A Republic of Korea (ROK) Marine helps undo the safety harness from a Marine assigned to the 3D Marine Logistics Battalion from Okinawa, Japan, after rappelling from a tower during training with the ROK Marines at the ROK Mountain Warfare Training Center. The 3D Marine Logistics Battalion is in Korea to participate in Key Resolve/Foal Eagle 2010. Exercise Freedom Banner involves the movement of U.S. Marine Corps equipment on Maritime Propositioning Force ships and is part of Exercise Foal Eagle. Key Resolve is primarily a command-post exercise with computer-based simulations. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Bobbie G. Attaway

Via IMCOM-Korea.

Joint military exercise: A Korean Marine, left, bumps fists with a U.S. Marine during a joint drill by South Korean and U.S. troops in Pohang, North Gyeongsang Province, Tuesday. South Korea and the United States kicked off their 10-day annual Key Resolve/Foal Eagle exercises Monday. / Korea Times Photo by Shin Sang-soon

It is extremely important to note that while the South Korean military is highly capable of combating a traditional conventional forces threat from North Korea, it is still heavily dependent on the capabilities of the U.S. military to deter and defeat the highly evolved North Korean asymmetric threat. The North Korean military threat of 2010 is not the same as that of 1990 against which South Korea has been so well prepared to defend. While high-ranking American officials have stated that the U.S. can support its ally with “bridging capabilities,” in reality, the best bridging capability would be to continue the command relationship that has proven to successfully deter the DPRK for so many years. By postponing the change in Wartime Operational Control (OpCon) until the ROK military has sufficiently achieved the necessary acquisition, training, personnel upgrades and transformation, the United States would be safeguarding the security and stability of its most loyal ally in East Asia.

I have to respectfully disagree with Mr. Bechtol.  How is the US military best equipped to deal with the asymmetric threat from North Korea?  In the opening of any hostilities the North Koreans using their special operations forces disguised in ROK Army uniforms as well as civilian clothes will likely be wreaking havoc on population centers in South Korea  order to clog the roads with vehicles and evacuees in order to stop the ROK military’s ability to quickly move armored forces and other vehicles.

Due to the chaos the North Koreans will cause there is going to be much friendly fire incidents and the killing of civilians.  In such chaos how are American soldiers with no linguistic ability the best suited to deal with this? The Korean War should be a good indication of what happens when you throw US soldiers into such chaos.  Furthermore why isn’t a ROK Army general better suited to command forces in such a chaotic situation plus deal with the blow back that is sure to come after wards due to the killing of civilians?

Bechtol also stresses that delaying operational control will give the ROK government more time to acquire needed technology to properly address the responsibility they are taking on.  Seeing the Korean government’s delay games over the years in regards to the relocation of Yongsan Garrison, does anyone doubt such delay games would continue with this issue as well?  The ROK government receives a huge defense discount due to the capabilities that the US military provides for them.  The 2012 deadline that is at least forcing them to acquire some of the technology the US military currently provides for them.  If this deadline is dropped it was just give the Korean government an excuse to not continue to move forward with taking over responsibilities currently handled by the US military.

Personally I would not be surprised to see the operational control deadline delayed considering reports have already been leaked that President Obama has agreed to do this in exchange for ROK military support in Afghanistan.  That is why I have continued to maintain, the hand over of operational control is something I will need to see to believe.

________________________________________________________

Note: I tried to find a link to the article itself on The Asia Foundation website but was unable to find it.  However, you can read the full report below and whenever a link is available I will include it.

