The following is a snippet of a much larger piece I wrote about four years ago after Roh came into office. After a while, I simply threw up my hands in disgust with the spy situation in Korea after Roh sent all the North Korean spies — one of them that the Japanese want because of his alleged involvement in the kidnapping of one of their people — all back to North Korea as a matter of “good faith.”

Roh sought to castrate the NIS and DSC by putting his “left-leaning” comrades into the key positions. He sought to do away with the National Security Law (NSL), but the Constitutional Court prevented it — and the Korean people voiced their opinion that it was still required. Roh backed off the NSL issue — but never gave up trying to water down its provisions.

When Roh took office, the US intelligence sources believed there were as many as 3,000 “sleepers” (North Korean deep-cover) in Korea in unions, academia and business. I believe there are a lot more — and I believe that many of these have now brought in the second-generation to replace them as they retire.

The coastal waters are too porous to protect — and the ROK gave up trying in Kim Young-sam’s tenure.  The fact is the ROK can NOT stop any infiltration,  But in my opinion, the North no longer needs to send in infiltrators — and I believe they have stopped or minimized their infiltration use except as coordinators.  I believe the North now has the internet and enough sympathetic people to send them all the info they need.  Also with the lowering of the borders, infiltrators no longer needed to go South as the “sympathizers” (like the KCTU, KTEWU, etc.) all make annual pilgrimages — with the blessing of the Unification Ministry — to meet with their counterparts in the safety of North Korea.  

During the Roh administration, the NIS only arrested those spies that other nations – such as the Japanese — “forced” them to arrest by telling them they were spies.  I have nothing but disdain for the Roh administration, but I will let history judge Roh Moo-hyun.  However, Lee Myeong-bak and the NIS/DSC are now gearing up to make up for the lost years. The first of the Hancheongryeon fugitive outlaws protected by Roh went to trial in Mar 2008 and the NIS/DSC/KNP announced they were stepping up spy searches in Feb 2008. If you’ve read the papers in the last week, you’ll see they are now targeting the some of the same guys mentioned in my little snippet.

But there is also another important item that I should mention here. I firmly believe that the North Koreans will NEVER invade the South. If the North never invades, there are no SOF (DPRK Special Operations Forces) that will need the “sleeper” assistance. They will remain asleep infinitum. Thus “sleepers” are playing a charade shadow game — hiding and pretending to be something they aren’t. It is all a game without a real purpose. The same holds true for all the spies — they are sending material that can be obtained over the internet or read in the papers or copied off of Google Earth. All this information is useless if there is no end invasion to take place. Again, I do NOT believe the North will ever invade the South. If I didn’t believe this down to my toes, I would have left Korea long ago.

However, I should also point out that since I wrote this piece North Korean defectors have increased dramatically — though the ROK is dragging their feet and allowing entry only reluctantly. However, this element is something that the DPRK is taking seriously and looking at assasinations on ROK soil to intimidate and frighten defectors. The NIS and DSC have long suspected that DPRK spies were being brought in, but the Roh administration pro-DPRK policies handcuffed them from looking. FINALLY they are now looking. If my suspicions are true, this is only the first of MANY that will be surfacing — and everyone associated with the progressive camp had better be looking over their shoulders.

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NIS and DSC under Roh Moo-hyun

According to a June 2003 Time Asia article, “As South Korea has evolved into a progressive democracy, however, the agency’s vicious methods and anticommunist agenda have increasingly become an outdated national embarrassment. Now, the reform-minded administration of South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun has set about rehabilitating the agency—or, as some believe, castrating it.” (21)

Abolition of the law was one of the public pledges of the administration of President Roh Moo-hyun. As a reflection of this new mood, President Roh Moo-hyun upon taking office in 2003 immediately assigned a North Korean sympathizer to the position of the Director of the National Security Planning Agency. President Roh alienated the National Assembly when he appointed a “left-leaning” individual, Ko Young-koo, to head the National Intelligence Service to “reform” it. The National Assembly voiced strong opposition as his nominee was considered as having no experience for the top intelligence job. As Roh did not need the National Assembly approval, he angrily appointed him despite the opposition. (See NIS and National Security Law.) To add salt to the wounds, the National Assembly National Security Committee objected to the nomination of Suh Dong-man to the head of the NIS Planning and Coordination department because they openly claimed he was a “North Korean sympathizer.” “We seem to have forgotten that North Korea is communist and is still eager to reunify the two Koreas under communism,” says lawmaker Hahm Seung Heui, a member of the bipartisan National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee. (21) Roh brushed this aside and he was appointed anyway.

