Via One Free Korea comes news of a report released by Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institute.  I have a lot of respect for Mr. O’Hanlon because he does always offer well thought out analysis on the issues he writes about, but in this report I have to strongly disagree with his analysis that the US military should assist in the occupation of North Korea:

The notion that the United States could somehow outsource most of this DPRK stabilization mission to its South Korean ally falls apart the minute one begins to consider the immediate stakes and the long-term strategic nature of some of the challenges listed above—and the possible degree of uncertainty, confusion, and violence that could accompany many collapse scenarios.

If the main task were to simply restore order in North Korea, rather than defeat a combined air-armor offensive by DPRK forces, it might seem logical to defer to Seoul as much as possible. South Korea may have the numerical capacity to handle North Korean stabilization. North Korea is a mid-sized country, slightly smaller than Iraq or Afghanistan demographically. Its population is estimated at just under 25 million. That implies a stabilization force of 500,000. South Korea has that many soldiers in its active Army, and eight million more between its reserves and its paramilitary. Such reassuring arithmetic may help explain DoD’s apparent inclination to view this problem as manageable largely by ROK forces themselves.  [Michael O'Hanlon]

O’Hanlon goes on to explain his support for a US occupation of North Korea this way:

The problem is more complex than a peacekeeping mission, however. To begin, some significant fraction of North Korea’s million-strong army may fight against South Korea even in an apparent collapse scenario. Collapse is likely to imply a contest for power among multiple North Korean factions rather than a literal, complete, and immediate dissolution of authority nationwide. Some significant amount of the South Korean army could therefore be in effect on war footing, fighting from village to village and city to city.

Okay and why would US soldiers fighting from village to village and city to city be better than Korean soldiers that speak the same language and share similar cultures that would better be able to communicate with the North Korean civilian population in these cities and villages?  Mr. O’Hanlon is making one big miscalculation and that is ignoring the regime’s propaganda directed towards its population.  Since the day they were born North Koreans are taught that the South Koreans are nothing more then the puppets of the Imperialist Yankees.  If the big nosed Americans come walking into North Korea with the ROK Army in tow, that would only validate that propaganda and increase the animosity against an occupation by ROK forces.

That is why it is critical that South Korea quickly deploys it’s forces throughout North Korea and implement martial law and immediately begin humanitarian assistance to exert a sense of authority.  It is critical that the South Koreans have to be viewed early on as the legitimate occupiers of North Korea by the North Korean population.  Everything done in the early days of a collapse has to be viewed in the context of building the legitimacy of the South Korean government in the eyes of the North Korean population.  If the South Korean military is not immediately prepared to act the Chinese will.

Here is another reason O’Hanlon gives for wanting US forces in North Korea:

But even for this scenario, the role of American special forces in helping search for nuclear weapons could be quite significant (assuming they could be flown across the ocean quite quickly). They might team up with not only ROK forces, but even an element of a North Korean unit that had possession of the materials and was under siege by larger parts of the DPRK army; Seoul and Washington might strike a deal with any such DPRK unit holding nuclear weapons if that was the only viable way to secure the dangerous materials.

Maybe I could support the deployment of US Special Forces into North Korea for an operation like this, but when you think about it, why can’t ROK Special Forces do this?  Why would it take US forces to do this?

Mr. O’Hanlon goes on:

Due to the importance of stopping DPRK vehicles that could be carrying nuclear materials, it would be crucial to coordinate U.S. and ROK forces to avoid friendly fire incidents and other tragedies. Otherwise, in attempts to stop North Koreans from moving about, allied forces could wind up firing frequently on each other.

Once again if US soldiers are not present in North Korea you would not have to worry about this issue.

This is where O’Hanlon left me totally scratching my head:

Even more crucial would be how to handle coordination with China. If the United States could position some forces in the general theater before the North Korean state truly failed, perhaps on Okinawa, it might be better equipped than the ROK to help secure northern North Korea. With its amphibious and air assault capabilities, the United States might be able to handle such deployments more rapidly than South Korea could.

Is there anyone out there that thinks that the Chinese will just stand by and let a US amphibious & air assault forces land on their border?  Does anyone remember the lessons from the Korean War the last time we tried this?  What if the Chinese military has units that crossed the border to seal it from North Korean refugees trying to cross and these US military soldiers air assaulting in mistakenly fire at them thinking they are North Korean soldiers?  This proposal has wishful thinking written all over it.

Even more perplexing is that O’Hanlon thinks that the US should get the United Nations to issue a resolution legitimizing a US occupation of North Korea:

We would have to know that China was not itself moving into northern North Korea to create a buffer zone and handle humanitarian issues there rather than on its own territory—requiring rapid and clear communications with Beijing at a minimum. Or, to avoid that potentiality, we might have to develop a legal basis—and if not, a U.N. Security Council resolution—explaining why American forces had the right to occupy part of North Korea while Chinese forces did not.

Does anyone think that the Chinese and Russians as well will actually allow this resolution to go through without vetoing it?

Like I said before Michael O’Hanlon does good work, but I think he is off the mark on this issue.  For a better read on what should be done in a post-collapse North Korea I offer these two articles.  The first one from a ROK Army perspective and the second one from a US Army perspective on why the ROK Army is best equipped to occupy North Korea:

The ROK Army’s Role When North Korea Collapses Without A War With the ROK

Finding America’s Role In A Collapsed North Korean State