THE U.S. AND SOUTH KOREA: CHALLENGES AND REMEDIES FOR WARTIME OPERATIONAL CONTROL

Bruce E. Bechtol Jr.
The Center for US-KoreaPolicy

The Asia Foundation
March 2010 – Vol. 2, No. 3

According to an agreement signed by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and South Korean Defense Minister Kim Jang-soo in 2007, the United States and the Republic of Korea have formally agreed that Combined Forces Command (CFC) will be dissolved by April 17th of 2012. Some political scientists—largely individuals without military experience in the United States, and certainly many academics and politicians on the left in South Korea—have hailed the move as “necessary” and useful. In addition, most of these same individuals have repeatedly simplified these complicated issues by asserting it will simply be a matter of the ROK military buying a lot of equipment and the U.S. maintaining its status as an ally, albeit in more of a supportive role. The official position of the United States government supports this assertion.

The majority of conservatives in South Korea do not support this position and have very real concerns about national security issues directly related to the planned dissolution of CFC. Meanwhile, most Americans do not understand even the basic infrastructure of CFC, nor are they aware of the complications associated with its disestablishment. In recent months in Korea, many respected scholars, politicians, and retired military officers have voiced concerns associated with this complete and unprecedented change in command relationships. But before addressing what South Korea’s military needs to do if it is to assume a separate wartime command structure by 2012, one must first address the threat that the South will face from North Korea.

The threat from North Korea’s military has not subsided, despite the overwhelming resource constraints Pyongyang has faced since the early 1990s (a better term to use when addressing what has occurred in North Korea’s military forces would be “evolved”). In fact, as North Korea’s capability to mount a large invasion built around armor and mechanized forces and supported by aircraft declined during the 1990s due to losses in fuel and foodstuffs that simply could not be replaced, Kim Jong-il focused his efforts on the build-up of asymmetric forces. These forces include short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) that now number at least 600 Scuds, and other shorter, more accurate missiles (such as the North Korean version of the old Soviet SS-21), long-range artillery, much of which was moved close to the demilitarized zone (DMZ) during the late 1990s, and special operations forces (now estimated to number up to 180,000 men by the ROK Ministry of National Defense) that can create havoc in the South using unconventional warfare. North Korea continues to extensively develop and enhance these capabilities. Most recently, unusual live-fire exercises were conducted on the west coast (north of Pyongyang) utilizing some of the exact long-range artillery systems that would be used to target Seoul in time of war.

By focusing resources on asymmetric forces, North Korea has maintained its capability to threaten the South, and has also continued to maintain its belligerent and uncooperative foreign policy—a policy that shows no signs of changing. It is this asymmetric threat to the South that the U.S. government currently seems to underestimate when addressing the needed capabilities of its military ally, South Korea. The U.S. Director of National Intelligence Congressional testimony from February 3, 2010, clearly demonstrates just how much the North Korean non-nuclear threat is being downplayed. What makes the North’s non-nuclear forces even more ominous is the fact that once they have created confusion and casualties potentially in the hundreds of thousands (many of them civilians) in the early hours and days of a potential war, this confusion could lead to weaknesses in South Korean defenses that could be exploited by North Korea’s less capable but still extremely large and potentially dangerous maneuver forces such as mechanized infantry and armor. North Korea’s maneuver forces have undergone reorganization and disposition changes since 2006 that have enhanced their capability to threaten the South.

It is because of this evolved North Korean threat that the ROK military faces challenges they will unlikely overcome by 2012. South Korea will not have the needed command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems online and operational by 2012 in terms of acquisition, training, or even probable integration with U.S. systems. The same applies when it comes to airpower. The ROK Air Force continues to focus on improving its attack and air-to-air interdiction capability but must radically upgrade the airlift capability of elite airborne units if it is to truly take the fight to the North in any potential conflict. Finally, the ROK government simply does not have the ballistic missile defense capability to protect its military bases and population centers. The missiles Pyongyang holds in its growing arsenal can presently do damage to important nodes in the ROK that 15 years ago would have been more threatened by North Korea’s now declined but still dangerous conventional maneuver forces capability. While realistic (though costly) steps can be taken to answer this threat, it will be nearly impossible to complete them within the next five years.