Critics see Roh’s appointment of liberal lawyers and activists to run the NIS as a political gambit to further his policy of engagement with the North. With Ko at the helm, “the agency will be pro-North Korean,” fumes Chung Hyung Keun, a conservative lawmaker and former spy catcher. (21) After his impeachment was overturned, President Roh Moo-hyun returned the resignation submitted by the head of the nation’s chief spy agency, paving the way for him to control his agency for a considerable time. Ko Young-koo, director of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), presented his resignation just after Roh was reinstated by the Constitutional Court on May 14.

A new reform blueprint curtailed the agency’s domestic-spying operations and abolished its anticommunist bureau. Hundreds of operatives whose jobs were to infiltrate “subversive” groups, including labor unions, now lawfully gather intelligence on foreign-business competitors overseas.

From President Roh’s perspective, Ko was credited with making the NIS “less domestically oriented.” Since taking office, Ko has been emphasizing the spy agency’s role in collecting information overseas and preventing the outflow of advanced technologies from domestic companies. It has been notorious in the past for political maneuvering to benefit the candidates of ruling parties in the lead up to various elections. Ko has been urging NIS officials not to meddle in domestic politics or general elections under any circumstances.

The NIS will be responsible for ferreting out North Korean spies. But the job of catching domestic sympathizers will be passed to the country’s Korean National Police (KNP) — a task which it is ill-prepared, ill-equipped, ill-trained and has no will to pursue. The shift in responsibilities, as well as efforts to make the NIS more accountable, have made the agency a toothless tiger in less than a year. It is believed that this action would give freer rein to the thousands of North Korean agents believed to be operating in the South. (21)

The extent that the Roh administration has shifted the view of “communists” was seen in Jun 2004 when the Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths said that “those who struggle against unjust government forces to defend one’s ideology and conscience, despite refusing to accept liberal democracy, can be seen as in association with the democratization movement.” Seo Jae-il from the truth commission revealed that, “Choi and Park were North Korean spies in the 1950s and Sohn was a pro-North guerrilla.” Regarding the suspicious deaths of these three people, the first commission in 2002 stated they had no relation to the democratization movement and dismissed the matter. However, the second truth commission in 2004 said, “During the conversion procedures, their basic human rights were violated. Since the illegalness of the converting system and the law-abiding oath was revealed while they were struggling to follow procedures, it can be seen as a contributing to democracy,” and approved their deaths as suspicious deaths. The truth commission added, “The conversion system itself was basically illegal and the freedom in ideology and conscience that is stated on the constitution is an internal freedom that cannot be forced.” Thus under Roh, communist spies who die in confinement contributed to democracy. (21a) Because of the public outcry, a panel under the Prime Minister’s Office expressed disagreement with the recognition of two North Korean spies as people who fought for democracy. On 7 July 2004, the hastily assembled panel stated, “Because they denied our country’s constitutional order and threatened our national security, we cannot recognize them as pro-democracy fighters even if they insisted on the abolition of antidemocratic laws while in prison,” the panel said. (21b) On 16 July 2004, it was revealed that three “investigators” convicted of spying for communist North Korea were found to be working on the Presidential Truth Commission. Although the three men have had their civil rights reinstated under government amnesties by Kim Dae-jung, their service on a sensitive presidential investigative panel stirred angry protests by critics of reformist President Roh Moo-hyun. (21c) One handed over military secrets to the North in return for operational funds. He was arrested in 1993 and served in prison for four years. Another person was an official of the anti-state South Korean Socialist Workers’ League who was arrested in 1990 and served eight years’ imprisonment.

