By That is the question that Andrei Lankov, one of the North Korean scholars I respect the most, ponders in this editorial in the International Herald Tribune:
The recent rumors about the poor health of Kim Jong Il might be unfounded, but the world got a reminder that the North Korean dictator is mortal – and that his system, outrageously archaic, will not last forever as well. Sooner or later, change will come to Pyongyang.
But who will be the agents of this change? North Korea has neither well-known dissenters nor even public figures who might be seen as independent of the authorities.
This constitutes a striking difference with Eastern Europe. By the 1970s, the authorities in most of the Communist bloc controlled the bodies of their subjects, but not their minds. [International Herald Tribune via Tom Coyner]
Lankov goes into how any form of dissident in North Korea, no matter how small can lead to not only that person being imprisoned in the North’s infamous gulags, but their entire family. Lankov then goes on to discuss how illegal radios and cell phones are being smuggled into North Korea which is allowing for the first time outside information to infiltrate into the country. Lankov believes this entry of outside information into North Korea could set the stage for a North Korean dissident movement if properly supported:
Thus foreign support is vital. One possible solution might be an international foundation whose task would be to support the North Korean intellectuals in exile, giving them an opportunity to continue their work. Their journals and newspapers should be supported with money and technical assistance. Translation of their works into foreign languages would boost their contacts with the outside world.
The cost would not be great – U.S. forces in Korea, whose mission is to counter the North Korean threat, probably spend more on coffee and pastries. These programs, moreover, would help dissolve the threat once and for all, and would also make the road to a democratic North Korea somewhat less bumpy. It is easier to travel such a road with people one trusts, and who have at least some idea of the right direction.
We do not know where a future North Korean Solzhenitsyn is now. He or she might be still living in Pyongyang, or hiding in the Chinese borderlands, or washing cars in Seoul. One thing is clear: He or she needs help, and now is the time to provide it.
I agree fully with Dr. Lankov and this is why I have always believed that the US government should be using the North Korean Human Rights Act to bring defectors to the US in order to organize and educate them. This not only would create an organized external dissident group but by educating them, this group could become the future doctors, teachers, government administrators, essential services operators, etc. in a post-collapse North Korea.
When the country collapses it will be extremely important to have North Koreans rebuild and govern their own half of the peninsula. If South Koreans move in and take up all the political & economic positions while North Koreans are left to do nothing but toil in insignificant political positions and low paying jobs under South Korean bosses this will eventually create animosity and resentment.
Having an organized and educated North Korean dissident group that can advocate for North Koreans abroad and then move in and begin to work with their own people to reconstruct the government after regime collapse, will in my opinion be more acceptable to the North Korean population who are deeply suspicious of South Koreans because of the decades of indoctrination. Even with such a policy in place any reconstruction of North Korea after regime collapse will be extremely difficult and expensive, however allowing North Koreans to rebuild and administer their own half of the peninsula should at least allow the population to feel they are not being occupied and in fact have a stake in the successful reconstruction of their country.
7:56 pm on October 11th, 2008 1
“…I have always believed that the US government should be using the North Korean Human Rights Act to bring defectors to the US in order to organize and educate them. This not only would create an organized external dissident group but by educating them, this group could become the future doctors, teachers, government administrators, essential services operators, etc. in a post-collapse North Korea.”
I’m sorry, but didn’t the US DOD, led by true-believer neocons try and do this with Iraqi exiles to absolutely no avail? Last time I checked, these exiles and dissidents went to Iraq with no indigenous, native support and were, not suprisingly, seen as illegitimate.
My opinion is that sending in individuals and groups that have heavy US backing and support will only create far greater problems should the DPRK regime collapse. The perception that will be created is that the US is, in a redux of 1945-1950, interfering in the affairs of the Korean peninsula.