It is extremely important to note that while the South Korean military is highly capable of combating a traditional conventional forces threat from North Korea, it is still heavily dependent on the capabilities of the U.S. military to deter and defeat the highly evolved North Korean asymmetric threat. The North Korean military threat of 2010 is not the same as that of 1990 against which South Korea has been so well prepared to defend. While high-ranking American officials have stated that the U.S. can support its ally with “bridging capabilities,” in reality, the best bridging capability would be to continue the command relationship that has proven to successfully deter the DPRK for so many years. By postponing the change in Wartime Operational Control (OpCon) until the ROK military has sufficiently achieved the necessary acquisition, training, personnel upgrades and transformation, the United States would be safeguarding the security and stability of its most loyal ally in East Asia.

Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. is Professor of International Relations at Marine Corps Command and Staff College.  Dr. Bechtol will serve as a roundtable presenter at a symposium on OpCon Transfer and Its Implications for the U.S.-ROK Alliance, co-hosted by The Asia Foundation’s Center for U.S. Korea-Policy and The Maureen & Mike Mansfield Foundation on March 25, 2010, in Washington DC.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, the Marine Corps University, or the United States Government.

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Wednesday said American ground forces may be unable to arrive in South Korea in time for an emergency in North Korea. Gates was speaking at the House Armed Services Committee when asked when U.S. ground forces could be fully ready for another battle in case of an emergency in North Korea following the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq and deployment of forces to Afghanistan.

Gates told the committee that under present circumstances, U.S. ground troops would not be able to arrive in South Korea on the timeline required by the Korea-U.S. contingency plan. “It’s just that they wouldn’t get there as quickly because of the commitments that we have in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Gates said. “That’s not to say they wouldn’t get there.” He added that the U.S. would instead be dependent on the Navy and Air Force before ground troops arrive.  [Chosun Ilbo]

This is actually a good thing because as I have been saying for years, the ROK Army is strong enough to defend the peninsula itself with the assistance of US Naval and Air Force assets.  Plus IMO the US shouldn’t be committing hundreds of thousands of soldiers to occupy North Korea for a variety of reasons I have listed before.

Rear Adm. Peter Gumataotao, Commander, U. S. Naval Forces Korea, presented a Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal to Cmdr. Duk Cho, Director of the Republic of Korea Naval Academy Museum, for Cho’s participation in the Officer Exchange Program to the U.S. Naval Academy.

“I am honored to be receiving a medal for having done what I was given to do,” said Cho. “I was glad to have been able to teach Korean culture and tradition to cadets.”

Cho participated in the Officer Exchange Program from July 2007 to July 2009, teaching American Naval History at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Md. The Officer Exchange Program began in 1993, under which eight Korean officers and six American officers have taught in the partnering schools. Cho was the seventh officer from Korea to teach at the U.S. Naval Academy.

“One of the best U.S. Navy mottos I found was spoken by Capt. James Lawrence, who commanded the USS Chesapeake during the War of 1812,” said Cho.  “His last order before the ship sank was ‘Don’t give up the ship!’  I asked my students what other things that ‘D.G.U.T.S’ could mean.  The most impressive answer was ‘Diversity gives us the strength,’ which I think was a very telling answer.”  [USFK Website]

Foreign instructor are always interesting to receive classes and training from simply because of the different perspective on things that they bring.

I finally transferred the photos from the CD to the webpage. The photos number over 240 and are on a separate page from the 1952 chronicles. All the photos are in color. The new page is at Robert Evilsizor’s Photos.

The reason these photos are so important is that they can trace the continuity of the area’s history from then (1952) till now. The following photos below span over 60 years. The first photo is from the Robert Evilsizor collection and plainly shows the railspur crossing with Hill 170 (where the Main Gate is now) off in the distance in 1952. Notice that there was no village or shanty town in existence then — only the choga-chip homes of the original farmers. The shanty town of Chicol-ni sprouted up in 1953. The road was carved out from rice paddies and built up with a steep drop off on both sides. Even today, this explains why Shinjang Mall is elevated and all the other markets slope off from it.

