By GI Korea noted recently South Korea was starting the process of selecting its new Next Generation Fighter for the Air Force.
I did an extensive review (which I no longer have) of the press coverage the last time we went through this process. It was brutal. The amount of savaging the US aerospace giant and plane took vs the coverage of the other companies. One of the other foreign firms got caught in the bribery scandal during the fire storm. The French government got caught trying to influence the selection process at the same time US congressmen and DOD leaders were having to cancel planned trips to Korea under the daily barrage of negative news coverage about American imperialism. (I give the Kim Dae Jung administration credit for being even-handed in its treatment at least in the public eye. )
People easily remember the period of the aftermath of the tragic death of the 2 middle school girls in the summer and winter of 2002. If they look back, they can see the pump was primed for this in part by the massive amount of negative press coverage the last time Korea sought to modernize its fighter fleet in 2001 and early 2002. (And if you look further back you can see how this was triggered by the historic NK-SK Summit of 2000.)
Well, today, I started reading the Korean press again and caught this:
The maintenance cost for Korea’s F-15Ks has jumped nearly 10-fold over the past four years, becoming a financial burden to the nation’s defense budget, multiple sources said Monday.
Seoul has purchased 60 of the high-end multirole aircraft from American aerospace giant Boeing since 2002.
I haven’t been reading the press enough to know if this is the first shot fired, but this will be something to watch in the coming months. Last time was a hoot…
It took delivery of 40 by 2008 and 13 more as of the end of 2011. An F-15K crashed during a night training flight in June 2006 off the east coast, raising doubts over the reliability of the aircraft.
How long has the US been flying this death trap? And in how many wars?
6:50 pm on February 13th, 2012 1
The first F-15A flight was made in July 1972, and the first flight of the two-seat F-15B (formerly TF-15A) trainer was made in July 1973. The first Eagle (F-15B) was delivered in November 1974. In January 1976, the first Eagle destined for a combat squadron was delivered.
The single-seat F-15C and two-seat F-15D models entered the Air Force inventory beginning in 1979. These new models have Production Eagle Package (PEP 2000) improvements, including 2,000 pounds (900 kilograms) of additional internal fuel, provision for carrying exterior conformal fuel tanks and increased maximum takeoff weight of up to 68,000 pounds (30,600 kilograms).
The F-15 Multistage Improvement Program was initiated in February 1983, with the first production MSIP F-15C produced in 1985. Improvements included an upgraded central computer; a Programmable Armament Control Set, allowing for advanced versions of the AIM-7, AIM-9, and AIM-120A missiles; and an expanded Tactical Electronic Warfare System that provides improvements to the ALR-56C radar warning receiver and ALQ-135 countermeasure set. The final 43 included a Hughes APG-70 radar.
F-15C, D and E models were deployed to the Persian Gulf in 1991 in support of Operation Desert Storm where they proved their superior combat capability. F-15C fighters accounted for 34 of the 37 Air Force air-to-air victories. F-15E’s were operated mainly at night, hunting SCUD missile launchers and artillery sites using the LANTIRN system.
They have since been deployed for air expeditionary force deployments and operations Southern Watch (no-fly zone in Southern Iraq), Provide Comfort in Turkey, Allied Force in Bosnia, Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Iraqi Freedom in Iraq.
6:54 pm on February 13th, 2012 2
The F-15K Slam Eagle (Korean: F-15K 슬램 이글) is an advanced derivative of the F-15E, operated by the Republic of Korea Air Force. Several major components for the aircraft were outsourced by Boeing to various Korean companies for local production as part of an offset agreement, wherein Korea will be responsible for 40% of production and 25% of assembly and subassembly of the Slam Eagles. Fuselage and wings are supplied by Korea Aerospace Industries, flight control actuator by Hanwha Corporation, electronic jammer and radar warning receiver by Samsung Thales, Head-up display, airborne communication system, and radar by LIG Nex1, and engines by Samsung Techwin under license before final assembly by Boeing at its St. Louis main facility.
QUESTION: If that much of the aircraft is made by Korean companies, can anybody really blame Boeing for any faults found in the aircraft?
8:39 pm on February 13th, 2012 3
“How long has the US been flying this death trap? And in how many wars?”
You will have to qualify the death trap remark. The airframe has performed exceptionally well for nearly 40 years. There are a large number of those frames still flying today with numerous nations. I’d be interested in an accident matchup between other airframes. If you have 10 accidents in 5 years but 1000 aircraft in service versus 5 accidents for 200 of say a Mirage the numbers can be deceiving but the statistics should win out.
If memory servers correct the first ROKAF crash was pilot error, one of the other ones due to improper engine maintenance procedures. I also remember them towing one into the side of hangar.
The 10 fold maintenace cost jump is surprising but the aircraft are now 10 years old some of that is to be expected. Since many of the parts are custom made for the Korean version I imagine they have run out of the initial supply from the original contract. Other than that I would be interested in the particulars.
8:41 pm on February 13th, 2012 4
The outsourcing was one of the angles of attack by the media during the last selection process: That the stingy, imperialist Americans were unwilling to share technology with local contractors and allow Korean workers to benefit from the huge project like the Russians and Euros were willing to do.