Reply
9:50 pm on October 11th, 2008 2
The use of Iraqi exiles immediately after the fall of Saddam Hussein failed because the State Department and CIA refused to allow the exiles to be organized or used effectively. State and the CIA kept claiming it was because exiles would not be accepted by the Iraqi population. General Franks eventually bought into this line of thought as well and blocked General Abazaid’s attempts to train and use the exiles.
Using exiles worked immediately after the over throw of the Taliban with Karzai taking over Afghanistan after a Loya Jirga was held. However State and the CIA had no problem with Karzai and thus were not obstructionist to efforts to use exiles in Afghanistan.
State and the CIA were obstructionist to using Iraqi exiles simply of because of each organizations bad blood with Ahmed Chalabi who was head of the main exile group the Iraqi National Congress. The bad blood probably extended from Chalabi’s bungling of his involvement with the Kurdish resistance in northern Iraq that was crushed by a Saddam Hussein military operation in the mid-90’s. Because State and the CIA hated one man they were obstructionist to the efforts of using the exiles in order to prevent in any way Chalabi gaining any political power in Iraq. That is why the State Department advocated for a US occupation with Bremer running the show in Iraq.
With the benefit of hindsight it is readily obvious State and the CIA were wrong about the exiles not being accepted by Iraqi society considering the number of exiles currently holding positions in the Iraqi parliament and the fact that every Prime Minister of the country (Alawi, Jaafari, & Malaki) were exiles. The Iraqi population has clearly accepted the exiles back into Iraqi society.
Would history have been different if an organized and trained Iraqi exile movement was allowed to immediately move into Iraq, aid in the country’s liberation, and begin taking responsibility for the country? I can tell you one thing, it couldn’t be any worse then the 14 month US occupation strategy.
Likewise having trained and educated North Korean exiles to move immediately into North Korea to aid in the country’s reconstruction and lead its political development couldn’t be worse then assigning someone viewed as a foreign occupier to administer the place like Paul Bremer.
Reply
11:48 pm on October 11th, 2008 3
The misuse, or outright refusal of the DoS to not use the in-place Iraqi Army, or Iraqi exiles is just another example of our incompetent leadership.
The military was NOT in charge of these decisions initially, but once the incompetence of DoS was obvious, the authority was turned back over to the military…still, they were unqualified to conduct a counter-insurgency/Anti-terrorist war due to their professional military background training, until the President was finally forced to ask Gen. Petraus to come back in off retirement & provide some unconventional leadership.
Now…well, hopefully the U.S. has learned a thing or two and will start incorporating things like using the disillusioned populace of a country to overthrow and re-establish an acceptable government in countries that are totally oppressive, such as DPRK.
However, as a caveat, I would caution about the use of groups, such as Iraqi-Americans, Korean-Americans, etc., as they do tend to establish their own selfish agendas that may not be conducive to reaching the goals of turning their original countries into an acceptable homeland for all of those that have stuck it out.
Reply
6:40 am on October 12th, 2008 4
“With the benefit of hindsight it is readily obvious State and the CIA were wrong about the exiles not being accepted by Iraqi society considering the number of exiles currently holding positions in the Iraqi parliament and the fact that every Prime Minister of the country (Alawi, Jaafari, & Malaki) were exiles. The Iraqi population has clearly accepted the exiles back into Iraqi society.”
Yes the were exiles but you fail to mention important factors among the three that would cast doubt onto the overall effectivness of using exiles. Allawi and Jaafari were exiles made into prime ministers, but last I checked, Iraq, under these peoples leadership saw the burgeoning and mushrooming of the insurgency. Not a good judgement about the effectivness of using exiles. In regards to Maliki, it’s odd that you make no mention of the fact that he got to his position by making initial compromises and concessions to the Sadrist movement.
Second, you mention the experience of Karzai following the Talibans ouster. But again, you fail to mention that Karzai too had to make serious concessions and compromises with warlords to maintain his power. Also I find it odd that you make no mention of the Northern Alliance in paving the way towards Karzai’s becoming president.