Railspur from the Kyongbu Railway that leads to the Bravo Gate area. The road crosses the spur and heads to base. Hill 170 to right. (1952) (Robert Evisizor)

The second photo is from Bob Jones in 1964. The coolies used the area then to wait for business. In the 1960s, there were two forms of cargo delivery in Songtan — pony-drawn carts and coolie laborers. At that time, the coolies carried massive loads on their backs using the Choge (A-frame carrier).

A-Frame Corner at Rail Spur (1964) (Bob Jones)

The next photos are ones I took at different times of the same spot in 2009 with the little clothes shop on the corner. The road next to the railspur was resurfaced (macadam) and theun upgraded to bricks to give the mall a more “attractive” look befitting an “international shopping mall.” Further down, the railspur has been turned into flower gardens.
Shinjang Mall Rail Spur looking North (2009) (Kalani O’Sullivan) — Rail has been inactive for over thirty years, but rail right of way retained as a “contingency.”

Shinjang Mall Rail Spur (29 Mar 2009) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

Rails being “upgraded” to fit image of a Shopping Mall (Sep 2009) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

The second set of photos is of the Main Gate area. The first two photos are from Robert Evilsizor’s 1952 collection. The main gate area was the road and a few choga-chip (mudwattle houses) at the base of Hill 170. The shanties would spread from the “main gate” area out towards Milwal-dong and into the Shinjang-2 dong area in 1953 as many Koreans flocked to Osan-ni AB to seek work. The “main gate” then was nothing more than a box for a ROK Army guard in 1952.

Road from base leading to MSR-1. Notice that no shanties or any buildings have been built yet. The shanty town of Chikol-ni has not started. Notice how the road was built up. To this day, the Shinjang Mall area buildings slope away from the main road. The road continued down between Hobak Hill (left) and Jwadong hill (right) across the Kyongbu railroad where it joined the MSR-1 (Main Supply Route 1) that is now called Tanhyeon Road. (1952) (Robert Evilsizor)

ROK guards along road to base. ROK Army was responsible for the perimeter defense of the base. In 1952, this box structure was the “main gate.” (1952) (Robert Evilsizor)

Outside the Main Gate in Chicol-ni (1958) (Unknown)

Only one road in and out of base. Alleyways opened to the side of the main road to access the market place and living areas of Chicol-ni. USAF and ROKAF security police man the main gate. (1959) (Ed Stirling)

Notice that the road to the Bravo Gate had not been cut yet. This would occur in the late 1970s when the base ceded the land back to the ROK to create the road. The town was still called Chicol-ni, though the businesses called it Songtan. (1964) (Bob Jones)

Road leading to MSR-1 (1965) (Harry Tezlaf)

Main street outside of Main Gate (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger)

Main street to MSR-1 with Hanil Church at end (1977) (Unknown: Courtesy 51st FW Historian)

A new gate shack but nothing else changed. (1988) (Frank Scheirer)

New Main Gate edifice built along with a similar structure at the Doolittle Gate. Big edifice, but the gate shack remained about the same size. In the 1980s, Songtan Eup (district) became Songtan-shi (city) and Chicol-ni faded from memory. In 1992, Songtan City was incorporated into Pyeongtaek City and it reverted downward as a sub-unit of Pyeongtaek City — much to the displeasure of many lifelong Songtan residents. Songtan started being promoted by the national government as a “special tourism zone” to placate the dissent. (2001) (Unknown)

Main Gate (2001) (Curley Knepp) — After 9/11, the ROK National Riot Police were stationed permanently outside the gates primarily for anti-American protest control. In addition, barricades were erected to prevent anyone from “running the gate.” Tire shredders were added so no one could “run the gate” from the exit side. Later, automatic anti-terrorist barricades were installed.

