The following is about the 90th Bomb Squadron (LNI) which later evolved into the 90th Fighter Squadron — the Dicemen — of Elmendorf AFB after being returned to their original wing, the 3rd Wing — Grim Reapers.
The Korean War Starts — “The 731st becomes the 90th”
At the outset of the Korean conflict the 3rd Bomb Group was at a two Squadron level (8th BS and 13th BS) with the 731st Bomb Squadron (L-NA) from the USAF Reserves attached to it. On June 25, 1951, the 731st was redesignated the 90th Bombardment Squadron (Light - Night Intruder) and absorbed all aircraft and personnel of the 731st. The 90th BS (L-NI) operated from Iwakuni Air Base, Japan where the 3d Bomb Group had moved in July 1950 from Yokota Air Base, Japan.
Iwakuni Tower 1950
Click on the photo to enlarge
(From the 731st BS (L-NA) Homepage)
Bob McFarland in his history of the 731st written in late June 1951 said, “When the 731st landed in Japan, we were detached from the 452nd and attached to the 3rd Bomb Group (L). There were mixed feelings concerning the shift. Mostly, we, as Reservists, were being thrown in with the Regulars, like so many lambs thrown to the wolves. It wasn’t long until we discovered that as a whole, the Officers and Airmen of 3rd were a swell bunch. Little did we now the 3rd is one of the oldest organizations in the Air Force.”
Bob continued, “By September, four crews had completed a stepped-up schedule (at George Air Force Base, California) and flew their planes to Japan where they were attached to the 3rd Bomb Group and started flying combat the day after arrival. A short time later, the balance of airplanes, crews and ground support personnel were transported by air and water.”
“With their training focused on RADAR & SHORAN, they became the Night Intruders, the radar and electronic eyes of the Tactical Air Force. This was the only B-26 squadron trained in this fashion. They were pulled out of the 452nd and assigned to the 3rd Bomb Group to bring that group up to strength. The 452nd flew daylight missions from Pusan Korea and the 3rd flew night missions from Iwakuni, Japan.”
“In late June 1951, the 731st was deactivated - ON PAPER - and the 90th which was one of the other WWII squadrons with the 3rd, was reactivated. All the equipment and remaining personnel was then transferred to the 90th. By this time the 731st had flown more than 9000 hours of combat and 2000 missions under every conceivable disadvantages: bad weather, patched-up airplanes; weary personnel and few replacements. They had flown all sorts of missions including high, medium and low-level bombing, visual and radar bombing, front-line support, flare drops, armed reconnaissance, strafing and rocketry… and had the distinction of flying the 10,000 mission for the 3rd Bomb Group.”
731st Members with 50+ missions
Iwakuni AB, Japan
(From 731st BS (L-NA) Homepage)
Click on Photo to enlarge
Roderick W. Clarke of Old Town Alexandria, Virginia added, “When I arrived in May 51 the unit was designated as the 731st Sq which had been one of the four squadrons of the 452nd Wing, a reserve wing based at Long Beach, CA when the war broke out. Many of the ground crew members had been employed by the Douglas Aircraft Company, the manufacturers of the A (B)-26. They provided excellent maintenance and other support which we, the aircrews, thought was a tad better than that provided to the 8th and 13 Squadrons.”
Manned by personnel from the 731st Bomb Squadron (L-NA), the 90th continued to attack supply routes and airfields. After the mammoth Chinese drive was stopped short of Seoul and the Communists were steadily driven northward again. Only a Chinese request of “peace talks” and international politics halted the United Nations advance in June of 1951. On 13 June Gen Van Fleet ordered by Washington to halt the attack and wait for armistice negotiations. UN forms a Main Line of Resistance (MLR). On 20 June 1951, the UN Command stopped the Allied offensive as peace negotiations began at Panmunjom. Close air support (CAS) flights were now flown only on orders from Air Force/Army combined higher authority. With the details arranged, armistice talks between U.N. Command and NKPA/CPVA representatives begin at Kaesong on 10 July 1951. U.S. Adm. C. Turner Joy headed the U.N. delegation. From the start there were problems when the NKPA/CPVA barred UN Press teams and Adm. Turner walked out. Later the press was allowed in.