Third, I fail to see how it is the fault of State and CIA that led to the ineffectiveness of using Iraqi exiles after the ouster of Saddam. Last time I checked, State and CIA were essentially sidelined. Moreover, I’d have you consider that State and CIA oppossed de-Baathification and the dismantling of the Iraqi Army. Those two actions were things that were desired on the part of the Iraqi exile groups. They got it and they bungled they’re opportunity. Exile groups thought that they were going to have the US wipe away any sort of opposition to them. They were wrong. Such actions only exacerbated the initial problem. I fail to see how any of the above can be construed as “obstruction”.
Finally, if you want to engage in rosy counterfactuals about what would’ve happend had an exile movement been allowed to blossom and been installed immediately following the ouster of Saddam, so be it. But I would have you consider that such thinking is incredibly myopic. Because at the end of the day it ignores that maybe, just possibly they’re are other groups in factions, already within in Iraq who would want to have they’re say in what direction their country was going to take following Saddam’s ouster. The notion that the US was going to simply fund and train one group, with its own want and interests, over that of other groups within Iraq with their own wants and interests was a miscalculation at best. We ignored the already existing indigenous element within Iraqi society in the name of supporting these exiles and have are in turn paying the price.
Hopefully a such a mistake won’t be repeated should the DPRK regime collapse.
Reply
11:21 am on October 12th, 2008 5
Gaetano is trying to rewrite history again and putting words in my mouth that I didn’t say. This is why you are on moderation because of your tendency to claim people said things they didn’t say. You insinuate that I want exiles to run everything in Iraq and North Korea, I never said such a thing. Exiles can play an important role in the reconstruction and administering of the country.
Notice I mentioned how Karzai was approved through a Loya Jirga who approved of Karzai even though he was an exile. Karzai also led a force of his own men who helped US special forces fight the Taliban in southern Afghanistan. He was seriously wounded in the fighting. The Hunt for Bin Laden provides a good account of Karzai’s involvement in fighting the Taliban:
http://www.amazon.com/Hunt-Bin-Laden-Robin-Moore/dp/0891418385?&camp=212361&linkCode=wsw&tag=gikorea-20&creative=380793
It is clear State and the CIA had no issues with using exiles to fight as well as participate in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Why was Iraq different? It was simply because they didn’t like Chalabi and thus wanted to prevent the involvement of the exile community which ultimately gave legitimacy to the insurgency. In a Lessons Learned briefing in June, 2006 headed by General Myers it was said that the Free Iraqi Forces “could have proven an invaluable asset to the combatant commander during armed conflict”, just like the Karzai’s men were invaluable in fighting in southern Afghanistan. Like I said before the Free Iraqi Forces were not used because Franks bought into the CIA and State’s rationale for not using them though Abazaid was advocating for them.
The insurgency started under the 14 month occupation of Iraq under Paul Bremer, not any of the former Iraqi Prime Ministers. Bremer handed the insurgency to Allawi when he took power. However, the insurgency would have started no matter what happened because it was planned, funded, and operated by the ousted Baathists, which is something the DOD or anyone else did not expect to happen which is probably the biggest blunder of the pre-war planning.
However, the insurgency gained legitimacy with the population because the US government said it was going to liberate Iraq and then suddenly it was occupying the country. The insurgency would have had a hard time gaining legitimacy if the country was handed over to the Iraqis themselves instead of a 14 month occupation. Garner and Khalilzad did a lot of work forming an interim government composed of both exiles and internals and when Bremer took over he threw them to the curb. All you have to do is read Bremer’s book to see how disdainful he was of the Iraqi governing council (pg 123-124). He said in his book of the governing council that was a mixture of both internals and externals, “Those people couldn’t organize a parade, let alone run a country.” Do you think such contempt of both external and internal political leaders in Iraq was helpful to forming an Iraqi government? What do you think those political leaders went back and told their supporters about the US occupation?
