By popular demand I have posted the part of the book Survival: How a Culture of Preparedness Can Save You and Your Family from Disasters by former 2nd Infantry Division Commander General Russell Honore’ that describes his take on the 2002 Armored Vehicle Accident:
My command in Korea was gratifying despite the frequent battles over money, but I left there in 2002 with a heavy heart. I though I knew the Korean people. I always respected their culture and traditions. In June of that year, however, two of my soldiers were involved in the accidental deaths of two Korean girls. it quickly escalated into an international incident and had some anti-American Koreans called me a murderer and suggesting that I be tried for what they were calling war crimes against the Korean people.
On June 13, 2002, Shim Mi-son and Shin Hyo-sun, both 13 year old schoolgirls, were walking on a narrow road in rurual Kyonggi Province when they were struck and killed by an armored vehicle that was part of a 2nd Infantry Division convoy. It was a tragic accident in which everything that could go wrong did. The road was too narrow. The girls were walking on the road. The vehicle the soldiers were in had a blind spot to one side. It was the worst of circumstances at the worst of times.
Korea was in the international spotlight that June because of soccer’s World Cup tournament. In addition, the country was transitioning from a culture in which many of the old politicians who had lived through the Korean War and were anti-North were giving away to younger politicians who were more anti-American and pro-North. The younger group wanted to expand the economy by establishing friendly relations with their countrymen on the other side of the DMZ. The accident and the tragic deaths of those thwo young girls became kindling for anti-American forces to try to make a political point. They wanted to get out from under what they perceived as the onerous presence of the United States military.
After the accident I did the same dumb thing that many senior leaders do in a crisis situation. I put my Public Affairs Officer (PAO) out in front. I let a young major be the face and voice of the 2nd Infantry Division’s response to the tragedy. He was a good PAO but it was the worst possible move in that culture. It was completely counter the culture of Korea. There, if you or some you are responsible for does something wrong you should profusely apologize. It doesn’t matter if you were to blame or not. You should be in the apologizing mode. My young PAO was in the explaining mode. The sent the wrong message to the Korean people, which played into the hands of the anti-American minority party and the result was riots and demonstrations throughout the country. By the time I realized my mistake it was too late to make amends. I vowed never to let that happen again. (…………..)
At my change of command at Camp Casey in July 2002 it was raining so hard I could barely read my notes. We had 4,000 troops on the field for the ceremony but about half again as many Koreans were at the front gate protesting the deaths of the two girls and the American presence in the country. We heard them shouting slogans and as I spoke they started trying to get onto the base. I shortened my speech and the assistant division commander had to lead the troops down there to keep the protesters at bay because there were not enough Korean police to control the crowd. That’s a country with thousands of police and only a few were at the front gate of Camp Casey that day.
It was disappointing and hurtful to leave Korea that way, being literally shouted out of the country and reading signs that read “Honore’ Murderer”. I thought the Army’s relationship with South Korea was better than that. We had been there fifty years. We had suffered 33,000 dead and more than 103,000 wounded during the Korean War. Our soldiers made a lot of sacrifices to serve a year’s tour in Korea. It’s such a different culture that Americans almost become isolated inside the country. We share the same space but there’s very little cultural exchange between us and the Koreans. After all these years and all we’ve done for that country and all those people who have gotten rich off the Americans, I don’t remember a single one standing up in our defense.
Honore’ has much more to say about his time in Korea in the book but that is his say on what happened in 2002. I you want to read about what I have to say about what happened in 2002 then I highly recommend everyone read my prior postings on this subject:










8:24 am on May 14th, 2009 1
Thank you for sharing the excerpts. It was interesting to compare his actual text with the Korean quotes and my translations of those quotes. The Korean quotes did not match word for word although they did accurately convey the meaning of his remarks.
8:54 pm on May 14th, 2009 2
Whether he or his PAO officer apologized greatly at the start wouldn't have made a difference.
The fact the Korean media refused to report on the candlelight vigil USFK held with many VIPs from USFK, the US Embassy, and Korean officials proves that. It was a big event that mixed elements of American and Korean mourning customs and paying tribute to the dead. It demonstrated how seriously USFK took the accident — which is why the Korean media didn't want the country to see it.
Apologizing profusely is the smart and customary thing to do in Korea. But, there have been plenty of examples, including ones not related to the US in Korea, that show part of the culture of apologizing is how selective the people can be in accepting or rejecting them.
Apologies do not automatically wipe away an incident.
We can also bring up the West Sea Battle here – which occurred a month or two before the armored vehicle accident – where North Korean patrol boats crossed into South Korean waters and shot up a SK patrol boat killing a half dozen SK sailors and wounding more:
Under pressure from SK and others, NK finally agreed to release a (joint?) statement that simply expressed regret that the incident had happened but also left open the idea that it was South Korea's fault.
It was far from an apology or accepting responsibility, but President Kim Dae Jung was quick to announce it as an apology and called for the subject to be closed. And only a few people in the Korean press voiced outrage about this. The society didn't utter a peep — which wasn't surprising, because they hadn't expressed any rage against NK's actions from the start.
1:15 am on May 15th, 2009 3
I disagree.
The PAO visited the deceases girls' houses daily and that made a huge difference because in spite of their best efforts – the radicals were never able to co-opt the parents.
Video of a grieving mother screaming USFK killed her baby girl would have been the icing on the cake – but that never happened – for the simple fact that MAJ Ono (the 2ID PAO) won them over with his sincerity.
The best the radicals could do was co-opt other relatives of the girls (a few uncles). But that's not the same as the parents.
I was there for all of this – as part of a team the command put together to deal with it.
11:16 am on May 2nd, 2010 4
Thank you for sharing this excerpt. I had the chance to interview the general in 2001 for The Korea Times.
I was here for that very chaotic 2002. I recall that there was an immediate apology issued, but as was the case in the media, the apology was just a blurb in the paper and lost amid all the World Cup hoopla.