In July, the squadron pounded enemy supply routes, airfields, and supply concenterations in Korea. On July 20, Chinese suggested a recess until July 25, so “each side could reconsider the views presented by the other side.” On hearing this, Ridgway got suspicious and ordered an all out bombing of Pyongyang on July 25. On 23 July, the Far East Air Force, accompanied by naval aircraft, launched a massive air strike against North Korea’s hydroelectric power grid, causing a blackout that lasts for almost two weeks. Results of the air strike extend into northeast China, which loses almost 25 percent of its electrical power. According to Causes of War, on July 27, US delegate offered a truce line with a 20 mile DMZ bordered on the battle line which would gain 12000 square km land from communist control, this relegation on previous US positions shocked the communists delegates, and they reproposed a truce line along the 38th with a 20km DMZ. On 27 July, the negotiations reached an impasse when Nam Il, the chief delegate for North Korea, lost his temper at a U.N. proposal that the military demarcation line be based on the present battle lines. On 28 July, President Truman says it’s uncertain if the communists in Korea are “simply trying to gain by negotiations what they have not been able to gain by conquest. We intend to find that out.”
On 30 July in order to keep pressure on the communists, Gen. Ridgway ordered massive air attacks on Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. Four hundred forty-five planes hit the city. The AFHRA stated “July 30: In the largest single mass attack for the month on targets in the Pyongyang area, ninety-one F-80s suppressed enemy air defenses while 354 USMC and USAF fighter bombers attacked specified military targets. To avoid adverse world public opinion during on-going peace negotiations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff withheld information on the strike from the news media.” (See Maps from Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow: November 1950-July 1951(Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1990) for reference maps and Lines of Conflict: 1 July 1951 for Pyongyang location.)
The entire 3rd Bomb Wing was involved in this push that included every available USAF fighter bomber from the 8th FBW along with USMC support from the 1st MAW. Korea — 50 years ago… states, “On July 30, the Far East Air Force carries out a bombing raid on Pyongyang. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, United Nations Supreme Commander, has convinced the political leadership and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it is necessary to keep military pressure on the communists to keep them at the bargaining table. The raid is directed against military targets in the North Korean capital. Bad weather prevents medium bomber participation in the attack, but Air Force fighter and fighter-bomber crews fly 450 sorties. Damage assessments cannot be made because of weather and dense smoke.”
Ford Garvin, Navigator with the 90th Bomb Squadron, remembered this mission and describes the 90th’s portion. He wrote in 2005,
“I think you might be interested in the day light formation mission to Pyongyang. At this time Intelligence reported that virtually every building in Pyongyang had one wall removed so the first floor of the buildings were used as garages for the many trucks bringing supplies in from China during the nighttime . During the day the trucks were in the buildings, any needed maintenance and or repairs were performed out of the weather and the crews were fed and rested up for the next nights run down to the MLR ( Main Line of Resistance ) The decision was made at higher Headquarters to literally wipe Pyongyang off the map . An all-out raid against Pyongyang was planned . This would be the first 1000 plane raid since WWII The 90th Bomb was to be the last formation over the target that day with many single ship follow ons that evening.
“The 90th put up 36 A/C in two groups of 18 each. I was the Wing Lead Navigator, Lt/Col Moyer was the Lead Pilot and Col. Nils Ohman was the Mission Commander Col. Ohman also acted as Copilot for Col Moyer. I hate to admit it but I can’t remember who the Shoran operator was.
“As I recall Col. Ohman was being groomed for a B/G star in SAC and was temporarily with the 3rd Bomb Wing to get some recent combat experience.
“The briefing was normal until the briefing people put the route overlay up. We had already had the weather overlay, the flak overlay, evasion and escape and everything else you could think of but when the route overlay went up I think all the Navigators and half the Pilots raised their hand. After the bomb run we were to fly straight for, as I recall, three minutes then turn on a heading of 121 degrees. Because I was in the front row I was asked what all the hands were for. When I requested that they superimpose the Flak overlay onto the Route overlay it became apparent. That 121 degree turn put us right over the most feared flak position in North Korea . I forget the name of the Flak Position but it consisted of three radar controlled 76mm guns that were manned by Russian crews that were training Chinese and North Koreans. These guys were good and should be avoided under all circumstances. Col. Ohman got on the phone to 5th A/F and said they couldn’t tell us why but the heading was correct. I was hoping that maybe they had some fighters that were going to come in low and knock the guns out, that would sure be fine with me.
“I don’t believe a single crew had flown formation since WWII. Believe it or not, the take off and form up from Iwakuni was excellent, not a single glitch. As I recall not a single plane out of 36 aborted. We slowly climbed up to our bombing altitude of 12,500 ft. The bombs were right on the target. We encountered no enemy fighters and absolutely no flak After we turned to 121 degrees I started staring at the three 76 mm guns I of course couldn’t see them but I knew exactly where they were in a very prominent crook in a river. As I was staring at the gun position Col. Ohman said over the intercom ” OK Navigator where’s all that flak you were talking about ” Just as he said that I could see the muzzle blasts of all three guns, so I replied ” Check your watch Col. it will hit us in 12 seconds” and it sure did. For those that don’t know, a good rule of thumb is that heavy flak (anything over a 40mm) comes up at around a thousand feet per second. Within 30 seconds or less 7 of the 18 A/C were knocked out of formation. All the planes made it to South Korea and there were no fatalities but lots of wounded and washed out aircraft . One Pilot called and said “My Navigator is dead and I’m hit, I will try to make it to Seoul.” A few minutes later he said he was getting back into formation. He was told to get off the air and go to Seoul, and he did.