Bremer would not approve of any interim Iraqi leadership until a constitution was made which caused the US to be a occupying power legitimizing the insurgency. Bremer actually wanted to be an occupying power for several years in an Op-ed he wrote in the Washington Post which he did not clear with the administration:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/documents/bremerplan.html
Condoleeza Rice and Rumsfeld had to intervene and he was ultimately forced to speed up the process of handing over sovereignty because it became clearly evident the occupation was legitimizing the insurgency and making it difficult for Iraqi political leaders to work for the CPA because they did not want to be seen as aiding the occupiers when the time for elections did come around. Ultimately Bremer’s undoing was when Ayatollah al-Sistani demanded the handing over of Iraqi sovereignty. Sistani is the most respected leader in Iraq and not even Bremer could ignore him.
State and the CIA did not oppose de-Baathfication or dismantling the Iraqi Army, they were for it. In fact in the State Department’s own Future of Iraq Project, de-Baathification was one of it’s key recommendations:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/index.htm
An April 15, 2003 political conference in Nasiriyah was organized by Garner where both internal and external Iraqi political groups gathered. Most of the people who attended the conference were internals. According to Kanan Makiya who worked for the State Department’s Future of Iraq Project and attended the meeting said all the attendees wanted de-Baathification accept for two smaller political parties which one happened to include Allawi’s Iraqi National Accord.
The DOD also supported de-Baathification with the original intention of disbanding the party and barring only high level leaders from holding office and prosecuting war criminals which was about 1% of the 2 million members of the Baath Party. Low level Baath Party members were still eligible for government employment. The CIA and State both agreed with this policy. Bremer admits in an interview that the mistake he made with de-Baathfication is that he gave the implementation of this policy to the Iraqi governing council instead of an Iraqi judicial group. The governing council implemented the policy more broadly then intended to oust political rivals. A judiciary would have allowed people to have a hearing before a judge instead of being simply blackballed from the government by political rivals.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/interviews/bremer.html
The State Department’s Future of Iraq Project also recommended that the Iraqi Army only be cut in half. Jay Garner also recommended not disbanding the Iraqi military to Bremer. However, Bremer went ahead and dismantled the army anyway. In the same interview link above Bremer continues to support his decision to disband the army.
Also the only Prime Minister appointed was Allawi who was appointed as the interim Prime Minister after Bremer left. Jaafari became Prime Minister after the January 2005 elections and he remained in power after the December 2005 elections as well. Malaki became Prime Minister after Jaafari lost confidence from his political block in parliament due to his inability to quell violence in Iraq and losing the endorsement of Ayatollah al-Sistani. With the loss of confidence in Jaafari, Malaki took over in 2006 as Prime Minister. Jaafari and Malaki are both exiles that clearly have legitimacy since they were elected through the parliamentary process to power.
State and the CIA were clearly wrong about the role exiles could play in Iraq and how they can effectively work together with internals to administer the country. To this day there has been no rift between internals and externals in Iraq.
Likewise in North Korea externals can play a key role in the reconstruction of that country as well. For example what internals in North Korea would know anything about modern economic policies? Externals trained in economics could be used to help organize and manage the North Korean economy instead of installing South Koreans to run such important positions.
Any reconstruction of North Korea will be extremely difficult and mistake will be made but at least if North Koreans are administering their own reconstruction at least those mistakes cannot be blamed on the ROK government or the US if the US foolishly decides to get involved in a post-Kim Jong-il regime North Korea.
Reply
1:10 pm on October 12th, 2008 6
I applaud your efforts to make use primary-archival resources to bolster your argument. However, I think that this laudable act on your part is hampered by the fact that you selectively quote from the available sources.
