The Hankyoreh’s executive editor Jung-soo Jang writes that there is a power struggle within the Obama administration between the people that want to emphasize the US-Japan alliance and negotiate to end North Korea’s nuclear program and those that just want to give North Korea everything they ask for with little to nothing in return:

The diagnosis offered by some Washington experts on the Korean Peninsula who recently visited South Korea is that feuds and fissures within Obama’s diplomatic team are having a negative effect on foreign policy, including policy toward North Korea. This is the combustion of a conflict in courses between proponents of active negotiations, who are calling for normalization of relations with North Korea as soon as possible, and proponents of managing North Korea’s nuclear program, who are denying the possibility of North Korean denuclearization and calling for controls on nuclear outflows from North Korea and additional extraction of nuclear material. The argument for crisis management on the North Korean nuclear issue is being led by a contingent that emphasizes the U.S.-Japan alliance, including Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg, who is influencing the Obama administration’s Northeast Asia policy, along with Kurt Campbell, the nominee for Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Jeffrey Bader, senior director for Asian affairs on the National Security Council.

On the other hard, experts with progressive or moderate tendencies who advised on diplomatic issues from the periphery during the election are emphasizing active bilateral negotiations between the United States and North Korea, claiming that North Korea could rid itself of the feeling that its system is in danger and ultimately abandon its nuclear weapons if normalization of the two countries’ relations is realized.  [Hankyoreh]

Is it any surprise which side won out?

In the internal power games prior to Obama’s inauguration, the winners were the side emphasizing the U.S.-Japan alliance, including Campbell, who served as Clinton’s foreign policy brain while she was running for president. They won because Clinton was appointed Secretary of State. This seems to have been reflected in the fact that Clinton’s speech at the Asia Society, while it seemed ostensibly to present a comprehensive solution to the North Korean nuclear issue, also adhered to the perspective of management proponents in terms of its content.

Of course the Hankyoreh sides with the side of the debate that wants to give everything to North Korea now with little to nothing in return:

The attitude of the management proponents is, at least externally, that all issues can be discussed, including normalization of relations with North Korea. There can also be talk of a North Korea-U.S. summit. It represents a step forward in negotiation technique from the Bush administration, which limited the items that could be discussed at the negotiations table. There is a strong probability that this negotiation argument will end as negotiation for negotiation’s sake, without any fundamental solution to the problem. This is because there is an underlying calculation in the minds of the management proponents of freezing the North Korean nuclear issue at its current level by maintaining the negotiations in themselves while offering partial concessions in the discussions with North Korea. The history of past negotiations on the North Korean nuclear issue shows that this kind of tactic alone will not solve the issue. Like putting old wine in a new bottle, Secretary of State Clinton is approaching North Korea policy from the unchanged perspective of a simple nuclear issue. It will be interesting to see if she can realize a breakthrough in the deadlocked negotiations on this issue.

So what kind of issue does the Hankyoreh expect the US to approach North Korea with?  What would the Hankyoreh say if the Obama administration suddenly started emphasizing human rights issues with North Korea? I’m sure that is another issue the Hankyoreh would not want the US to approach North Korea with.

Anyway the Hankyoreh’s executive editor is right about one thing, the continuation of the Bill Clinton-George Bush Agreed Framework will not work because it places expectations on the North Koreans to reciprocate by dismantling their nuclear weapons which they have no inkling to do.  The Hankyoreh prefers people like Stephen Bosworth who want to give the North Koreans everything they want with little to nothing in return.

The fact of the matter is that Secretary of State Clinton will  meet frustation and disappontment with dealing with the North Koreans just like everyone else has and the danger in this is that President Obama may then turn to people like Bosworth to give in to the North Koreans while ignoring better options.