“When we got back to Iwakuni Col. Ohman called 5th Air Force to find out what happened. He got absolutely no satisfaction . After we got out of the flak I called the second group of 18 A/C and gave them a different heading to avoid these particular guns , The second group was never even fired at.
“The Pilot who said he wanted to rejoin the formation after saying that he was hit and his Navigator was dead was the last one to come back to Iwakuni . It seems that a piece of flak about 5 inches by 2 inches went through the windshield between the Pilot and the Navigator . It appears that the piece of windshield hit the Navigator in the nose knocking him out and giving him a terrific nose bleed. The pilot had his sleeves rolled up and his arms were all cut up by small pieces of glass. When they finally got back to Iwakuni the front of the Navigators flying suit was absolutely covered in blood.
“I believe that the 3rd bomb wing did a fabulous job and the entire Wing should be commended. Flying a good formation with lots of practice is difficult at best, doing it with no practice what so ever is damn near impossible. That was one of many days that I was proud to say that I was in the 3rd Bomb Wing.
Later Ford wrote, “As a follow up history for the July 1951 raid on Pyongyang . the 3rd Bomb Wing carried a mixture of fire bombs and 500 pounders with delayed action fuses . The fuses were set randomly from 30 minutes to 72 hours . This was to keep the fires spread around and to discourage the fire fighters. I remember flying over Pyongyang 6 or 8 weeks later and the entire city was just one big vegetable garden. As I recall there also were a couple of B-29 formations involved as well as some RAAF fighter sweeps. I am pretty sure that it added up to over a thousand planes, many of which flew more than one sortie.”
Squadron Moves to Kunsan AB (K-8)
On 21 August 1951, the squadron moved to Kunsan Air Base (K8), South Korea after the Allied forces gained a stronger foothold on the peninsula.
 B-26 of the 90th Bomb Squadron (Courtesy of Roy McPherson) Click on photo to enlarge. |
 B-26 #43-5425 (Courtesy of Roy McPherson) Click on photo to enlarge. |
Roderick W. Clarke wrote, “When we deployed from Iwakuni to Kunsan in late August 1951, most of the original ground crew members were still with us although most of the original aircrews had returned to USA-jima. If you have access to the combat loss stats by squadron I think you’ll find that there were significantly fewer losses in the 731st/90th Sq than the 8th and 13th. Much of the difference is attributable to the fact that the aircrews were somewhat older (mid to late 20s) than those of the other two squadrons. But the the ground crews deserve some of the credit.”
90th B-26s on the dirt parking ramp (Dec 1951)
(Courtesy James Heath)
(Click on image to enlarge)
When the first elements of the 90th arrived at Kunsan in Aug 51, the PSP parking areas were still being laid by the 808th and 809th Engineering Aviation Battalions (SCARWAF). As a result, the 90th had to use the old Japanese airstrip (a raised sod strip) as the temporary parking area until the parking area was complete. There was mud everywhere. Ed Moynagh of the 90th BS wrote, “about Aug 51 we left Iwakuni, flew a mission & landed at K-8 [ my first time ] our parking area [ 90th ] was on the far side of the runway on the old Japanese runway [ grass/mud ] dark.”) He continued, “The main runway was “24?, 5000? long, our first parking area was about 1/3 of the way down that runway on the other side [east I think] not at the end, 90 deg. from the 24.” As soon as the PSP was laid, the unit moved over to the north side of the runway.
The original asphalt runway was totally unsatisfactory. Basically, it was like taking-off and landing on a waterbed. Jim Heath of the 809th EAB which was aiding the 808th with the runway repairs, concurred wholeheartedly. He said, “Oh yes I remember the wave and our crews trying to fix it. They said the it was built over a rice paddy that had been there since time began. I saw trucks, graders and bulldozers get stuck. Never saw so much mud…” Jim later wrote, “When it (the runway) was finished it had to dug up and refilled as I remember a truck went over it and it did the wave way thing and the Capt Waters (commander C. CO. 809th) said dig it up and add more fill.”
TO BE CONTINUED:
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