I was reading a transcript of a foreign policy debate between the candidates' Asia advisers the other day, and Obama has all of his camp (somewhat unnaturally) parroting the same policy line. They talk at length about the need for (their) skill and flexibility in negotiating concessions to the North, then casually insist on pushing the FTA off of a cliff.

GI Korea — I know the polls give Obama an 8 point lead, but it ain't over until the fat lady sings. The debates are over and most people has made up their minds. It's now just waiting for the final vote count.

But either way the KORUS FTA is in deep trouble.

If Obama is elected, he and the Democratic Congress have already stated that the KORUS FTA is in deep trouble. Obama is on record as opposing the KORUS FTA as "badly flawed," claiming it wouldn't do enough to increase U.S. auto sales and reflects the views of the auto labor unions. Obama has several general concerns with the KORUS FTA: (a) the auto provisions, (b) inadequate labor and environmental provisions, and (c) Korean failure to liberalize rice.

If McCain wins the ROKUS FTA still has a rough row to hoe. Though McCain has endorsed the FTA with Korea and has a strong pro-trade voting record in Congress, he will be facing a Democratically controlled Congress. Though McCain has expressed his strong support for liberal trading rules, many members in Congress don't like the agreement and have little incentive to cooperate with him and give him a success.

Article.II. – The Executive Branch

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur …

The president negotiates but 2/3 of the Senate must ratify. As a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I think Senator Obama is familiar with the current state of the KORUS FTA. I didn't read Senator Obama's statement as one of opposition, not even dissatisfaction, but more of non-satisfaction. He is skeptical.

The UAW is also skeptical:

The Korea trade deal does not contain any guarantees that the U.S. will get substantially increased access to the Korea auto market. Instead, it simply has more toothless promises like those contained in the failed 1995 and 1998 agreements. It is likely that Korea will simply develop new non-tariff barriers in order to still keep its market closed to U.S. built automotive products.

I am not a trade expert, but while the state of the currently negotiated agreement does seem to explicitly address auto trade tariff barriers, there appears to be enough ambiguity to allow the possibility for non-tariff restrictions.

Increased Access for U.S. Autos

• Includes a broad and unprecedented range of focused provisions designed to open up Korea’s auto market to U.S. cars and ensure that U.S. automakers have a fair opportunity to compete in Korea.

• Eliminates Korean tariffs on most U.S. priority passenger vehicles and trucks. Korea has also agreed to overhaul its system for taxing cars based on “engine displacement”, including Special Consumption Tax, the Annual Vehicle Tax, and the Subway/Regional Development Bond. In addition, commits the Korean government not to impose any new engine displacement taxes and to maintain non-discriminatory application of those taxes.

• Korea agrees to address specific auto non-tariff barriers to ensure they do not impede the market access of U.S. autos, and to create an Autos Working Group to serve as an early warning system to address regulatory issues that may develop in the future.

• Korea also agrees not to adopt technical regulations that create unnecessary barriers to trade and to cooperate to harmonize standards.

• Contains innovative expedited dispute settlement process for auto-related measures that violate the FTA, with a full snapback of MFN car tariffs in the case of a violation.

We have learned from experience with previous free trade agreements that there are always loopholes to be exploited.

In the end, I am sure there will be a KORUS FTA. But, as in any negotiation, it is always a good idea to insist on more than you expect to get. Mr. Obama is signaling that before this agreement is ratifiable, you can expect to see many more teeth added to it.