Shinjang Mall closed off to vehicular traffic. (2001) (Curley Knepp)

After 7 pm when the shops start closing, the Shinjang Mall turns into a bar row. (2005) (Unknown)

Shinjang Mall from Main Gate (29 Mar 2009) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

South Korea and the United States are discussing a plan to draw up “defense guidelines” next year in a bid to upgrade bilateral defense cooperation, according to defense and foreign ministry officials Wednesday.

The guidelines, similar to the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines established in 1996, would include key measures to strengthen military cooperation between the two, they said.

Among the topics are U.S. reinforcement plans in case of a war on the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. nuclear umbrella for South Korea and the stable presence of U.S. forces in Korea.

“The defense guidelines will be part of follow-up measures to materialize the Korea-U.S. alliance joint vision adopted at the summit between Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama,” an official at the Ministry of National Defense said. “The guidelines will include a comprehensive package of measures on how the two nations are to cooperate in the event of war on the peninsula.”

In the summit meeting in Washington, D.C., Obama said the U.S. government would provide an extended nuclear umbrella to South Korea in response to increasing nuclear threats from the North.

Lee and Obama adopted a “joint vision for the ROK-US alliance” that calls for building a broader, strategic partnership in the realms of politics, economy, culture and other areas beyond the security arena.

In the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in Seoul, Oct. 22, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates confirmed the increased defense cooperation with South Korea. In a joint communique issued at the end of the annual meeting, Gates reaffirmed “the U.S. commitment to provide extended deterrence for the ROK, using the full range of military capabilities, to include the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional strike and missile defense capabilities.”  [Korea Times]

Read the rest but the only thing I found of interest was what was left out, which is the fact that nothing was mentioned about what the alliance’s role would be in the case of North Korean regime collapse.  This possibility is more likely to happen than a war breaking out on the peninsula.

The latest currency reevaluation issue is only further driving home the point of how unstable the regime currently is.

South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and U.S. President Barack Obama urged North Korea Thursday to immediately return to nuclear negotiations, vowing joint efforts to fully denuclearize the communist nation under a package deal.

In a joint press conference after their summit, Obama announced that Stephen Bosworth, special U.S. representative for North Korea policy, will visit Pyongyang on Dec. 8 for bilateral talks as part of such efforts.

The leaders agreed to the so-called “grand bargain,” Lee said, which was first proposed by the South Korean president in a bid to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program in one single step rather than in phases.

“We two leaders completely agreed on the need to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue in one single step as I proposed under a grand bargain, and agreed to discuss how to pursue that goal in close consultations,” Lee said at the joint press conference.

The South Korean president said there was no set timeframe for the denuclearization of the communist North, but that the proposed grand bargain seeks to do so at the earliest date possible.  (……….)

The two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to move forward on the bilateral free trade agreement (FTA), signed over two years ago but yet to be ratified. U.S. trade officials have insisted South Korea needs to concede more in the auto sector where the trade balance leans heavily in Seoul’s favor.  [Yonhap]

As I expected not a whole lot came out of this visit.

As I said before there is little that the President can do on the FTA due to the labor union’s being part of the Democratic political base.

Stephen Bosworth’s trip to North Korea has long been in the planning process and is nothing new.  Both Lee and Obama know the North Koreans are not going to denuclearize for a variety of reasons and the “Grand Bargain” talk is just good politics because it shows that the leaders are trying to provide constructive options for the North Koreans, but they are refusing to take it.

What the North Koreans want is a grand bargain where they need to give little to nothing in return.  Past grand bargains such as both Agreed Frameworks did not have good protocols to ensure that the North Koreans were not cheating on the agreement.  The Bush administration originally resisted such an agreement, but then gave in to a smoke and mirrors verification protocol in order to get a deal done in order to make it look like they had some kind of foreign policy success.  Such a policy was doomed to failure and in due time it did fail.