Go through those archives a little more carefully GI, and you’ll find this little nugget:
De-Ba’athification – The Democratic Principles working group overwhelmingly endorsed de-Ba’athification “of all facets of Iraqi life,” with the caveat that such a program “would not consist of the total abolition of the current administration, since, in addition to its role of social control, that structure does provide a framework for social order.” Those former Ba’athists who are not reintegrated into society, most notably members of the Iraqi army, the group foreshadowed, “may…present a destabilizing element, especially if they are left without work or ability to get work.” (4.3.1, Democratic Principles working group) Ultimately, CPA Order 1, issued by Administrator L. Paul Bremer on May 16, 2003, eliminated in its entirety the Ba’ath Party’s structures and removed former members from positions of authority in the “new” Iraq. This decision has since faced intense scrutiny and considerable criticism from outside observers.
Dismantling the Military – In tandem with the de-Ba’athification issue, the Coalition Provisional Authority promulgated CPA Order 2 on May 23, 2003, which dissolved the 400,000-member Iraqi military. Almost one year before this divisive measure, the “Future of Iraq” Project’s Defense Policy and Institutions group had instead advocated gradually halving the army’s size and transforming it as an “important tool for supporting democracy,” with additional long-term tasks like fighting terrorism and drug smuggling. (“A New Iraq: Democracy and the Role of the Army,” May 24, 2002, Defense Policy and Institutions working group)
So there was after all great skepticism about purging wholesale the Saddam era state apparatus by the State Department’s working groups. Your contention that State and CIA were gung-ho about what occured under Bremer is untenable.
Moreover, I find it odd that you accuse me trying to re-write history when you seem to have no problem doing so yourself. You seem to want to argue that Karzai played a significant role in helping the US military oust the Taliban. The documentary evidence indicates that he did but not to the extent that you seem to think he did. The historical record makes clear that it was the US militaries linking with Northern Alliance that was the key in ousting the Taliban. And it was the involvement of the Northern Alliance that Karzai transition into his position.
In other words, what do we have here? Simple, and exile leader who came into power with the influential and significant aiding and backing from a indigenous group.
You also make this statement:
“Likewise in North Korea externals can play a key role in the reconstruction of that country as well. For example what internals in North Korea would know anything about modern economic policies? Externals trained in economics could be used to help organize and manage the North Korean economy instead of installing South Koreans to run such important positions.”
You seem to ignore that North Koreans were able to build a functioning state and economy following liberation from Japan with limited help from foreigners. Yes, that’s right, following liberation the North Korean leaders had enough know how and intellect to build a state and economy with considerable amount of independence. To find out specifically what I mean I suggest you read Charles K. Armstrong’s “The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950″
The main argument of this book can be quoted as thus:
“…despite the Soviet role in its creation, the North Korean state almost from it’s inception was ‘indigenized’: that is it must be seen as a Korean regime, not an import from Moscow.”
I know I’m going to get shit on from people on this site, but I believe it is Bruce Cumings who also said it best:
“First, North Korea evolved an indigenous political system in the late 1940’s, and its basic structure has never changed substantially…Second, the closest comparison to North Korea were Romania and Yugoslavia-not the states under complete Soviet hegemony, such as E. Germany. Third, Soviet influence competed with Chinese influence, and both conflicted with indigenous political forms and practices. The DPRK was and is a divergent case among postwar Marxist-Leninist systems, representing a profound reassertion of native Korean political practice-from the superordinate role of the leader to his self-reliant ideology, to the Hermit Kingdom foreign policy.”
It is this history GI, that your “send US trained exiles to a post-Kim North Korea” utterly ignores. However problematic and tragic such a path has been for the people in North Korea, this past and it’s attendant mythologies still has considerable resonance. This explains why the DPRK regime has still survived despite all that it has faced during its 50 plus years of existence and this is why sending in foreign trained North Korean technocrats will most likely face resistance.
Reply
1:49 pm on October 12th, 2008 7
“Also the only Prime Minister appointed was Allawi who was appointed as the interim Prime Minister after Bremer left. Jaafari became Prime Minister after the January 2005 elections and he remained in power after the December 2005 elections as well. Malaki became Prime Minister after Jaafari lost confidence from his political block in parliament due to his inability to quell violence in Iraq and losing the endorsement of Ayatollah al-Sistani. With the loss of confidence in Jaafari, Malaki took over in 2006 as Prime Minister. Jaafari and Malaki are both exiles that clearly have legitimacy since they were elected through the parliamentary process to power.”
