usually bus stops where many intracity bus lines stop. Buses on a tight schedule will simply bypass any blockage leaving people stranded — causing a disruption of service. These blockages would have to be done by large group (1,000-3,000 demonstrations as it is shutting down a major artery.For intercity bus traffic, the roads leading to the bus terminal are best. Unfortunately, most of these locations have police stations nearby making them poor choices. These blockages would have to be done by large group (1,000-3,000 people) demonstrations.
• 5. Air transportation: The same goes for choke points leading to the major airports. Most regional airports usually have only one developed road leading to and from the airports. The blockage of the roads will stop cargo and passengers from reaching their flights. However, because only a few people are usually affected, these are probably not good choices for protests. Remember that the rule is for a maximum disruption of service in order to gain publicity. These will probably be left alone.
• 6. Ship terminals/Cargo container terminals: Most passenger ship terminals are located in the outer port areas of the harbor cities. There are usually multiple choke points. However, because this will impact only a few people, it probably will not be undertaken. Remember that the rule is for a maximum disruption of service in order to gain publicity. These will probably be left alone.Stoppages of a cargo terminal will probably NOT be effective because there are too many entrances and exits for the container trucks. The KCTU has practiced this form of blockage in the past during the anti-US beef demonstrations at the warehouses in Yongin. As a hit-and-run tactic it will not be effective.
• 7. Public Services: These are usually out of the scope of hit-and-run protestors because of the technical problems. If they attempt to disrupt electrical or water systems, these pose grave danger for the perpetrator of the act — as well as to bystanders who may get electrocuted or have similar harm done to them. As most of the hit-and-run guerillas will be young, most will not have the expertise to accomplish this. In addition, these types of sabotage are usually for very refined activist groups or communist infiltrators. We believe that there will be no attempts to disrupt the public services by these hit-and-run groups.
• 8. Internet Hacking/Server Attacks: This is the greatest danger area from these guerilla groups. Many are computer literate and attempts will be made to hack into government systems simply to disrupt services.The favorite technique of the younger internet users is to simply overload a server by making too many inquiries in a short space of time. These can be easily coordinated through the internet. Though this would not be generally listed under hit-and-run crimes, the impacts are as great or greater than those of the physical hit-and-run protestors. In recent months, this technique has been used against the KNP and Chosun/Joongang/Donga newspapers to shut down their servers.But the major problem is that the protestors have now progressed to the level of being thugs. After the shops in the Chonggak area moved to sue the organizers for recompensation, the internet group published their names and phone numbers on the internet. Immediately the shops were besieged by threatening phone calls and people blocking the entrance to the shops. Threatening phone calls have also been received at government agencies.By publishing the names, phone numbers and addresses of the individuals that offend the activist NGO group organizers, the accused people will be subject to intimidation and threats.

E. PREDICTION: COORDINATION VIA INTERNET AND CELLPHONES:

As was shown by the latest anti-US beef protests, the power of the internet cannot be underestimated. Intercommunication through text messaging has also been shown to be very effective. To set up a demonstration, a bulletin board (i.e., Agora on Daum) can start looking for “volunteers.” They will be told to visit a chat site where they will be recruited. Once set up, the people would become part of a “cell” of 10-15 and the organizers will encourage new members to recruit their friends. Each of the cells will be autonomous to ensure that if there is a breach in security, only a small number of people will be affected.

Targets will be selected by shadowy NGO activist groups working in the background. The information will be passed to the “cell” leader. After a target is selected and escape routes planned, the entire group would be told where to assemble using mass text messaging. The group will be briefed and implement the plan.

First attempts will probably be very clumsy and unsuccessful. However, the groups will learn from their mistakes and become more proficient at disruptions after a few times. Like the activist NGO groups between 2002-2003, there first results to obtain attention for their causes were very poor. However, once they joined forces, they started to gain the public attention and achieved their goals.

It is possible that the police could infiltrate a group, but there will be too many autonomous groups floating around. The police could attempt to monitor and trace the IPs of individuals, but the chances are slim for its success as the police cannot monitor ALL the bulletin boards and chat rooms 24 hours a day.

If you’re thinking that this all sounds much like the US Communist Party operations of the early 1950s, you are right. But then look at the activist NGO groups and key players. The activist NGO groups represented during the latest anti-US beef protests along with the KEWTU and KCTU all are demanding the right to visit North Korea in August — to coordinate with their peers in friendship.

F. PREDICTION: WEAPONS BECOME TOOLS:

According to police, metal pipes that symbolize violent protests appeared four times between June and July during which candlelight vigils were held on and off. The metal pipes were used on June 7, 26 and 28, and suddenly reappeared on July 17. It was revealed that they fully planned and prepared for the violent protest, shooting the police with slingshots and preparing raincoats in case police use the water canon. “These protesters prepared beforehand one metal pipe, two hammers and one fire shooter to stage a violent and radical rally,” explained police.

However, in the future, we believe that dangerous weapons such as pipes and poles will disappear simply because of the transportation problems and the inability to disguise these weapons on public transportation. The use of the long multi-battery flashlights that can be used as a club will probably NOT be chosen as it is a close-in, hand-to-hand combat weapon and is also too heavy to carry. The squirt guns filled with acid will also fall out of use. Sling shots with metal ball bearings may fall out of use. The new weapons/tools of the guerilla hit-and-run protestors will be lightweight, portable and disposable.

The aim for a guerilla operation will be weapons/tools to be used to immobilize traffic or a service operation– NOT for personal protection or for inflicting harm to the police. The objective will be to disappear BEFORE the police arrive, so even for large scale groups (100-200 people), the idea of getting into a face-to-face conflict in which they are outnumbered is discarded. The new weapons/tools will NOT be for face-to-face conflicts with police.

Therefore, the type of weapons will be light-weight and disposable — and dual purpose. We believe the new weapon of choice will be the spray paint can. It can be used to leave grafitti messages on buildings and structures. At the same time, it makes an excellent flamethrower — in conjunction with a hand-held lighter — for short distance to back up any hostile crowds.

Flags and banners will still be an integral part of any protest as the items are very portable. The pole consists of the collapsable fishing rod and a nylon flag/banner can be easily folded to fit into a backpack. As a weapon, the fiberglass fishing rods were seen in the past protests being used against the riot police as the protestors beat upon them with the poles.

We also believe that protestors will start carrying some tools such as hammers and pliers/bolt cutters to break into buildings or cut off locks on gates to make their getaway. These tools may assist the hit-and-run guerillas as they will be improvising on most of their attacks. The hammers will prove useful if hammering nails to make a picket to flatten tires — or deface public buildings. The hammer can also be used to attack car windshields to create confusion and chaos in affecting their escape.

Nails and brads can be used to disable tires but these probably will be of limited value. The spreading of nails and brads onto a street will only cause slow leaks to tires. Those with simply welding skills may fabricate these brads beforehand in home workshops. An X-board with nails embedded thrown across a street will cause instant blowouts — and hopefully accidents to tie up a road for hours. Again we repeat the protestors must be ruthless and not care if others sustain injuries.

We noticed in the 19 Jul demonstration, the protestors used roman candles to fire over the heads of the police. This was only used as a taunting tool — hoping that the police would turn on the water cannons. In the hit-and-run tactics, these types of fireworks are worthless, but may find other uses in creating confusion and chaos to disrupt operations. Again the hit-and-run protestors intended to NOT get into a face-off with police operating under the principle of maximum effectiveness with minimum personnel and minimal risk.

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