As soon as the responsibility for catching “domestic sympathizers” was passed to the KNP, the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, a state-run human rights watchdog established by Kim Dae-jung, in June 2004 accused law enforcement agencies of giving points for convictions in cases involving suspected violation of National Security Law (NSL). This resulted in a massive violation of the human rights of suspects. The number of people arrested for suspected violation of the NSL stood at 7,778 from 1961-2002. (64) After the Uri Party consolidated their hold on the National Assembly, in August 2004, the party proposed legislation that would revise the inter-Korean exchange law; legislate the inter-Korean relation development law; and abolish/revise the NSL simultaneously. The Uri Party felt that the NSL should be nullified in order to remove “basic problems running counter to democracy and the mprovement of inter-Korean relations.” Concerning the follow-up measures after the law is abolished, the Uri Party is divided into two factions: one supports the legislation of an alternative law, considering public sentiment, while the other claims that an alternative law is not necessary because the criminal law can cope with related cases. Plans are underway to submit a revision of the NSL instead of the abolition. Clauses that define what organizations are anti-state and a clause designating “groups claiming to be a government” so that North Korea is no longer considered anti-state organization. In this way, pro-North groups prosecution would be dramatically reduced. (21d)

“The law has been so widely applied that its subjects not only include novels and movies but also citizens’ jokes during a drinking party,” the report read. “It served not as a law, but as a chief tool to instill into citizens’ consciousness that thoughts that deviate from government-prescribed political thinking should be punished.” It is the first time in memory that a governmental body has criticized the law. Since its adoption in 1948 to counter internal threats generated by North Korea, the National Security Law has provoked controversy in civil society.

“The purpose of this law is to restrict anti-state activities which endanger national security, so that the nation’s security and the life and liberty of the citizens can be secured,” the law’s first article says. Many civic groups and human rights activists say that the law has been twisted and used for witch hunts and political persecution. It has been used to imprison people who were thought to be inclined to communist ideology. (64a)

In May 2003, President Roh ordered the NIS to stop its surveillance of media organizations and government ministries. It was strange that it was at the same time that Roh launched his attack on the “gangster press” — and attempted to weaken their power by limiting their market share.

By the same token, the Defense Security Command (DSC) has been relegated to an intelligence gathering function. Unfortunately, the reliance on U.S. spy satellites for information and U.S. sources for intelligence data outside of Korea has proven to be a great weakness in the organization. The bulk of the intelligence that the South receives is from the U.S. and there are concerns over real-time intelligence and the future effectiveness of the NIS. The exchange of intelligence between the two countries is immensely important and if the process breaks down it could trigger a crisis.

There has been friction developing ever since Robert Kim, a Korean-American analyst with Naval Intelligence, provided documents to the ROK Military Attache dealing with the 1996 submarine incursion during the Kim Young-sam administration. Robert Kim was sentenced to 9 years and 3 years probation for espionage, but was released after 7 years in prison for good behavior in 2004. (25) In July 2004, Robert Kim demanded the South Korean government to acknowledge his contribution and restore his honor. “The South Korean government has never said whether they have received my help or not,” he told a news conference. “My reputation will be restored only if they say they received my assistance. There was no comment from the ROK government, though the media continued to paint him as a native son and hero. (25b)

However, according to US Federal Bureau of Investigation wiretaps, Robert Kim and his brother Kim Yung-gon devised a plan to “acquire”, reverse engineer and sell a secret US military computer system to the South Korean government, a plan that if successful would likely have ensured the two brothers a huge windfall for their efforts. Robert Kim acquired export permits and licenses that would have allowed the Kim brothers to export stolen, sensitive technology to South Korea under the guise of normal technology trade. These licenses were ultimately revoked by the US Department of Commerce in June 2000.