Let me get this straight: Jaafari, despite being an exile, is considered “legitimate” because he was elected prime minister in an election that huge number of Iraqi’s boycotted and because he lost the support of a powerful domestic, indigenous figure such as Sistani?
Moreover, if an exile like Jaafari, who in your estimation has all this “legitimacy”, then why couldn’t he quell the internicine violence that eventually got him sacked?
Reply
2:57 pm on October 12th, 2008 8
In an effort not to put words in GI’s mouth, I would ask him to please define the difference between exiles “controlling” everything and “playing and important” role should the DPRK collapse.
Because when he says that “…by educating them, this group could become the future doctors, teachers, government administrators, essential services operators, etc. in a post-collapse North Korea”, it sounds like these groups, while not in charge of everything, are instead in charge of everything that matters.
Reply
6:05 pm on October 12th, 2008 9
I seriously doubt anything of significance could be accomplished with North Korean defectors. The overwheming majority are people looking for a way out of a destitute country. They have grown up in a society as ferel children outside of the rest of the world. Their values, ethics, ways of dealing with society (much less the CIA) on a day to day basis make them incompatable as accomplices for a new North Korea.
Reply
6:21 pm on October 12th, 2008 10
GERRY:
In total agreement.
IMHO, the best avenue of approach is for the South to flood te North with trained operatives once hostilities began, by our agencies if need be, with the eventual goal of reuniting both countries into “One Korea” and with an end game of letting the South completly take over just as soon as hostilities were brought under a certain level of containability…let Korea take care of Korea and let us leave quietly to a position of overwatch.
Reply
6:23 pm on October 12th, 2008 11
Gaetano once again putting words in my mouth I never said. Is this what they teach you political operatives in DC to do? Keep repeating that someone said something they didn’t say until people believe you?
I never said anyone wanted complete de-Baathfication. State’s Future of Iraq Project Report supported what every government agency supported that de-Baathification would happen but had to be done selectively. Just admit it the State Department supported de-Baathification. You are looking foolish to say otherwise.
The State Department also supported disbanding the Iraqi military which is clearly evident with the fact Bremer a State Dept. guy disbanded the Iraqi Army against the wishes of Jay Garner. Bremer defends his reasoning for doing so in the interview. Once again your argument that State was opposed to dismantling the Iraqi Army is absurd when Bremer a State Dept. guy defends his decision to do so.
Once again I never said Karzai played a more important role in ousting the Taliban the Nothern Alliance. It quite pathetic your repeated attempts to claim I said things I never said. Karzai did play a significant role in fighting the Taliban in southern Afghanistan. The US did not want the Northern Alliance to conduct heavy combat in southern Afghanistan because of the ethnic make up of the Northern Alliance fighters compared to the mainly Pashtun people in the south. That is why Karzai’s mobilizing of people to fight the Taliban in the south was so important.
Exiles from North Korea do not have to come from just the United States either. The majority of exiles are in South Korea and the ROK would be wise to organize and train their defector community but probably won’t because of complaints from NK. That is why it is important to send them overseas to be educated in not just the US but other western countries.
Your statement by Jaafari is once again absurd because the only ones that boycotted the elections in Iraq were the minority Sunnis which would have made no difference to whether Jaafari was Prime Minister or not since he was from the major Shiite party. In the December 2005 elections more Sunnis participated in the election and turnout for the election was at about 70%:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_legislative_election,_December_2005
The turnout for the next Iraqi elections for the Sunnis I am willing to bet is going to be enormous.
Both Afghanistan and Iraq show that exiles can play an important role in reconstructing their countries. Your claims that exiles have no role in reconstructing their countries is contradicted by the overwhelming evidence saying otherwise. Exiles both in Iraq and Afghanistan have been accepted by the internals and no rift between the two have ever been reported.