So far President Obama has resisted the urge to his credit to come up with his own smoke and mirrors verification protocol in order to cut a deal with North Korea in order to get this issue to go away for a while.  However, the President is surrounded by people such as Stephen Bosworth who’s past statements clearly indicate he is more then open to the idea of paying off the North Koreans for little to nothing in return.

So all in all a nice 24 hour visit to South Korea, but nothing ground breaking coming out of it.

PS: I wonder if anyone in South Korea tried to get President Obama to wear a hanbok? 

South Korea and the U.S. have completed an operational plan that envisages military responses to six types of emergencies in North Korea including regime collapse, a government source said Sunday.

The source said the two sides will continue to complement and develop the plan.

In 1999, during the Kim Dae-jung administration, the South Korean and U.S. militaries gave shape to the contingency plan, but it was then billed as a “concept plan” and envisaged five scenarios — a civil war caused by a transition of power or a coup after North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s death; theft and sale abroad of WMD including nuclear, missile and biochemical weapons, by an insurgent army; a mass exodus; massive natural disaster; and the kidnapping of South Korean citizens.

The plan included no details on troop mobilization and deployment. During the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the two militaries discussed ways to turn it into an “operational plan,” but Cheong Wa Dae slammed the brakes on the idea since it feared the plan infringed on South Korea’s sovereignty.

But reports that Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in August last year brought fresh impetus to the plan, and “Operational Plan (OPLAN) 5029″ was completed after about a year of consultations.  [Chosun Ilbo]

The Korean government for their part is saying that none of this is true:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff on Sunday denied the plan has been completed. “Media reports that OPLAN 5029 has been completed are unfounded. We deeply regret that a secret military operations plan has been reported,” it said in a statement.

I find that hard to believe considering that USFK Commander General Walter Sharp had this to say just last week in regards to collapse scenarioes in North Korea:

The commander of U.S. forces in South Korea says the U.S. will continue to lead major operations even after South Korea regains its wartime operational command from the U.S. in April 2012.

During an international forum held in Seoul Friday, General Walter Sharp said U.S. forces will lead operations on removing North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and amphibious assaults even after the wartime operations command transfer is finalized.  [KBS Global]

What is going on is that the ROK government is probably slowing leaking this info out as a trial balloon to see what the public reaction will be.  So far the reaction has been pretty muted, which means we will probably hear more details about this plan in the coming weeks.  From what I am reading so far I am not liking it.

The effort to develop an updated OPLAN has been going on for years, but was long delayed by the prior Korean government.  OPLAN 5029 last came up back in 2006 and the then South Korean Roh Moo-hyun government did not want to do any real planning for fear of angering North Korea.  The South Korean reluctance to plan for the internal collapse of North Korea, something that is more likely to happen then a second Korean War, was a perfect example of ideology compromising the national security of the nation. A collapse of North Korea with no contingency plan between South Korea and the US would make the occupation planning before Operation Iraqi Freedom look like the second coming of the Marshall Plan.  So both sides compromised and came up with a plan that really didn’t plan for much of anything other then securing weapons of mass destruction and the handling of refugees if the regime collapsed.

Will the PLA intervene in North Korea if the US deploys troops there after a collapse?

This current OPLAN announcement appears to just be building off the CONPLAN with the US once again responsible for securing WMD sites.  First of all, why do US troops have to be used to enter North Korea to conduct such as mission?  How are US troops being used to infiltrate in North Korea to secure WMD sites more effective than using ROK Army special forces troops?   I have long maintained that no US troops should move into North Korea if the regime collapsed, which has put my views at odds with people I respect such as John Bolton and Nicholas Eberstadt.

I have said this repeatedly, but I will say it yet again, if US forces moved into North Korea if the regime collapsed, that would be an excuse for the Chinese to move in. The Chinese want to keep the North Korean buffer state along their border and will not willingly go along and give it up if they can help it. That is why I have always believed that if the ROK Army was prepared to execute an immediate occupation of North Korea if the regime collapsed.  This would cause China to have a harder time legitimizing any invasion of North Korea with their own forces if the ROK Army is already moving in to stabilize the situation without the assistance of US forces.