8:44 pm on February 13th, 2012 5
Hamilton,
I was being facetious.
12:17 am on February 14th, 2012 6
I agree with not sharing technology if it can be helped. Unless it is old outdated technology that is useless to us lol!
12:22 am on February 14th, 2012 7
I can actually understand the Korean government making an issue of this during the selection/negotiating process: If the Russians and Euros were willing to share it and give more production over to the Korean economy, I can see how it could factor into the bids.
3:42 am on February 14th, 2012 8
“QUESTION: If that much of the aircraft is made by Korean companies, can anybody really blame Boeing for any faults found in the aircraft?”
Yes you can. Most of the spare parts necessary for the plane to actually fly after being built are not locally produced in Korea. It would be hard to miss that fact if you read the part about PBL in the article properly.
The Korean defense industry’s aircraft overhaul and maintenance capability is often top-notch and very efficient; Korean Air performed and still performs high, extensive, and complex level of such overhaul and maintenance programs on hundreds of both USAF F-15 and F-16s. Not just historically, but also very recently. If given the proper and timely delivery of spare parts and components, or the license to locally build them, the Korean defense industry will not fail to let anything fly safe and well.
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/09/27/2011092700769.html
http://www.f-16.net/news_article2475.html
I mostly agree with the article’s opinion that the maintenance problem with F-15K largely lies with Boeing’s slow and overpriced delivery of spare parts.
4:43 am on February 14th, 2012 9
I have no idea about plane maintenance, but if they kept that fleet of F-4s in the air for so long…
6:49 am on February 14th, 2012 10
#9
I do know something about aircraft maintenance and I might be able to explain some of the difference.
The main difference between maintaining an F-4 and an F-15 could be compared to the difference between maintaining 1960s to post 1990s era car. While the older model cars could be repaired with a standard tool set, multimeter, timing light and mostly off the self or fabricated parts, the newer cars were infused with sensors and controllers requiring computerized diagnostic equipment and manufacturer proprietary parts for repairs.
I worked avionics in the 70s and 80s. Most of that was with F-4 aircraft. I never worked directly on F-15s because they used a different avionics maintenance concept than F-4s. F-15s, F-16s and even back to the F-111 had an Integrated Avionics (IA) system. In such systems, all the avionics were tied to centralized computer busses. At some of the bases I was assigned our shop was next to an IA shop and I sometimes went over to assist. The main difference between their level of repair and the level of repairs we did in the standard avionics shops at the time was they had almost no authorization or capability to repair the internals of components they removed from the aircraft. A receiver/transmitter they brought into the shop was basically a black box to them. They hooked it up to a test station, verified whether it was or was not working properly and if it were bad, shipped it off back to the manufacturer for repair while they repaired the aircraft with an off the shelf spare. So, if the turn around wasn’t fast enough they could run out of off the shelf spares before enough replacements came back from the manufacture.
On the F-4 side, and it’s probably still this way with ROKAF F-4s today, you could repair almost all the components in a shop on base, down to the smallest components. F-4 avionics still had and maybe still has circuitry where you could replace surface mounted resistors, capacitors and transistors. These older components failed more often than the more modern solid state circuitry but you could more often find the parts you needed to make the repairs in the local bench stock.
The Integrated Avionics concept was sold by the manufacturers as a more simplified and efficient maintenance concept but it was heavily based on a logistics supply chain that sometimes couldn’t keep up.
I am only pointing out differences from the avionics points of view but I am sure some of the same issues applied to other aircraft systems like engines and flight controls.
8:38 am on February 14th, 2012 11
Since US-maintained F-15s are not having the same problems, one might assume the problems are with a) supply chain, b) maintainer training, c) sabotage, or d) some combination of the above…
I think a would be the easiest to check. b and c might be related to attitude of the trainers and maintainers vis-avis the USA and the DPRK.
Frankly, I would tend to start replacing General Officers until the staff figured out how to do their job right…
12:14 pm on February 14th, 2012 12
Several hundreds of USAF’s own F-15, some even coming from units in other regions specifically to receive Korean after service, are maintained and overhauled to their top condition by Korean engineers and servicemen who have enough spare and refurbished parts to do their work. And actually at the moment the F-15K still have higher flyable rate than the older USAF F-15s.
3:07 pm on February 14th, 2012 13
Well, K, assuming you are correct (and I have no cause to doubt your statements), you should get the published article referenced above corrected…
5:28 pm on February 14th, 2012 14
What the KoreaTimes article tries to say isn’t actually wrong. there’s appears to be a problem with the supply chain from the Boeing side that adversely affect the F-15K’s mission capable rate, and to address that some solutions like PBL needs to be implemented to financially compel Boeing to meet its obligation. ROKAF’s older jet like KF-16 (which is actually more complex than F-15 flight control-wise) is in a lot better flyable condition than the newer F-15K despite its greater age because Korea can locally produce their spare parts or cannibalize them. If ROKAF just had enough spare parts on hand from the suppliers there wouldn’t be a lot of problems with its planes’ maintenance. The problem does not lie with crew skill or work quality.
Related article: http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/01/116_103849.html