Since you don’t have reading comprehension let me explain what by “educating them, this group could become the future doctors, teachers, government administrators, essential services operators, etc. in a post-collapse North Korea”, means. North Korea does not have modern medicine capabilities they will need people to come in and train North Koreans in modern medicine. North Korea’s essential services is a joke. They need lots of people to help re-establish the essential services in the country. Why not train North Korean exiles to help with these functions?
And Gaetano since you can’t stop your habit of falsely claiming I said things I didn’t say this thread is now closed to you.
Reply
6:34 pm on October 12th, 2008 12
Gerry & Clamseas,
Has anyone even tried to do anything to organize and educate the North Korean defectors? Most of the defectors are in South Korea where they feel like second class citizens due to the discrimination against them.
With ROK agents completely controlling everything in North Korea you will have the entire north of the country feeling like second class citizens in their own land.
In my opinion the ROK should do everything possible to put as much of a North Korean face on the reconstruction of North Korea as possible instead of flooding the place with ROK operatives and turning the place into one big source of cheap labor for the chaebols with South Koreans calling all the shots. Such a policy is bound to eventually cause animosity with the North Korean population.
Reply
6:58 pm on October 12th, 2008 13
It was a good informative read, but I became fixated on: “The cost would not be great – U.S. forces in Korea, whose mission is to counter the North Korean threat, probably spend more on coffee and pastries.” Weasel speak. Dude, just give us a cost estimate. What does the eating habits of troops have troops have to do with cost the program? Are the troops themselves to fund this program by giving up their coffee?
Reply
8:42 pm on October 12th, 2008 14
GI Korea, Yes, I had a discussion with a group who were in the process of helping North Korean refuges in China survive about a year ago. They mentioned while they believed they were making progress the North Koreans were very difficult to work with. They will tell you anything you like to hear for a reward. If you give them something they demand more. If they can’t get it they will steal it and leave. They are the product of 50 years of poverty and famine and know every trick in the book to get what you have. To them, you are the stupid one for being so gullible. Work with them to build a new Koea until they can take care of themselves? No problem, but first they will need billions of dollars to do so. Then they will all disappear. It will take several generations in a free society before they become adept at living in the same world we do.
Reply
9:06 pm on October 12th, 2008 15
Gerry but who better to work with North Koreans then those who know them best? Do you think South Koreans would better able to work with the North Korean population then North Koreans themselves? Any rebuilding of North Korea will be extremely difficult with many challenges and mistakes. At least if fellow North Koreans are running things the North Korean population cannot completely scapegoat the ROK government.
Many of the defectors are highly uneducated and do not have the work ethic or skills of the average South Korean because of the way they were brought up. They are not all hopeless though.
My battalion had a North Korean refugee come and speak to the officers in the unit and though he needed a translator because he couldn’t speak English, he came off as quite interesting and not a hopeless cause. Why not try and educate those that are not hopeless causes?
Reply
9:19 pm on October 12th, 2008 16
GI Korea/Gerry:
Might sound hash, but the “let us help yourselves, does not work, and has never worked.”
The North is completly incapacitated as a society waiting to break free.
They have been brainwashed, starved, isolated from outside influence and heavily restricted from establishing their own culture/history…tghis isnot some thousand year old civilization, such as Vietnam, etc. From what modern day N. Koreans know…they are the children of Kim Jong Il. Might sound very harsh, but psychologically based, it is true.
This is the reason that I say let the South bring them into the fold once hostilities start and over the generations they will be assimilated into the fold of South Korean culture.
There is no North Korean culture to be salvaged…from what we know, only suffering, survival, etc. let Koreans work it out.
This is a hard road to travel by Judeo-Christian cultures, but we do not have the most glowing track record in the reconstruction of countries.