Espionage in intelligence agencies is not new. Money, blackmail - the motivators are many, but the gall of Kim claiming his treasonous behavior was motivated only by love of his birth country is frustrating, not supported by fact, and wholeheartedly accepted by the South Korean press and relayed as truth to the Korean people, many of whom consider Kim a hero and a patriot - nationality notwithstanding. That Robert Kim is guilty of sedition is incontrovertible. He was not tried and found guilty, but rather pleaded guilty to “conspiring to gather national defense information” when confronted with the mountain of evidence investigators had compiled. He pleaded guilty and cut a deal on sentencing; a deal that in 1997 reflected the strong desire of the US government to maintain the perception of a strong US-South Korea alliance, vital to maintaining the deterrence component of the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea. (25b)

In fact, the Korean-American community has become suspect as John Joungwoong Yai, 59, a naturalized citizen who had lived in the U.S. for over 20 years, was accused of operating within the United States at the direction and control of North Korean officials. Authorities say he gathered information and forwarded it to the North Korean government over several years. (25a)

In May 1998, eight Korean-Americans, who had been intermediaries between South Korean businesses and North Korea under Kim Young-sam’s Government, were blacklisted by the ROK saying they were “pro-communists and unreliable, and should not be contacted.” Those listed were:

• Kim Young-hun, 58, (head of the Korean Security Institute of the U.S. Security Council), (38j)
• Kim Yang-il, 58, (advisor to the Korea U.S. Food Federation), (38j) — Alleged that “Kim Yangil, the Korean American who had arranged Jung Jaemung contact went to Seoul on November 28. A high-ranking ANSP agent in Tokyo accompanied him on a first-class seat. He was met by four top ANSP brass at the airport and receive a VIP treatment”. (38k) He is listed as a Korean-American ‘businessman’ (honorary chairman of the Los Angelese Korean Food Service Association), was present at a meeting of Chun Chaemung (a Kim Dae Jung supporter) and Ahn Byong Soo, a North Korean official, in Beijing on November 20, 1997. The ANSP claims that Kim delivered $3.6 million dollars to Ahn as a bonus for North Korea’s cooperation in the North Wind project, but Kim denies this allegation. Kim was instrumental in arranging a meeting of Kim Young Sam (prior to his election as President) and Huh Dam (a North Korean official). Kim got to know Ahn Byong Soo and Chun Chaemung from this meeting. Kim has been to North Korea several times. Kim wants to help improve North Korean argriculture and is working to procure fertilizers for North Korea. (38l)
• David Chang, 55, (senior vice-president of Nikko Trade), (38j)
• Tony Namkung, 53, (consultant for the Atlantic Council), (38j)
• Kim Young-jin, 70, (professor of George Washington University), (38j)
• Park Kyong-yoon, (chairman of the Kumkangsan International Group), (38j)
• Scott Oh, 33, (consultant for AZ&C), (38j)
• Oh Jong-hwan, 47, (president of United Projects). (Kim In-ku, ginko@chosun.com) (38j)

The U.S. sources in turn have accused the DCS of not providing access to North Korean defectors information. While the US has high-tech abilities through satellites to monitor North Korea, South Korea has strength in human intelligence gleaned from defectors. The problem is the Koreans are reluctant to share the information extracted or don’t provide everything. Ready access to defectors gives South Korean analysts a better sense of the validity of what they are told and the ROK is reluctant to share its intelligence. (61)

In Mar 2004, the U.S. military intelligence community was reported to be “frustrated in its attempts to obtain information on North Korea - including access to defectors - from the South’s National Intelligence Service.” Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy caused the present difficulties by gagging defectors from making embarrassing comments on the North. Supposedly, “defectors have had to keep a low-profile in South Korea, partly due to the protectiveness of South Korean officials concerned with offending the North and giving ammunition to US hawks.” (61)

Fast, complete access to defectors is vital to the U.S. intelligence community in light of how little the CIA knows about the extent of Pyongyang’s nuclear programs, but the access is being denied. The ROK relies almost exclusively on US intelligence information from satellite monitoring, but its intelligence in not reciprocal. The case of Mr. Hwang Jang-yop, who was a North Korean party secretary before defecting seven years ago is at the heart of the current problems. Hwang and a top aide who defected with him arrived in Seoul from Beijing, where they had sought refuge in the South Korean Embassy, several months before Kim Dae-jung’s election in December 1997. Although the government was conservative until Kim’s inauguration in February 1998, CIA officials had to wait several months before getting to see Hwang, and they never had the steady access they would have liked. Then, when a North Korean officer in charge of a missile unit and a former senior official at North Korea’s Nuclear Research Institute came to South Korea in 2003, the ROK hid them in a rural area. (61) Hwang first claimed to have a list of “10,000″ spies, but later dropped that to those he knew. However, he has not been able to meet privately with the U.S. intelligence sources. Even when he visited the U.S. in 2003, he was not allowed to be alone in any room with U.S. officials — even though the American government guaranteed his safety.

