By Like I have said before, I would be surprised if Japan goes nuclear, but South Korea that is a different story:
The ruling Grand National Party’s chief policy-maker says the nation should have the right to reprocess nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes.
Representative Kim Sung-joh told a radio program Tuesday that his party supports the reprocessing of spent fuel rods for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
He added that countries worldwide have been using nuclear energy as an inexpensive quality power source for years because it causes less environmental damage than conventional energy sources.
The GNP said that during his talks with U.S. President Barack Obama, President Lee Myung-bak should propose a revision to a South Korea-U.S. atomic energy agreement that bans reprocessing of nuclear fuel.
Under the 1974 accord, South Korea should seek Washington’s agreement if it wants to reprocess spent nuclear fuel. In a 1992 declaration, South Korea also announced it will not seek uranium enrichment or reprocessing facilities. [KBS Global]
11:14 pm on June 16th, 2009 1
I called it:
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0810/p09s01-coop.ht…
2:51 am on June 17th, 2009 2
I've read through the CS Monitor article and can't help but comment on some of the odd assertions and thin arguments present in the piece. Here are just a few that come to my immediate attention:
[On the question of the Sunshine Policy and SK perceptions of NORK]: "To sell this policy to a skeptical electorate, Kim spearheaded a comprehensive propaganda campaign to reconstruct the South's image of the North. This campaign included government censorship and intimidation of those who would criticize North Korea. As a result of this ongoing campaign, South Koreans are now increasingly kept in the dark about the true nature of Pyongyang's gulag state."
Let's cut to the chase here, whatever criticisms one levels at South Korean's over their attitudes towards the North, it goes too far to say that they are "increasingly kept in the dark" about the true nature of the DPRK state. Last time I paged through my copy of the Monthly Chosun there were no shortage of stories delineating how awful a place the DPRK is. This goes without mentioning the fact that even in 2005 when this article was written, provisions in the National Security Law banning individuals from making pro-DPRK laws were still in effect. One would think that if gov't officials during this time were going to pull the hood over the eyes of the South Korean populace as to the true nature of the DPRK, that scotching if not greatly modifying such a law would have been one of the very first things on its agenda.
Here's another statement that I found rather odd:
"The South Korean public must be made to see North Korea for what it is: an evil, totalitarian regime that murders its own people and even today threatens to communize the South."
I have no problem with the majority of the accusations leveled at the North in the sentence expect for the last one. The notion that the DPRK "threatens to communize the South" is patently absurd. This hasn't been the case arguably since around the late 60's. One, the North in an ideological sense holds little sway for the majority of South Koreans. Two, the military balance on the peninsula is heavily skewed toward the South. Third, it's difficult to understand how a country that can barely feed it's people is going to "communize" a country that's awash in food-stuffs. Even for a piece written back in 2005, the authors are clearly peddling some rather dated notions.
[On why South Korea want's nuclear weapons]:
"First, Seoul believes nukes will one day guarantee security for a unified Korea and thereby free it from its traditional dependence on foreign powers. This desire to achieve a self-sufficient security posture was behind Park Chung Hee's US-aborted drive to develop a bomb in the 1970s. It may have also contributed to the recently revealed secret nuclear experiments that "rogue" South Korean scientists undertook as late as in 2000, which has been hushed by Washington to avoid friction with Seoul.
Second, Seoul believes going nuclear would confer it the international prestige that it feels the country deserves for its "miracle" economy but has yet to obtain. Such intangibles loom large in the minds of the fiercely nationalistic Koreans."
As for the first premise, the authors omit a very important factor as to why the Park government in the 1970's began the pursuit of a nuclear options: the pull out of 26,000 US troops. Now, I'm not going to make an argument either for or against the troop pull out in the 1970's. But I will say this, that from the perspective of someone like Park, the action of 26,000 troops leaving signals that ones allies are not so committed. If that be the case, I sure as hell would develop my own nuclear weapons so as to hedge my bets.
In regards to SK's enrichment activities in 2000, it's rather hypocritical for the US and other int'l bodies to be chastising SK for its actions when countries such as Japan can possess tons of plutonium and experiment with oxide fuels for reactors while SK cannot. Moreover, it's difficult to understand why SK's enrichment activities are so problematic but say India's isn't. After all, India wasn't a signatory nation to the NPT, yet the US didn't bat as much as an eyelash when it hammered out a bilateral nuclear arrangement. All this underscore how deeply selective and discriminatory the US is when it comes to the issue of nuclear proliferation and why it has such difficulty in persuading nations such as Iran and the DPRK from eschewing such practices.
As for the issue of nuclear weapons conferring international prestige for South Korea, I won't disagree with that assessment per se. There a many empirical cases that prove their point (i.e. France) That being said, however, I would have liked it if the authors had provided more evidence to substantiate their point for the SK context. Some survey data perhaps, anecdotes, opinions pieces in major dailies or magazines to show that such a notion has an acute hold over the larger SK populace. As of now what they assert is just that, an assertion.
Furthermore, the authors never really specify what they mean by "international prestige". Are they smuggling in the assumption that "international prestige" means military prowess? This is what I glean from their piece. But if this is the operative definition of what constitutes "international prestige" then its a rather narrow one. Nation's can pursue "prestige" through many different ways. When France developed its nuclear capabilities, it was for the expressed purposes of re-achieving its pre-WWII grandeur. On the other hand, there are those nations who eschew the nuclear option under the assumption that "prestige" can be achieved through other means and by adhering to international norms (See Brazil).
12:43 pm on June 17th, 2009 3
Maruyama Masao; the article was written in 2005 – the assertions about being 'kept in the dark' are indeed accurate. As for the rest, Phffffft.
12:54 pm on June 17th, 2009 4
WJC,
What's to brag about? It's old news. South Korea revealed in 2004 that it has a nuclear research program.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Korean_nuclear…