Reply
9:45 pm on October 12th, 2008 17
GI Korea, Yes, I do believe the South Koreans will be best able to work with the North Koreans. While it will not be a perfect match it is the best avenue of approach. What is involved is the complete deconstruction of the North Korean society over time. 5 years, 10 years? It is a Korean issue and the best outcome will come from the Koreans themselves. The South Koreans are not stupid either, and will use and abuse North Korean leaders for name value and exploitation while the North Korean Leaders will give whatever is required for a fee. Complaints over how the North Koreans were poorly used and underpaid by the south, will come 20 years later in retrospect. And you are correct. It will be extremely difficult and painfull to South Korea as well as the north. The role of the US should be one of aid and support.
Reply
3:02 pm on October 13th, 2008 18
If the short one is now the decomposing tyrant is debateable. However any change is going to have to happen from the inside of North Korea. Until the people know the truth, they won’t do anything for fear of being killed or imprisoned. This will require getting the message of what’s going in the world to the masses.
You should take a look at what information the folks in North Korea get to see everyday. Those of you in South Korea take a look at the Pyongyang Times. They constantly talk about Mr. tiny doing this and that. How can one short idiot make x tons of food? Or be able to produce y megawatts of electric enegry. I read one article back in the 1990’s talking about North Korea inventing the superconductor. Talk about a total fabracation of history, those people once freed are going to need to be re-educated on what really has happened in the world since their Great/Dear Leaders took over.
Since ‘ole tiny Kim has not named someone to take over, if he has passed into the great fire down below, the military and the government will have to make that decision. That person will have to have the backing of the Army to supress any uprisings.
The role of the US and Japan would be a large one, but they must be one of supporting South Korea when the North finally falls. South Korea will need to grow some nads or appear to do so to tell folks what they want the US and Japan to do. The US will likely dispose of any nuclear material and shut down the Youngbyon plant. The US and Japan should supply the food and supplies to help as the South would have a very difficult time figuring out what to do with all of those people. China, doesn’t want the North to fail due to the possible presence of US forces near their border and the possibility of taking care of a boatload of North Koreans as they leave their former country. The US will have to negoiate some sort of treaty to keep the government in China happy.
I do hope that Mr. small man who thinks he’s big, has joined Hitler, Saddam, and his father in Hell.
Reply
7:27 pm on October 14th, 2008 19
I’m with Gerry in the feeling that the North Koreans defectors will be unable to form any “dissident in exile” organization with the aim of taking over the government functions in case of the collapse of the North. When Vietnam fell, the deposed leadership immediately set up a government in exile-type of organization. However, the North Koreans have only formed “support groups” with special interests — ie, education, benefits, aid to North Korea, etc.
As far as I know, there are no POLITICAL organizations — possibly because North Korean hit-squads would be dispatched to kill its leadership immediately. No North Korean defector has stepped forward to try to take the leadership role in trying to become a “dissident in exile” which indicates to me that no one wants to hold that role.
I believe that the North should be handled sort of like Okinawa was handled — in a very general sort of way. If the North fell, the ROK Constitution states that the North and South are one country. Therefore, it could take over its operation as a “protectorate” — under the watchful eye of the United Nations. It could contain the North Korean refugees in the North to keep them from flooding to the South and destroying the ROK economy.
The ROK could shuttle aid — along with the international community — to allow them to survive and start a reeducation program to bring the DPRK populace out of the dark ages. This process may take over a generation. The North has the infrastructure of government – but they have a different philosophy. Once the North’s people have their eyes opened to the truth of the world community around them, the mechanics of government would simply be modified to support a market economy/democracy/modern lifestyles and move away from the juche welfare state idea. Understandably such a technically-backward populace will take a great deal of time to be reeducated. However, if the Chinese are an example of how quickly it can happen, it may not be long — perhaps as little as a decade.
Then when the time is right hold a plebiscite over whether the North wants to join South Korea — or go on its own to remain an independent nation. Let it be there choice. The Okinawans chose the Japanese — and many now regret it — but that was their choice. The same needs to hold true for the North — let it be their choice whether for good or bad.
Reply