US forces moving into North Korea would only legitimize any Chinese action into North Korea plus cause a host of other issues such as causing the North Korean population to question the legitimacy of the South Korean government.  North Koreans have been brought up since the day they were born that the South Koreans are just puppets of the Americans and any US occupation force into North Korea would only confirm this in the minds of North Koreans.  It will be imperative after any regime collapse to establish the legitimacy of the South Korean government with the people of North Korea and any US or Chinese intervention force will greatly compromise this.

Who will provide basic services for the people of North Korea?

Secondly, securing WMD sites is extremely important, but as the U.S. military’s experience in Iraq has taught us, providing for security, the rule of law, and government
services immediately after a conflict is even more essential. Who will stop the inevitable looting that will begin after a regime collapse? Who will prevent North Koreans from taking revenge against regime security forces and others who had oppressed them? The Koreans rely on government food rations, if the regime collapses, who will provide food for the country’s 23 million citizens? Several infectious diseases—scarlet fever, measles, typhoid, paratyphoid, and typhus—are reportedly spreading inside North Korea now. Who will enforce quarantines and treat the sick? Who will establish law and order in a country filled with small arms and explosives? Who will stand up a government that the citizens of North Korea will accept after a collapse?  These are just a few of the host of issues that needs indepth city by city planning to address.

Any occupation of North Korea will not be easy even with detailed planning.  The 60 years of indoctrination that has brainwashed the population against the outside world and has left the country with a shattered economy will make any occupation of North Korea extremely challenging.  However, detailed planning in the event of a North Korean regime collapse will at least contain an extremely dangerous situation from turning into an international crisis and a possible stand off between the United States and China.

Here is some further reading on this issue:

• OPLAN 5029 Risks Ceding South Korean Sovereignty to the US [Hankyoreh]
• Time for Dialogue, Not OPLAN 5029 [Hankyoreh]
• Don’t Let Contingency Scenario Become Self Fulfilling Prophesy [Korea Times]
• Contingency Plan [Korea Herald]

South Korean President Lee Myung-bak said Saturday his country will consider deploying peacekeeping troops to Afghanistan in response to a U.S. proposal at summit talks early this week.

Lee said his U.S. counterpart, President Barack Obama, asked him to send troops to the war-torn country, according to Park Sun-young, spokeswoman of the minor opposition Liberty Forward Party. His remarks came at a meeting earlier in the day in which he briefed the country’s political leaders on the outcome of the summit talks held last Tuesday.

The leader of the ruling Grand National Party, Park Hee-tae, and the head of LFP, Rep. Lee Hoi-chang, were invited to the meeting. Lee returned home Thursday after a three-day visit to Washington, where he also met with U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for discussions on the North Korea nuclear issue. “Dispatching combat troops may be impossible, but we can consider sending peacekeeping forces to Afghanistan,” he was quoted as saying. South Korea withdrew its 200-strong team of medics and engineers from Afghanistan in 2007, ending several years of deployment under the U.S.-led war against terrorism.  [Joong Ang Ilbo]

This issue could be a cause the Korean left could use to moblize against Lee Myung-bak if he does decide to deploy troops.  I have been saying this for a while but there should be no Korean troops sent to Afghanistan for reasons I have outlined before. Doesn’t the US have enough allies doing little or nothing in Afghanistan, why add more?

Probably more troubling than this news is that also in the article it is stated that President Obama agreed that the war time control hand over could be delayed.  Like I have continued to maintain, the hand over of operational control is something I will need to see to believe.  Just like I will have to see Yongsan Garrison relocated with my own eyes before I believe it because those of us with long experiences in Korea know about the Korean governmental delay games all to well.