President Roh then sought to seek actions to pardon former student leaders of Hangcheonyong, Federation of College Student Council leaders, who were implicated when they were found to have direct links to North Korea — and operated as a North Korean front. These outlawed leaders have been in hiding for a decade — with some residing on university campuses in Seoul and some fleeing to North Korea. It is interesting that one of these outlawed student leaders appeared on one of Roh’s transition teams after he was elected as President in 2003. The Roh camp simply treated it as an administrative error stating the individual didn’t know he had a warrant outstanding on him — a somewhat unbelievable explanation. (See Roh Moo-hyun: Reformist or Anti-American?.)

The “openess” of the Roh administration attracted home Song Du Yul, 59, a sociology professor at Munster University in Germany, after 36 years in exile. Though invited home by a private group, his pending arrival was tacitly approved by the Roh administration as it took no moves to block his entry. A German citizen, he left South Korea in 1967. He had been outspoken in his criticism of the regime of the South Korean military dictator Park Chung Hee during some of the darkest moments of the cold war. At first proclaimed in the press as a returning hero of democracy, everything went swimmingly. Then Hwang Jang Yop, the high-level North Korean official before his defection to South Korea in 1997, said that Song was known in North Korea under the alias Kim Chul Soo, and was the 23rd-ranking member of the Politburo. From there everything went downhill. Though a German citizen, in March 2004, Song was sentenced to seven years in prison under the National Security Act, under which sympathizing with communism or with Communists, or aiding antigovernment organizations, is interpreted as a crime. (24) President Roh Moo-hyun suggested Song should be treated with leniency although under South Korean law collaboration with a “primary enemy” is prosecutable as a capital crime. In July 2004, his sentence was reduced and on appeal with the Supreme Court, but the key element was that the prosecution did NOT impose a travel ban on him. True to form, in Aug 2004, Song departed for Germany without fanfare — and as there is no extradition treaty, even if the Supreme Court did uphold his conviction, he will not return. The matter for Roh was swept under the carpet.

In March 2004, due to political scandals and claims of incompetence, President Roh was impeached in a political move. There was a nationwide protest — not so much to support Roh, but to condemn the trivial nature for the impeachment. However, in May 2004 Roh’s impeachment was overturned the Constitutional Court. (The vote for reversal was NOT unanimous, but the results of dissenting votes or comments were suppressed.) As such, his actions to continue with the Kim Dae-jung’s “sunshine policy” (now called the “peace and prosperity” policy) dealing with openess with the North Koreans are expected to continue. (See Protests (Jan-Mar 2004) and Protests (Apr-May 2004) .)

On May 18, 2004 Chosun Ilbo reported that a former official of the NIS who retired in October 2000 said that he, along with his family members, applied for political asylum in the United States last December, and is currently waiting for a final ruling. (33) What makes this interesting is that this request implies that the NIS is STILL using its power under the NSL to intimidate people which it considers “unfriendly.” With all the illegal high jinx in the NIS in the past, it makes one curious about what’s going on in the NIS. This request for political asylum reinforces the idea that the abuses of the NIS continues under Roh Moo-hyun and political opponents are still targeted — despite the “reforms” to get out of domestic politics that Roh claims. To request political asylum from the U.S. makes this a “hot potato” for the U.S. — a staunch ally of the ROK.

Kim Ki-sam, 39, said he submitted the application to a refugee office in New Jersey of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Early last year, Kim was accused of violating the NIS Law (charges of leaking secrets obtained while performing his duties) and defamation and is now under the suspension of indictment. Since last January, he has reported about the corruption of former President Kim Dae-jung’s government on various Internet media. Some of the irregularities he claimed include the political maneuverings which brought Kim the Nobel Peace Prize, illegal remittance of $1.5 billion to North Korea and illegal wiretapping by the NIS, as well as articles about weapon procurement corruption in both the Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam governments. Going to America on a tourist visa in March 2002, he is now living with his wife and two children in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. (33)
In July 2004, a couple that came to South Korea as defectors from North Korea has applied for exile in the United States — though having been granted South Korean citizenship. A diplomatic source in Washington said 58-year-old Lee Bok-gu and his wife Lee Sun-hui (not their real names), who fled North Korea in 1997 and came to the South in 1999, have applied with U.S. authorities for exile. Lee is known to have been a North Korean missile engineer, and appeared before U.S. Congressional hearing twice — wearing a mask — to give testimony on North Korean missile development. The couple entered the U.S. through Canada in June; it is known that the husband had a regular U.S. entry visa. The wife, however, tried to smuggle herself across the border without a visa and was arrested. She was detained near Syracuse, New York. As soon as the wife was arrested, the couple applied to U.S. authorities for asylum. On Friday, the wife was released from detention. Concerning Lee Bok-gu’s reasons for seeking exile, the U.S. edition of the Hanguk Ilbo said, “After participating in U.S. Senate hearings last year, [the relationship between Lee] and the South Korean authorities grew strained… Since this is a complicated issue between South Korea and the United States, [Lee] could not say what his reasons were exactly.” The paper felt that in the U.S. Senate hearings, Lee offered testimony on actual conditions in North Korea that was quite critical of South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy,” and afterward came under pressure from South Korean authorities. Another Korea expert in Washington said, “It’s true that Lee was critical of the South Korean government, but I don’t know how he was able to enter the United States with a proper entry visa.” (33a)

In the midst of the controversy, the people like the spokesman for the National Democratic Front of South Korea is still running around South Korea. The claim is that the North Korean sympathizers are responsible for the advances in democracy in Korea. They continue their “anti-US and anti-fascist” struggle. The statement issued on April 19, 2003 marking the 43rd anniversary of the historic April 19 Popular Uprising read: (37i)

Today we greet the 43rd anniversary of the historic April 19 Popular Uprising, which recorded the first victory in the history of anti-US and anti-fascist movement of the south Korean people. The April pro-democracy resistance, in which the empty-handed uprisers destroyed the stronghold of colonial fascism and overthrew Syngman Rhee’s pro-US dictatorship, was eruption of the south Korean people’s pent-up resentment against the US colonial rule and their aspiration and will for independent and democratic politics and a new life.

The uprising, which demonstrated the powerful spirit of resistance and strong aspiration of the people for independence, democracy and reunification, dealt a heavy blow to the US colonial rule and reaffirmed the truth that a dictator who reigns over the people is doomed to meet a miserable end.

The anti-US and anti-fascist struggle in south Korea, which entered a new stage occasioned by the resistance, met a new turn on the occasion of the Gwangju Popular Uprising in the 1980s and has since then developed ceaselessly through the popular resistance in June 1987 that toppled down the fifth Republic military dictatorship.

The nationwide anti-US struggle for independence sparked off with the killing of two schoolgirls by a US armored vehicle in last June, in particular, was a patriotic struggle that followed the spirit of the April resistance 43 years ago, which shook the US colonial rule to its very foundation.

However, we have not yet realized the desire of martyrs. The United States, occupying this land for more than a half century, still violates independence and existence of our people, hampers the nation’s march to achieve reunification with its concerted efforts and threatens the destiny and existence of our nation with dangerous nuclear war moves against north Korea.

Owing to the anti-north maneuvers of the United States and pro-US traitors, the Korean Peninsula is faced with the danger of war and the June 15 inter-Korean joint declaration faces difficulties in its implementation. Today’s reality shows that south Koreans can neither free themselves from the fate of colonial slavery nor evade the danger of nuclear holocaust as long as the US troops remain here.

They should turn out all together in the struggle as the April 19 uprisers did, in order to terminate the US colonial domination, nuclear war moves and US military presence. No force in the world can check the advance of popular resistance. This is a precious experience the April 19 uprising left. All patriotic people should intensify the anti-US struggle by renewing the spirit of resistance and experience of the April 19 uprising.

Seoul
April 19, Juche 92 (2003)

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